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ABSTRACT 
This study addresses a gap in the literature on the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) national security. 
It establishes a reference for further research into the analysis of national security of similar 
countries to the UAE based on established international relations theory.  
The UAE, since its establishment in 1971, has gone through exponential development and changes 
in terms of its politics, economics and social structures. However, attempts to develop a 
comprehensive approach to analysing the various aspects of maintaining the country’s existence 
are scarce. Any research focuses on narrow specific areas.  
This research analyses the UAE’s national security by using the most relevant analytical 
framework based on Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis from the Copenhagen School of 
International Relations. The threats to the UAE’s impeding national security threats are addressed 
using the various elements in the hypothesis. These elements are the ‘idea of state’ which 
concentrates on the country’s state formation, the institutional framework of the UAE, and the 
structure of its physical base. Importantly, due to the dynamic interdependency of these elements, 
a threat to one can create a threat to the other elements. 
The researcher establishes a framework for the analysis of national security, which; because of the 
similarity of the political, economic and social base of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia), can be used to analyse their national 
security systems. Furthermore, the researcher addresses the requirement for further exploration of 
the interdependencies between the three elements composing the state and the need for a coherent 
approach in addressing those threats.  
The study is structured in five parts. Chapter one highlights the research’s introductory material. 
Chapter two explores the theories of national security of the major schools of international 
relations theories, while chapter three theorizes the UAE’s national security according to the most 
relevant international relations theory (Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’). Chapter four explores the 
specific threats to the UAE national security and finally chapter five demonstrates the researcher’s 
findings and recommendations.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Academic studies addressing national security issues, whether in assessing threats to countries or 
attempting to understand a particular country’s national security situation, in relation to the 
established theories in the field are challenging. Such studies address the perceived reality of 
national security within a state of temporality; the global situation affecting national security can 
change rapidly. Hence policies, strategies and international relations in relation to national security 
have to be flexible in order to address such dynamism. 
The literature on the Middle East security studies undertaken by researchers has either been 
specialized within certain fields, or lacking when it comes to providing a holistic assessment view 
of a particular country’s national security. Individual state studies are essential in order to develop 
the internal analytic capability of national security issues and the consequent challenges.  
In the second decade of the 21st century, the Middle East has gone through considerable turmoil 
and systemic changes. The Arabian Gulf countries, albeit still generally perceived as stable 
heavens in the region, have not been immune from the recent unrest. Consequently, the capacities 
of the national security of these countries, including the UAE, have been put to the test. In this 
context, the UAE has secured a crucial role in promoting security across the region and ensuring 
its internal stability.  
As is apparent in the context of the Middle East in this decade, the types of threats to national 
security vary with time and geography. Understanding such threats can provide a realistic 
reference for future generations of academics, politicians and those interested in historical, 
structured studies. In this context, it is necessary to fill the gap in the literature in relation to the 
lack of hypothetical and theoretical review of the threats to the UAE’s national security. The 
researcher addresses this need and contributes to the development of knowledge of UAE national 
security threats within the context of a specific international relations school. 
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1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research objectives are, first, to start to fill the gap regarding the lack of literature related to 
the national security of UAE based on theories of international relations. This study does not cover 
all the issues related to national security in the UAE, but aims to be an important starting point for 
future research. The second objective is to establish a model to analyse the national security of 
other countries with similar social, cultural, political and economic values, such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. The location of these countries in the same interconnected geographical area has resulted in 
considerable homogeneity between these countries and peoples in terms of the historical, social, 
economic, cultural and political arenas. 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The concept of national security has been of considerable interest to western international relations 
scholars since the emergence of the post-Cold War era. The national security concept has evolved, 
since it was first used officially, in the early years of Cold War, when its term appeared in 1947 in 
the National Security Act (NSA) of the United States of America (US).1 Thus, as Rudolf argues: 
“National security was primarily defined in terms of military defense in scholarship produced 
during the cold war”.2 A typical definition of national security in this context is given by Brown 
who argues that national security is “the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and 
territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to 
protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its 
borders”.3 
Bock and Berkowitz extend the concept from the physical, economic and institutional aspects to 
include the more ephemeral aspect of values. Thus, they argue: “National security can be most 
fruitfully defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats”.4 
                                                          
1 Cameron, Iain. (0222). National Security and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Hague, London, 
Boston: Kluwer Law International, p. 39 
2 Rudolph, Christopher. (2006). National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and 
Western Europe since 1945. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 23. 
3 Mangold, Peter (1990). National Security and International Relations. London, New York: Routledge, p. 5. 
4 Asthana, Vandana and Shukla, Ashok Chandra. (2004). Security in South Asia: Trends and Directions. New Delhi: 
APH Publishing Corporation, p. 108.  
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Other academics also highlight values as a core element of national security. Thus, Wolfers 
explains: “[A] nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core 
values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a 
war”.5 Adar and Check add to the definition by stating what they consider the core values of a 
nation to be in relation to nation security. They posit that “the national interest encompasses the 
core values, such as the sustenance of state sovereignty and the guarantee of its territorial integrity 
at one level and the insurance of its economic interests at another”.6 However, Gordon and Taylor 
divide core values into two elements—fundamental values and core interests—stating that 
“national security encompasses the protection of the fundamental values and core interests 
necessary to the continued existence and vitality of the state”.7 
It is clear that the concept of national security has been expanded by international relations 
scholars. It was initially confined to the role of the military security in protecting the state from 
external threats. Thereafter, it was broadened to include the need for political security in order to 
protect the state from internal threats. The next step was to take into account economic factors, 
since the components of military security and political security are dependent to a degree on the 
economic strength of the state. This meant that national security now included ensuring the 
provision of the materials required for economic security.8 Moreover, development was introduced 
as a security component,9 based on the belief that development is the primary weapon in the 
struggle for survival, because it ensures the continuity of economic growth and mitigates risks 
from exogenous economic shocks.10 Relatedly, following the spill over effects of the energy crisis 
that resulted from the actions of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, which 
                                                          
5 Lott, Anthony D. (2004). Creating Insecurity: Realism, Constructivism, and US Security Policy. Burlington, Vt.: 
Ashgate, p. 14.  
6 Adar, Korwa G. and Check, Nicasius A. (2011). Cooperative Diplomacy, Regional Stability and National Interests: 
The Nile River and the Riparian States. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, p. 217.  
7 Jordan, Amos A. Jr., Taylor, William J., Meese, Michael J. and Nielsen Suzanne C. (2011). American National 
Security: Policy and Process, sixth edition. Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, p. 4. 
8 Robenson, Paul. (2008). Dictionary of International Security. Cambridge: Polity, p. 131. 
9 Craig, David and Porter, Doug. Development Beyond Neoliberalism?: Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political 
Economy. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, p. 52. 
10 Al Maktoum, Mohammed bin Rashid. (2012). My Vision: Challenges in the Race for Excellence. Dubai: Motivate 
Publishing, p. 86. 
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banned petroleum exports to the countries supporting Israel in the 1973 war, energy security 
became an integral part of the national security of states.11 
At the end of the Cold War, there has been a revolution in the field of security studies with 
academics moving away from the traditional state-centred approaches and theories towards a 
broader understanding of the concept of security.12 Although inter-state war still occurs, internal 
violence within states is now a more important issue, which bypasses the traditional focus, instead 
focusing on the identity and culture of the groups involved.13 These internal conflicts include racial 
and ethnic conflicts, as happened in the Balkans and Chechnya in the 1990s.14 Thus, the concept 
of societal security was added to the elements of national security. Finally, the concept of national 
security has been expanded to include environmental security on the grounds that environmental 
degradation can lead to a serious deterioration in the quality of standards of living, impacting 
negatively on the economy and triggering conflicts over resources.15 
However, the same degree of interest and consideration has not been shown by their Arab 
counterparts. The majority of international relations Arab scholars reject the notion of separating 
the concept of national security for an independent Arab state from the concept of pan-Arab 
national security related to the Arab states as a unit. This is primarily due to the influence of the 
Nasserite ideology that gained wide acceptance in Arab territories from Oman to Morocco from 
the 1950s. The Nasserite ideology was propagated by ‘the Sout Al Arab’ radio station, the 
mouthpiece of Nasser’s regime and which broadcast from Egypt and covered the vast Arab 
territories. The station called on Arab nations to topple the colonizing powers and to revolt against 
the regimes in their states in pursuit of an Arab national union, under Nasser’s leadership, with a 
secular tenor and based on a socialist ideology. One of the drawbacks of the Arab national security 
model is that nationalism cannot be established among nations with the only language as a common 
characteristic, but should be based on a number of elements, the most important of which is similar 
                                                          
11 Basrur, Rajesh and Collin, Koh Swee Lean. (2012). Nuclear Power and Energy Security in Asia. New York: 
Routledge, p. 17.  
12 Griffiths, Martin, O'Callaghan, Terry and Roach, Steven C. (2008). International Relations: The Key Concepts, 
second edition. New York: Routledge, p. 294. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Rudolph, Christopher. (2006), op, cit., p. 02. 
15 Robenson, Paul. (2008), op, cit., p. 132. 
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racial origins.16 For example, there are nations such as the US, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), Australia, parts of Canada and South Africa that speak English, 
but we cannot claim that the speakers of English all have common national origins.17 Furthermore, 
the national interests of individual Arab states may come into conflict or pose threats to the 
existence of other Arab states, which undermines the national interest of the Arab nation.  
An example of this occurred in 1990 when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait and threatened the 
other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Arab states were split into two camps 
precipitated by the desire to protect their national interests during the Arab League Emergency 
Summit held in Cairo one week after the invasion, and in the voting session on Resolution No.195 
to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to call for Arab forces to defend the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.18 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, Bahrain, 
                                                          
16 Meqlid, Ismael Sabri (1991). International Political Relations: A Study in Origins and Theories. Cairo, The 
Academic Library. pp. 97-98. (In Arabic). 
17 Ibid, p. 100. 
18 The Arab League Emergency Summit resolution adopted on August 10, 1990 stated that “in light of the historic and 
monumental responsibility dictated by the difficult situation arising from the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait and the grave 
repercussions thereof on the Arab World and national Arab security and the Arab nation’s higher interests, it is decided 
to: 
1. Reaffirm the resolution of the Arab League adopted on 3/8/1990 and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, passed on 4/8/1990 that both called for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. 
2. Reaffirming the UN Security Council Resolutions No. 660 of 2 August 1990, No. 661 of 6 August and No. 
662 of 9 August 1990.  
3. The Arab League condemns the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait and does not recognize Iraq’s 
annexation of Kuwait or any other consequences entailed by the Iraqi forces’ invasion of Kuwaiti territories 
and calls on Iraq to immediately withdraw from Kuwait and to return to the status as it was before 1/8/1990.  
4. The Arab League reaffirms the sovereignty, independence and regional integrity of the State of Kuwait as a 
member in the Arab League and the UN and insists on the return of the legitimate ruling regime that existed in 
Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion and the Arab League supports this legitimate regime in all measures it takes 
to liberate its land and restore its sovereignty.  
5. The Arab League condemns the Iraqi threats against Arab Gulf states and deplores the Iraqi build up of 
troops at the borders with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and affirms the Arab League’s complete solidarity 
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states and support any measures caused by the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states to in line with the legitimate right of self defense and in accordance 
with Article Two of the Joint Arab Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty signed by members of the Arab 
League and Article 51 of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution No.662 of August, 9 1990, 
provided that these measures shall come to an end immediately upon the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimacy there. 
6. Responding to the request of Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries, to transfer Arab troops to support 
its armed forces, in order to defend its territory and territorial integrity against any external aggression. 
7. The Arab League hereby tasks the Arab League Secretary General with monitoring the enforcement of this 
resolution and report thereon within fifteen days to the Arab League Council which will take the necessary 
measures.  
Lauterpacht, E., Greenwood, C. J.; Weller, Marc and Bethlehem, Daniel, (eds.). (1991). The Kuwait Crisis: Basic 
Documents. Cambridge: Grotius Publications, p. 294. 
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Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and Djibouti backed the resolution while the remaining Arab 
states expressed their reservations. The resolution was approved by a majority vote, but this crisis 
demonstrated that Arab states do not adhere to the ideal of Arab national security but are bound to 
defend their national interests even if they came into conflict with the interests of other Arab states.  
This was also demonstrated when the administration of US President George Bush threatened an 
allied invasion of Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussain under the pretext of the existence 
of weapons of mass destruction.19 International and regional interests to topple the Saddam regime 
coincided with Arab national interests to whose existence this regime posed a threat. Thus, Arab 
states did not openly oppose the US threat of invasion. During the Arab League Summit held in 
Cairo weeks before the invasion, Arab countries failed to extend any military support to Iraq, 
which went against the Joint Arab Defence Treaty, nor did Arab states attempt to present a unified 
political backing to the Iraqi regime for the purpose of pre-empting the military offensive. The 
only exception was the UAE, which opposed the invasion20 and proposed an initiative to spare 
Iraq the worst of the imminent war and protect the unity of its territory and its people. The UAE 
proposal called on Saddam Hussain to step down and welcomed him to stay in the UAE. It also 
guaranteed that members of the Iraqi regime would not be prosecuted and that the UAE would 
negotiate with international organizations to reach an agreement allowing them and their families 
to live safely in the UAE. The final element in the proposal was that Iraq would be left under the 
auspices of the UN and the Arab League until a new Iraqi government was formed.21 The Arab 
League refused to place the initiative on the summit’s agenda citing the rule prohibiting 
interference in the internal affairs of member states.22 Accordingly, the Iraqi regime rejected the 
UAE initiative, Iraq was occupied, thousands of Iraqis were killed, and Iraq’s institutional structure 
and infrastructure were destroyed in a war that was fought illegitimately outside the framework of 
the UN Security Council.23 
                                                          
19 Martel, William C. (2007). Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 244-246. 
20 Gupte, Pranay. (2011). Dubai: The Making of a Megapolis. New Delhi: Penguin Books, p. 363. 
21 Wilson, Graeme H. (2013). Zayed: The Man Who Built a Nation. Abu Dhabi: Center for Documentation & Research, 
pp. 673-674. 
22 Ibid., p. 677. 
23 Pogge, Thomas W. (2010). Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
pp. 177-178. 
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In late 2010, the contrasts between the national interests of the individual Arab states grew sharper 
when a wave of protests and security turmoil erupted in a number of Arab states. Dubbed the 
“Arab Spring”, this wave of protest was fuelled by a multitude of internal factors including 
autocracy, corruption and economic recession that undermined living conditions in many Arab 
states, compounded by external factors that contributed in instigating the populaces to revolt 
against the ruling regimes in their countries. The protests began in Tunisia, progressed to Egypt, 
then to Libya, Yemen and Syria with the local populations demanding the downfall of autocratic 
regimes and the establishment of democratic regimes. The Arab League interfered directly in the 
internal affairs of Libya and Syria where the regimes had cracked down on the revolutionaries. 
This was contravened of one of the essential principles on which the Arab League was 
established; non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The memberships of the 
Libyan and Syrian regimes were revoked which led to the elimination of communication channels 
and the lack of means by which to exert direct pressure on both regimes. It also resulted in the 
absence of the element of balance and accuracy in the information on the situation on the ground 
and the political situation in these two states.24 These factors led Syria and Libya into civil wars 
that still rage to this day. Furthermore, the changes in the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, resulted 
in the ascent of radical Islamist organizations to power, which resulted in the Arab states 
reconsidering the repercussions of the developments taking place in terms of their national 
interests. 
Therefore, international relations scholars in the Arab World need to separate the concept of Arab 
national interests and the status of national security in relation to the individual Arab states as the 
evidence suggests that there is no real regional security system that unites the national interests 
of Arab states. This reduces the concept of Arab national security to no more than a banner.  
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: PARAMETERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
The UAE is one of the most important countries in the Middle East in terms of energy, economy 
and foreign trade. It is the fifth largest oil exporter in the Gulf area, producing 2.9 million barrels 
                                                          
24 Khalaf, Hani (2013). “The Restricted Principle “Absolute Sovereignty” and the Impediment of the Arab League. 
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 193, July. Available at: <URL: http://digital.ahra 
m.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=1370414&eid=1639> Accessed: 19 June, 2014. (In Arabic). 
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of oil per day,25 and its oil reserves total 97.8 billion barrels.26 This means that it possesses 5.7% 
of the world oil reserves.27 Moreover, the UAE produces about 61.9 billion cubic metres per year 
of natural gas liquids.28 In addition, the natural gas reserves amount to 6.1 trillion cubic metres, 
which represents 3.3% of the total world reserves. This is the fourth largest natural gas reserve in 
the Gulf area and the sixth largest in the world.29 
In terms of the economy and foreign trade, the UAE is one of the most dynamic countries in the 
Middle East. The estimated GDP per capita of the UAE in 2015 was AED1.6 trillion,30 which is 
the third highest in the Middle East.31 Furthermore, it ranks third after Hong Kong and Singapore 
among the most active countries in terms of re-exports.32 Foreign direct investment in the UAE 
amounted to USD126 billion (AED462.4 billion) in 2015.33 Thus, if the national security of the 
UAE were threatened, it would impact on the investing countries whose interests are tied to that 
of the UAE.  
Since its independence in 1971, the UAE has faced various internal and external security 
challenges that have threatened its survival. One of these challenges was the instability in the 
international arena following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. According to Nye, the struggle 
for power in the current international system exists on three levels with military force located at 
the top; while economic power is located in the middle and international relations at the bottom. 
                                                          
25 Energy Information Administration, Available at:>URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/UAE/Oil.html 
<Access Date: 19 October, 2008. 
26 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) official website, “UAE facts and figures”. Available 
at: <URL: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/170.htm> Access Date: 7 April 2017. 
27 The UAE Government official website, Available at: <URL: http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm> 
Access Date: 19 October, 2008.       
28 Energy Information Administration, op, cit.  
29 The UAE Government official website, op, cit. 
30 World Economic Outlook Database, (April 2012). International Monetary Fund Official Website, Available at: 
<URL:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=63&pr.y=16&sy=2009&ey=2
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At the top level, the current international system is a unipolar one, led by the United States, which 
still maintains its military superiority over the rest of the world. However, at the middle level the 
international system is a multipolar one with economically powerful centres such as the United 
States, Europe, China and Japan all competing for economic powers. At the bottom level, 
transnational relations that cross borders are located outside the control of governments. These 
include non-state actors, such as bankers who transfer funds electronically, terrorist groups across 
states, and the hackers who threaten the electronic security of states. In addition, governments 
face environmental challenges such as climate change or the spread of epidemics.34 
In this context, the key focus of this study is to shed light on the threats affecting the national 
security of the UAE through an analysis of the behaviour of the UAE regime based on 
international relations theories. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is the most appropriate theory by which to analyse the national security of the UAE?  
2. What are the major threats that affect the UAE national security as highlighted by the 
selected theory of analysis?   
1.5 LITERATURE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UAE 
Much research analyses the national security of different countries across the world; however, 
academic studies on the national security of the UAE are rare. Indeed, the only study that addressed 
the subject directly is National Security of the United Arab Emirates: A Perspective in Light of 
Global Changes to the New World Order by Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 
2003. The study discusses the national security of the UAE through the lens of the collective 
security framework, which is based on the traditional military perspective of security. The author 
traces the performance from 1990 to 1998 of the defence system of the GCC states, which was 
established in 1981, in order to strengthen the collective security of its founding countries—the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. As the author explains the littoral states 
on the southern Arabian Gulf founded the GCC in 1981 in order to contain the risks from the Iran-
Iraq War on the security and economy of their respective entities. In addition, the new entity aimed 
                                                          
34 Nye Jr., Joseph S. (2010). “The Future of American Power :Dominance and Decline in Perspective”. Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, p. 3. 
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to help their economies recover from the chaos caused by the down turn in oil prices on their 
economies. 
However, the GCC’s joint military cooperation actually began following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990, despite the fact that the agreement on defence and security cooperation among the member 
states had been concluded years previously. Several reasons obstructed military co-operation 
between the six countries prior to Iraq’s invasion. First, the different nature of the military forces 
of the six member states, created by great disparities in military spending. The entire defence 
spending in the GCC countries since its inception and until 1990 amounted to around USD222.5 
billion, with Saudi Arabia as the highest spender.35 As a result, there was a great disparity between 
the countries in terms of the number of members of the armed forces relative to their population. 
In 1986, the UAE had the highest level of military personnel relative to its population, at 9.9%.36 
In addition, the armed forces were often dependent on foreigners for operating their sophisticated 
weapons and the training of local military and civilian personnel.  
The second obstacle was the lack of co-ordination in the purchase of weapons between the different 
GCC armed forces. As a result, the diversity of weapons systems led to a slow rate of integration 
at the technical level. In addition, the training methodologies formed another difficulty for 
integration; for example, Saudi Arabian troops were trained under the methodology of the 
American army, while Omani and the UAE troops adopted the British training methodology. The 
difficulty of integration created enormous challenges for the process of coordination among the 
different sets of armed forces.  
Third, the individual external relations of the GCC countries formed a barrier to military 
cooperation. For example, Iranian pressure on Kuwait and the UAE to reduce their political and 
financial support for the Iraqi army during its war with Iran hampered military cooperation 
between the GCC countries, such as their efforts to connect their air defences during the Iran-Iraq 
war. In addition, there were differences between the relationship of each country with the West in 
the field of defence co-operation. At that time, Kuwait rejected the presence of foreign military 
bases in the region. In contrast, Oman had defence agreements with the US and the UK, which 
                                                          
35 Al Nahyan, Sultan Bin Khalifah. (2003). National Security of the United Arab Emirates: A Perspective in Light of 
Global Changes to the New World Order. London: Rivermill Publishing, p. 95. 
36 Ibid, p.95. 
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allowed both countries the opportunity to establish military bases on its territory to defend it in the 
event of external aggression. 
The fourth factor was the failure of the GCC countries to achieve adequate military strength to 
allow them to rely on their own abilities to defend themselves against any external aggression. 
Thus, the Iran-Iraq war represented a financial drain on two levels. First, the GCC countries were 
forced to double their military spending in order to strengthen their defence capabilities. Second, 
they had to provide considerable financial support to Iraq as it was seen as defending their national 
interests against the Shi’a Iranian regime, which came to power after the overthrow of the Shah in 
1979. Ironically, the threat to the GCC following the end of the Iran-Iraq war came from Iraq. In 
1990, the Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait after the Iraqi regime had conducted diplomatic escalations 
against Kuwait and the UAE in the Arab League, accusing them, a few weeks before the invasion, 
of increasing their oil production beyond the quota prescribed by OPEC in order to reduce the 
price of oil to weaken Iraq economically. The UAE and Kuwait denied the Iraqi accusation, and 
subsequently the UAE formally requested the US to conduct the first joint exercise between the 
two armed forces in the UAE, while Kuwait entered into bilateral negotiations with Iraq in Saudi 
Arabia to contain the crisis created by the Iraqi regime. However, less than 24 hours after the two 
sides announced that they would resume negotiations later in Baghdad, Iraqi forces occupied 
Kuwait, with the other GCC countries unable to repel the Iraqi aggression. Dick Cheney, the US 
Secretary of Defence stated, at the time, that the Iraqi forces were capable of reaching Riyadh, the 
capital of Saudi Arabia, from the south of Iraq as no major military obstacle stood in their way. At 
the time, the Saudi National Guard battalion were concentrated on the eastern border of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to stop Iraqi forces from gaining control of the oil fields located there.  
This crisis revealed the failure of the GCC to guarantee its collective security because there was 
no planning for the possibility of the emergence of expansionist ambitions for Iraq after the end of 
its war with Iran. This was, in part, because Iraq was considered a strategic ally, but also because 
there were no joint initiatives or co-ordinated military policy between the six members of the GCC. 
Therefore, it was agreed that the GCC would seek the assistance of foreign forces in order to 
protect them from the threat of Iraq and to liberate Kuwait if Iraq refused to implement the UN 
Security Council resolutions to withdraw its troops. The international coalition forces, including 
GCC forces, managed to liberate Kuwait and eject Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory in 1991. 
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Notably, the study by Al Nahyan focused upon the collective security of the six GCC countries, 
including the UAE without addressing the UAE’s own national security. Furthermore, the national 
security of countries cannot be understood only through the military dimension as the concept 
includes other dimensions (such as the social and economic aspects). Therefore, this study reviews 
most of the dimensions affecting national security in the UAE. However, the researcher 
acknowledges that not all matters relating to national security of the UAE are discussed, as the aim 
is to provide a starting point for research on this subject in the future.  
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The nature of the subject required the researcher to adopt more than one approach in order to help 
to organize the relevant ideas and information to answer the research questions. Thus, the Systems 
Analysis Approach is important in explaining the behaviour of the UAE political system on its 
national security. The Systems Analysis Approach considers the political system as the unit of 
analysis, in which the system is a set of components that are functionally and orderly associated 
with each other, including interaction and interdependence. This means that the actions of a certain 
part affect the rest of the parts, as any change in the environment affects the system and the actions 
of the system affect the environment. In this sense, the UAE political system can be analysed on 
the grounds that political interactions in its society constitute a system of behaviour. The Systems 
Analysis Approach was used to understand the nature and constituent parts of the federal political 
system in the UAE, and how these parts interact with each other. In addition, the approach was 
used to understand how the UAE political system interacts with its social environment, and how 
this system maintained its survival since independence. 
Second, the researcher used the historical approach in order to understand the historical 
developments witnessed within the Arabian Peninsula in general and the UAE in particular as 
these have influenced the functioning of the UAE national security. Third, the survey method was 
used to survey the number of public and private schools and the number of students who are 
studying within such schools in all educational zones of the UAE. This was necessary because 
official statistics were not available at the UAE’s Ministry of Education for a number of school 
districts. The data allowed the researcher to perform quantitative analysis to assess the level and 
content of education, in view of its positive and negative impacts on national security.  
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In addition, the researcher adopted several methods for collecting information, such as desktop 
research in relation to books, official documents, theses, magazines, newspapers and e-materials 
that deal directly with the subject of the thesis. Furthermore, the researcher conducted 11 personal 
interviews with decision-makers in the UAE in the education sector in order to explore the 
vulnerability of the curriculum to undermining the sector’s role in mitigating threats to the UAE’s 
national security and also the impact of the education outcomes on the human resource base. In 
addition, data was collected from the interviews concerning the distribution of students between 
the public and private sectors, at the time of the thesis research. Overall data was not available 
from either the official Ministry of Education websites, or the public sources providing statistics 
on students’ distribution and curriculum.  
In addition, an interview was conducted with an author of a book related to the thesis.37 The author 
is a former leader in the Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Egypt, which was strongly involved 
in the Arab Spring, and has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood organization in UAE which attempted 
to destabilize the political system in the Emirates. The author was useful in providing insights on 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership structure and internal workings.  
The researcher did not interview decision-makers in the national security field in the UAE to 
evaluate their views on the Emirate’s national security vulnerabilities, as such a discussion is not 
permitted under their job confidentiality agreements.  
Official statistics from various sources were used to build new statistical tables and analysis. The 
researcher also attended a wide range of relevant lectures, seminars, conferences and exhibitions. 
Moreover, the researcher added his personal experience as a police officer in the Police General 
Headquarters of Dubai in the UAE while discussing the structure of the Interior Ministry, the 
processes of its subsidiary departments and the subject of intruders in the UAE, which are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This study consists of four chapters. The first chapter presents the problem, objectives, hypotheses 
and research questions, in addition to problems that were faced during the study. This chapter also 
                                                          
37 See Appendix 13. 
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contains the literature review, which addresses the subject of national security in the UAE, as well 
as detailing the methodology. The second chapter explores the theories of international relations 
and security studies which can explain the behaviour of states towards their national security in 
order to choose the most appropriate theory to be applied to this study. The third chapter explores 
theorizes the UAE national security analysis. The fourth chapter explores the external and internal 
security challenges faced by the UAE. The final chapter concludes with the findings and 
recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
Analysing national security threats is challenging if the research is not related to existing 
theoretical studies in the field. The structure is essential to synthesise the perceptions of existing 
national security threats. Therefore, reference is made in this study to the established international 
relations theories elaborating on their definitions of the scope of national security and the 
respective threats. This is done in order to use the most appropriate theories for analysing the 
UAE’s national security threats. In this context, Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis is 
examined in this chapter as a tool by which to analysis the threats facing the national security of 
the UAE. 
Many international relations’ thinkers have addressed the interpretation of states’ behaviours 
towards the subject of its national security through the prism of an anarchic international system. 
These academics agree that the national interest, in which one of its top priorities is the desire for 
survival, remains the main driving force influencing the behaviour of states. However, they differ 
in their methods and approaches of interpretation. The leading classical realists who touched upon 
the subject of national security did not consider the internal level including societal and cultural 
factors, but instead focused on the behaviour of the state within the realm of international politics. 
Thus, they interpret the behaviour of the state within the medium of international politics, and not 
analysing it as a unit of competing interests and values.38 Behavioural generalizations are 
frequently applied to the states of the Third World when attempting to explain the national security 
approaches. However, the approaches do not distinguish sufficiently between state survival and 
regime survival.  
According to Mohamed Ayoob, it is “difficult to disentangle issues of state security from those of 
regime security in the Third World”.39 It is also true that most regimes in the Third World attempt 
to portray threats to their regimes as threats to the state. Analysts must, therefore, distinguish 
between issues of regime security and those of state security. However, in many cases, given the 
lack of unconditional legitimacy both of the regime and of the state structure in the Third World 
                                                          
38 Bayliss, John and Smith, Steve. (2004). The Globalisation of World Politics. Dubai: Gulf Research Center, p. 245. 
(In Arabic). 
39 Shama, Nael. (2014). Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi: Against the National Interest. New York: 
Routledge, p. 1. 
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and the close perceptual connection between regime and state as far as the majority of the state’s 
population is concerned, the line between regime security and state security becomes very thin, 
and the interplay between the two so dense, that it is virtually impossible to disentangle one from 
the other. As Crocker, Hampson and Aall point out in connection with the Middle East:  
[T]hose who rule must attempt to encourage loyalty to the state, of which they hope 
themselves to be the chief beneficiaries, while at the same time seeking to disguise the 
fact that their system of power, and thus the identity of the political structure itself, 
frequently owes more to the old ties of sectarian and tribal loyalty. In many such 
countries, the fall of the regime is likely to signal the failure of the state as well; any 
student of Tudor England or Bourbon France will find this phenomenon very familiar. 
Iraq provides the latest testimony to the veracity of this proposition.40  
Although, this analysis may resonate with many Third World countries, the model does not appear 
to relate to the UAE. The regime in the UAE is an outcome of the state’s composition, as the 
legitimacy of the regime is dependent on the state structure. 
This chapter reviews a number of international relations schools of thought, in addition to the 
security studies, in order to explain the behaviour of states towards their national security. The aim 
is to choose the most appropriate theories for the analysis of the national security of the UAE, in 
order to answer the research questions. 
2.1 THE REALIST SCHOOL 
Realism was, for many years, the dominant theory in the field of security studies and international 
relations.41 As McCormack argues: “[t]raditional thinking about security has been deeply colored 
by the Realist paradigm, which has dominated the discipline of international relations since 
roughly 1950”.42 The Realism School considers the state as a unitary actor to be the tool for 
analysing the various international phenomena. Realism assumes that international politics is a 
struggle for power between different countries seeking to promote their interests unilaterally.43 
                                                          
40 Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen Osler and Aall, Pamela R. (2007). Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict 
Management in a Divided World. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 102-103.  
41 Robenson, Paul. (2008), op, cit., pp. 172-173. 
42 McCormack, Tara. (2010). Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches. 
London; New York: Routledge, p. 5. 
43 Walt, Stephen M. (1998). "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Foreign Policy, Vol. 111, Spring, 
Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge, p. 31. 
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However, the Realism School is divided into several theories, including classical Realism and 
Neo-Realism.44 Hans Morgenthau laid the foundations of classical Realism in his book Politics 
among Nations, which provided the theoretical framework for the writings of Realist School 
thinkers.45 His book remains one of the most systematic attempts to use the principles of Realism 
in the construction of an experimental theory in international politics.46 Morgenthau identifies six 
principles for political Realism. The first principle states that political Realism believes that 
objective laws, which are inherent in human nature, govern politics.47 The second principle states 
that “the main signpost that helps political Realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”.48 The third principle 
explains that the meaning of national interest, which is defined by force, is not constant because it 
varies over time and with circumstances. Although survival is considered to be the minimum level 
of national interest, states seek through their foreign policies to search for other ways to maintain 
their survival.49 The fourth principle emphasizes the awareness of political Realism towards the 
moral significance of political action; however, at the same time, it realizes the undesirable tension 
between ethical leadership and the requirements of successful political action. Therefore, it 
believes that building successful political action requires refining the behaviour of states from their 
ethical principles, because the standard of judging a specific policy is located in its political 
outcomes not its moral ones.50 The fifth principle affirms the refusal of political Realism to identify 
the moral aspirations of a particular state “with the moral laws that govern the universe”.51The 
sixth principle asserts that the difference between political Realism and other schools of thought 
                                                          
44 Dunne, Timand Schmidt, Brian C. (2001). “Realism”, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve (eds.). The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, second edition. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 
174. 
45 Gibran, Daniel K. (1998). The Falklands War: Britain versus the Past in the South Atlantic. Jefferson, North 
Carolina: McFarland, p. 7.  
46 Griffiths, Martin. (1999). Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations. London; New York: Routledge, p. 37. 
47 Pullen, L. Larry. (2000). Christian Ethics and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Helsinki Accords and Human Rights. 
Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, p. 51. 
48 Williams, Howard L., Wright, Moorhead and Evans, Tony. (eds.). (1993). A Reader in International Relations and 
Political Theory. Buckingham: Open University Press, p. 193. 
49 Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr. (1981). Contending Theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey. New York: Harper & Row, p. 99. 
50 Ibid, pp. 99-100. 
51 Morgenthau, Hans J. (1967). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. New York: Alfred 
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is real and substantial52 because the “political Realist sees power as the economist deals with 
wealth, and the moralist sees action in light of moral principles”.53 
In contrast, Lebow argues that the classical realistic thinkers stress the similarities, rather than the 
differences, between domestic and international policies, as well as the as the role of ethics and 
community in promoting stability in both fields.54 Most classical realists believe that in an anarchic 
world, states are preoccupied with providing their citizens’ material needs and with building 
alliances with other states for the sake of survival. Thus, the state, through its central institutions, 
in enacting laws and legislation, and providing protection for its citizens and borders, would have 
a domestic policy that would be little different from the way it tackles international policy. 
Moreover, all the policies are the result of human drives and subject to the same pathologies. 
Moreover, all policies are based on the principle of struggle, which can never be separated from 
the social life itself. In this case, the struggle is based on laws, organizations, rules, and social 
acceptance. Such scholars believe that the solidarity of the community and the mutual rules that 
maintain law, order, and self-control in the domestic policy are the same as for international 
policy.55 
The Neo-Realism movement emerged in order to organize the ideas of classical Realism within a 
coherent and strong theoretical framework.56 Morgenthau postulates that the theory is a “loose 
term”.57 However, Hoffman argues that Morgenthau did not succeed in unifying the realm of 
theory with that of politics,58 and that “Morgenthau was not sufficiently ‘theoretical’ or ‘scientific’ 
in his theories”.59 Lott describes classical realism “as a rhetorical device that presents the 
dangerous environment in which states operate rather than a general theory of international 
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politics”.60 Thus, Waltz proposed a version of the classical Realism theory titled Neo-Realism.61 
Waltz contradicts the classical realists’ analyses of the behaviour of states on grounds of human 
nature; he argues that the behaviour of states is not limited by the intelligence or wickedness of 
their leaders or their physical or spiritual deficiencies but rather is decided by formulas arising 
from the anarchic nature of the process of international politics.62 Accordingly, Waltz denies the 
influence of the state’s internal politics in providing explanatory frameworks for its external 
behaviour.63Neo-Realism focuses on the structure of the international system to explain the 
behaviour of states within that system,64 by studying the circumstances and the systemic data that 
give rise to the security dilemma.65 Waltz argues that the system consists of a structure and 
interacting units,66 and floats the notion that domestic political system is hierarchical in which 
internal units assume positions according to the degree of their power and authority or functions. 
By contrast, the international system is anarchical as international units position themselves in 
accordance with perpendicular relations between them. Due to this structure, international units 
have to be self-reliant and to adopt arrangements that guarantee their survival and improve their 
security status regardless of the nature of these arrangements.67 This leads to the ‘security 
dilemma’. Thus, Waltz wrote: “In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for 
power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety”.68 
Furthermore, Waltz and other Neo-realists believe that balance of power theory arising from the 
security dilemma makes it possible to predict the behaviour of states. This is because states are 
related by a behaviour of balancing, whether or not the power the state seeks to balance is the end 
goal, so long as security is the main objective. Each coalition seeks to enrol the largest number of 
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members. However, states always prefer to join with weaker members because states always view 
bigger powers as a threat. Therefore, the behaviour based on the balance of power is the best way 
to maintain the status quo.69 
The idea of security in Neo-Realism led to a division among its adherents into offensive realists 
and defensive realists.70 Offensive realists believe that this direction offers a more accurate 
interpretation of the behaviour of states on the grounds that the anarchic nature inherent in the 
international system leads states to attempt to maximize their security. One of the best ways to 
achieve this aim is to increase its power relative to other states. Therefore, a state will seize any 
opportunity to increase its power, regardless of the status quo and the threats they face.71In contrast, 
defensive realists argue that maximizing or achieving security is achieved by maintaining the status 
quo in the international system; therefore, aggressive behaviour will not lead to security but to 
insecurity. This is because security can be achieved with relative ease through defensive rather 
than offensive behaviour; any state trying to increase its powers will find itself in confrontation 
with a balance of power or a coalition of powers that may be stronger than that state.72 Defensive 
realists believe that the structure of international relations provides states with incentives to 
maintain the balance of power rather than attempt to change it.73 
2.2 THE LIBERALIST SCHOOL 
The Liberal School of international relations definition of national security was strongly used 
throughout the first half of the 1990sas a result of the growing role of non-state actors and the 
increasing importance of both economic and social components. Indeed certain thinkers, such as 
Joseph Nye, saw these elements as the most important components at the individual level, the state 
level or the international system level.74 While the Liberal School is divided into several theories,75 
they all share a view about international politics based on three basic assumptions which set it 
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apart from the Realist and Constructivist Schools.76 The first assumption is the belief that rational 
individuals and private groups are the fundamental actors in international politics, and the needs 
of individuals and social groups drive the interests underlying the behaviour of the state. Therefore, 
individuals in the different social levels determine the material and moral roles to be enacted, 
pushing them into political and collective action. Thus, the central axiom of the Liberal School 
states that understanding the practices of force or promoting collective action among nations 
cannot be achieved without understanding the basic social goals that states seek to achieve.77 The 
second assumption asserts that the state or any other political institutions are non-unitary actors in 
relation to domestic and foreign policy. The choices of the different interests constitute the goals 
of the state, which the official representatives of the state are committed to follow. Thus, the 
parliamentary institutions constitute a transmission belt through which the choices of individuals 
and different groups in civil society enter the political field; these choices are reflected in the 
foreign policy of the state. The internal policy of the state is constructed by the interaction of 
different social actors since the state itself is not considered as an actor.78 In the third assumption, 
liberals assert that the behaviour of the state in the international system is a result of the fine tuning 
of its options, since the state needs to target a goal in order to provoke conflict, achieve cooperation 
or take any action in order to achieve such a goal.79 
Moreover, El-Marhoun states that the concept of national security in liberal thought focuses on 
maintaining the state’s survival against external threats, whether this concept is related to the 
individual, the state or the international system. This policy is usually adopted as an objective of 
the foreign policy, which can be achieved by following protective and preventive procedures added 
to other remedial measures that may aim to change the surrounding environment of the state.80 
In any case, Walt believes that the end of the Cold War gave a strong impetus to the emergence of 
the three liberal theories in the field of international relations.81 Thus, the 'Democratic Peace' 
theory provides different analytical tools from those used by traditional Realism and Neo-Realism 
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Schools. Doyle and Russet, the theorists of this thought, argue that security analysis must be based 
on the democratic variable within the regimes of the states. The theory focuses on the internal 
variable of the political system and how it is represented as an alternative to the power variable. 
This means that democratic representation, commitment to human rights and the transnational 
interdependence between states make countries more prone to peace rather than war and the logic 
of power.82 This is because democratic countries embrace the norms of compromise,83 which 
prevents the use of force between parties embracing the same principles; thus, it is rare that 
democratic countries engage in wars with each other.84 This is in contrast to the case of permanent 
conflict envisaged by realists in the security dilemma.85 
Second, the theory of liberal institutionalism emerged in the post-Cold War era as an explanatory 
theory for the behaviour of states toward their national security. Liberal institutionalism argues 
that institutions play a crucial role in international security and even in strengthening the internal 
security of nations. Nations acquire powers and tools through these institutions, which allow them 
to adjust aspects of internal issues, and subsequently result in the adjustment of a nation’s policies 
in the international environment. Such influence and dependencies does not allow countries to act 
unilaterally in their internal policies. Fukuyama stresses that, at the end of the Cold War, liberal 
democracy became one of the basic components of the value system in the new world order. Thus, 
states that suppress the practices of individual freedom under liberal democratic doctrine come 
into conflict with political legitimacy in the international community. Therefore, the spread of 
liberal democratic ideals has led to the erosion of the modern state’s sovereignty through external 
institutions that can interfere in its internal affairs to ensure “refocusing sovereignty away from 
states, in practice their leaders, and locating it with the people the nation”.86 
Third, the economic strand of Liberalism theory has increased in importance, particularly through 
the globalization of world markets, the rise of non-governmental organizations and transnational 
networks, and the rapid spread of global communication technologies. These factors have all 
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contributed to undermining the power of the states and shifted the focus of states from issues 
concerned with military security to issues related to the economy and social welfare, in which 
communities have become tied together by a network of economic and social contacts. These links, 
due to their strength, have made it difficult for states to break them. In fact, states could face the 
wrath of their own populace if they are denied the luxuries gained from the network of links. Thus, 
populations are reluctant to fight wars which threaten their level of economic well-being.87 
2.3 THE CONSTRUCTIVIST SCHOOL 
The Constructivist School emerged in the field of security and international relations studies 
following the end of the Cold War because of the failure of Realism and liberalism to explain the 
reasons that led to the fall of the Soviet Union.88 Both schools neglected the internal changes within 
Soviet society, because the intellectuals of these schools only considered physical factors to be 
important in understanding the behaviour of states in the international system. Therefore, the 
Constructivism School emerged as a new explanatory theory arguing that international relations 
cannot be understood within the purely material constraints highlighted by Realism or within the 
institutional constraints on the local and international levels highlighted by the liberalism. 
Constructivists argue the focus should on the impact of ideas and the social dimension in 
international politics.89 Thus, constructivists believe that international politics is driven by ideas, 
values, and common standards, which are adopted by the actors. In this context, constructivists 
focus on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge and the role of shared ideas as an ideational 
structure that hinders or constitutes the behaviour of states.90 This is because the ideational 
structure not only affects the incentives of different behaviours of the state, but also affects the 
basic character, which is defined as the state’s identity.91 Wendt, as a leading constructivist, 
stresses that the identity is “a property of international actors that generates motivational and 
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behavioral dispositions”.92 Constructivists believe that the states have a corporate identity which 
generates the main objectives of the states such as material security, stability, economic 
development and recognition by others states. However, the states rely on their social identities in 
order to achieve their objectives, as their identity is the framework that constitutes the way in 
which states see themselves in terms of their relations with other countries. Therefore, states define 
their national interests on the basis of these identities.93 For that reason Wendt states that “identities 
are the basis of interests”,94 because actors could never establish their interests without identifying 
themselves first.95 
Thus, the identity of the state is determined by the ideas and values and standards held by its 
individuals. This identity is the factor that specifies the national interests and how to achieve them. 
Therefore, constructivists do not separate the internal and international environments when 
analysing the behaviour of states. They argue that interests are determined outside the social 
context of the states as a precondition dictated by the nature of the international system, but they 
stress that the interest is determined by the identity which changes as a result of the interactions of 
institutions, norms and cultures. Therefore, the process, rather than the structure, of international 
system determines how countries interact with each other in international politics.96 The 
intellectuals of the Constructivist School believe that: 
the international system is not something ‘out there’ like the solar system. It does not 
exist on its own. It exists only as inter-subjective awareness among people. It is a human 
invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and 
ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been 
arranged by certain people at a particular time and place. If the thoughts and ideas that 
enter into the existence of international relations change, then the system itself will 
change as well. That is because the system consists in thought and ideas.97 
                                                          
92 Zehfuss, Maja. (2001). “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison”. European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 318. 
93 Griffiths, Martin, O'Callaghan, Terry and Roach, Steven C. (2008), op. cit., pp.51-52. 
94 Wendt, Alexander. (Spring 1992). “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 398. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Nuri, Aziz. (2012). “Security Reality in the Mediterranean Region: A Study of Conflicting Vision between Both 
Sides of the Mediterranean Based on Constructivist Perspective”. Master's Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political 
Science, University of Batna, p. 29. (In Arabic) 
97 Jackson, Robert and Sørensen, Georg. (2003). Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches 
Methodological Debates: Post-Positivist Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 253. 
25 
 
Constructivists and structural realists share the same perspective regarding the chaotic nature of 
international relations, and that states seek to be secure and maintain their survival in the chaotic 
system. However, they differ in the interpretation of the policies of the countries use in overcoming 
the chaos of the international system.98 Constructivists believe that self-reliance is not the only 
way to overcome the issue of chaotic international system. It is true that seeking this option is 
imposed on the states, but not due to the chaos of the system rather due to the states’ behaviours. 
In this context, certain changes in the behaviour of the state could lead to the emergence of bilateral 
and multilateral understandings between the actors in the system. 
Thus, the Constructivist perception of security relations can be understood in the form of an 
equation in which there are two states, A and B. When State A takes certain political, military and 
economic actions in the form of self-help in order to achieve the goal of survival then State B will 
pursue the same behaviours in order to achieve the same goals. This is because this state will 
change its policy based on the principle of uncertainty in its foreign relations. However, 
Constructivist Theory envisions that if State A has taken the confidence-building measures and 
reduced any excessive defensive actions, then State B will take the same path. Thus, States A and 
B use other methods than self-help to achieve survival, which in turn leads to an increase in the 
chances of achieving international security. 
Therefore, it is possible conclude that constructivism, although it has adopted the same central 
axiom as neo-realism concerning the issue of a chaotic international system, disagrees with neo-
realism on the interpretation of the behaviour of states. This is because constructivists consider the 
social interpretations in the form of beliefs, reactions and norms. Furthermore, the chaos is not the 
factor that leads to the formation of spontaneous behavioural patterns of states, such as the 
emergence of the security dilemma in international politics.99 
2.4 THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL 
The Copenhagen School stands in contrast to the focus of Realism on military factors and 
Liberalism on economic factors. However, it shares the view with constructivism that threats to 
national security are perceived through a collective understanding of what a threat is, be it political, 
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environmental or economic. Thus, threats are treated more broadly than the traditionally 
recognized threats relating to military interventions. This school argues that other considerations 
such as political and environmental factors have to be taken into consideration in order to reach an 
accurate interpretation of the behaviour of states toward their national security.100 In fact, “the 
Copenhagen School became a term for a school of academic thought with its origins in 
international relations theorist Barry Buzan’s book People, States and Fear: The National Security 
Problem in International Relations”.101 In this book, Buzan discusses his hypothesis about the 
nature of the state and stresses the necessity of analysing the nature of the state in order to 
understand the threats it that may face in terms of its national security. Buzan believes that any 
state consists of three interrelated elements: the idea of the national state; the institutional 
expression of the state’s political and administrative system; and the physical base of the state (the 
people, resources, technology).102 He argues by understanding these elements, it is possible to 
achieve a deep and profound perception about the threats to its national security that any state 
could encounter (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Constituent Parts of the State103 
According to his assumption about the nature of the state, Buzan points out that any state is the 
outcome of a contract between a group of people who share the same culture and perhaps the same 
ethnicity, race or heritage and who are named the 'Nation' rather than being only a physical 
organism. Therefore, he considers that the idea of the state is the most centralized element in the 
Nature of the State hypotheses. It is through this idea of the state that the nation organizes the 
ideological underpinning on which the state is formed, and through which its institutional 
structures are established according to the physical base of the state. As a result, Buzan believes 
that any state can be defined through the nation and organizing ideologies.  
Furthermore, he argues that four different patterns explain the links between the nation and the 
state. In the first pattern, the nation, which precedes the state, plays an essential role in the creation 
of the state and the relationship between the nation and the state is deep. In this pattern, the purpose 
of the state is to protect, represent and express the nation, as: 
the nation provides the state with both a strong identity in the international arena, and a 
solid base of domestic legitimacy – solid enough to withstand revolutionary upheavals, 
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as in the case of France at the end of the eighteenth century, or defeat and occupation 
by foreign powers, as in the case of France and Japan during the 1940s.104 
In the second pattern, the state plays a key role in the creation of a nation, through the absorption 
of immigrants to fill any uninhabited territory. The residents submit to state control, such as in the 
case of the US, many countries in Latin America and Australia. In these cases, the institutions of 
these states integrate the migrants and indigenous people in their communities through the 
consolidation of cultural elements such as language, arts, custom and law. Thus, a new national 
identity for the nation becomes established over time, which retains the parts of the original identity 
that do not conflict with the new national identity of the state. Moreover, some institutions in Asian 
and African countries, which gained independence after decolonization in the twentieth century, 
such as Sudan and Nigeria, added a new layer of collective identity among its population in order 
to cope with the complex ethnic, tribal and religious divisions within the framework of the nation-
state.  
In the third pattern; the state is formed as a part of nation-state, in which the nation was divided 
into two or more divisions, such as Vietnam and Korea. The Vietnamese nation embraced the idea 
of forming the states of North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with each part seeking to join the other 
part to unite the nation. This resulted in a lack of security for each state and for others as a result 
of the 30-year struggle between the two competing regimes. In the case of North and South Korea, 
the strategy to differentiate the Korean nation into two states was adopted in order to build the 
legitimacy of each part.  
In the fourth pattern, the state has more than one nation within its borders and forms what is called 
a multination-state. Federal states that contain two or more states and imperial states rely on this 
pattern. In this pattern, the federal state encourages the states contained within its regime to retain 
their own identities and does not attempt to impose any artificial national identity upon them. 
Furthermore, the federal state attempts to restructure the multination-state within this context so 
that no one nationality dominates the structure of the entire state; examples include Canada, the 
UK and India. In contrast, the nation dominating the structures of an imperial state seeks to 
suppress other nationalities in order to transform itself into a semblance of the nation-state and 
thus maintain its dominance of the state structure. The dominating nation resorts to suppressing 
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the other nationalities through absorbing their cultural and racial elements in order to transform 
itself into a semblance of a nation-state, or by adopting a non-nationalist ideology such as 
Communism in the case of China. Thus, China was able to contain different nations under the 
framework of the communist state. Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was established 
after the revolution against the Shah’s regime in 1979, saw the Persian nation adopt the Islamic 
caliphate regime (or what is termed the wali al-faqih regime) in order to impose their control over 
the state while marginalizing other nationalities in Iran.   
In terms of the organizing ideologies, Buzan argues that the ideologies are the most evident factor 
in the upper idea of the state. These ideologies determine the form of the state, such as monarchical, 
republican or communist. In addition, many varieties of political, economic, religious and social 
thoughts may serve as an idea of the state, when the nation and the values associated to its national 
identity form a major element of the idea of the state. Thus, the ideologies handle the relations 
between the government and the community by identifying the conditions for harmony and conflict 
in the internal politics.105 However, the ideas by their very nature are prone to interact with other 
ideas, which may lead to the fact that “[o]rganizing ideologies can be penetrated, distorted, 
corrupted and eventually undermined by contact with other ideas. They can be attacked through 
their supporting institutions, and they can be suppressed by force”.106 Thus, “[i]n some cases, an 
organizing ideology will be so deeply ingrained into the state that change would have 
transformational, or perhaps fatal, implications”.107 For example, in Saudi Arabia, the largest 
segment of the idea of its state is based on Islam; if this changed it would be impossible for the 
state of Saudi Arabia to survive. 
In terms of state institutions, Buzan explains that the state institutions, including the government, 
are the mechanism through which the state exerts its authority. These institutions are broadly 
defined and include the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial authorities, in addition 
to the laws, rules and procedures. Accordingly, the institutions of the state are more tangible than 
the idea of the state, because they have a physical presence. This means that they are more 
vulnerable to physical threats than ideas which makes “ideas so difficult as an object of 
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security”.108 However, Buzan also explains that the ideas and institutions are intertwined and 
cannot be separated from each other; the ideas of democracy or communism would be pointless 
without the institutions that exist to implement them and the institutions would be meaningless 
without an idea to grant them definition and purpose. Therefore, any radical change to the idea of 
the state may lead to its death. In this case, the main threat to the state is internal. The internal 
threats can come from small groups of militants relatively isolated from the community that 
threaten the institutions by force, which leads the institutions to defend itself. However, the main 
danger arises when the opponents threaten the idea of the state and the state responds violently, 
which eventually erodes its legitimacy and causes collapses, as happened in Poland in 1980. A 
further example is of powerful guerrilla movements fighting against the institutions of the state, as 
happened in the case of Afghanistan. In addition, widely popular discontent may occur against the 
institutions of the state, as happened in South Africa in the 1990s, or a comprehensive revolution 
against the institutions of the state, as happened in Iran in 1979. In this context, regimes may 
interfere in the internal policies of other regimes in order to protect their national interest. For 
example, a regime can launch a propaganda campaign against the ideology of a certain regime, or 
provide funds and facilities for opposition groups, or encourage armed revolts against another 
regime, or escalate external economic pressures in an attempt to undermine the credibility of the 
local government or sponsor direct intervention by armed force under the guise of an international 
umbrella. 
Finally, Buzan explains his perception of the physical base of the state. He argues that it consists 
of the state’s residents and its territories, including all natural resources and human-made wealth 
within its borders. He adds that the physical base of the state is the most significant element in his 
Nature of the State hypothesis in terms of security. Threats to the physical objects are necessarily 
more direct and, therefore, clear in terms of the confiscation or destruction than threats to 
amorphous objects such as ideas and institutions. Another factor that threatens the physical base 
of the state occurs when a state claims that a certain region that lies under the sovereignty of 
another state is part of its territory, whether or not this claim is internationally recognized. Also, a 
province belonging to a state may be exposed to the threat of joining with another country, such 
as the Republican counties in Northern Ireland. The loss of a region does not necessarily, or even 
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usually, threaten the state’s survival. Each of Germany, Pakistan, Mexico and Poland has lost large 
areas of their territories without disrupting the historical continuity of the state. However, some 
areas are clearly more important to a state than others for a variety of reasons. The value can arise 
from its resources, such as oil in the disputed areas between Iran and Iraq; for strategic reasons, 
such as Gibraltar; or due to a combination of these reasons, such as the Falkland Islands, Kashmir, 
and the four islands of northern Japan. Such territory has a much higher priority as an object of 
security than other areas. Also, the physical base may be exposed to threats of damage or harms 
such as land-seizure motivated by policy of deterrence by another state; as happened in the Six-
Day War launched by Israel against Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967.  
Human migrations also represent a serious threat to the physical base of the state, especially if the 
state was a nation-state and the immigrants are from different cultural or ethnic backgrounds. This 
migration may threaten the fabric and cohesion of the community. Similarly, Giesen highlights 
certain countries with traditional societies adopt specific regulations in relation to foreigners 
wishing to obtain citizenship that are additional to normal international requirements such as the 
need to respect the law and the constitution of the state. Such countries require those who want to 
obtain its citizenship to be conversant in the language, customs, traditions and the history of their 
communities before being admitted as members in order to maintain the continuity of the collective 
identity of their citizens. This is because these countries do not want to be changed because of their 
interaction with migrants who do not belong to their communities.109 
In addition, the state’s inability to control its borders is another threat to its physical base. 
Relatedly, environmental threats also threaten the physical base of the state, as there is a strong 
correlation between environmental degradation and security. The grave consequences of 
environmental degradation are becoming a more acute issue, because it can lead to internal 
violence as populations are forced to migrate to less affected areas leading to an outbreak of social 
tensions between the displaced and resident population. Similarly, crises are associated with the 
scarcity in natural resources, such as water and energy.110 Finally, Buzan adds that the 
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technological threats can affect the physical base of the state. An example is the threat to the 
country’s electronic networks associated with its institutions from internal or external hacking. 
Hathaway et al. define an attack via the Internet as “any action taken to undermine the functions 
of a computer network for a political or national security purpose”.111 Indeed, many countries are 
now dependent on the technologies related to the Internet, as their micro-infrastructure is highly 
digitalised and therefore vulnerable to cyber-attacks that could destabilize their national security. 
For example, in 2013, vital institutions, including several major banks and three of the largest TV 
networks in South Korea suffered coordinated cyber-attacks, which could have led to chaos across 
the country, if the attack had not been contained by the authorities.112 
2.5 THEORISING THE NATIONAL SECURITYOF THE UAE 
It is important to note that none of the theories promulgated by the four schools of international 
relations theory in relation the interpretation of a country’s national security issues fit exactly with 
the social, economic and political composition of the UAE. This is because most are founded on a 
historic western perspective that differs radically with the concepts and perceptions of developing 
countries, to which the UAE belongs.  
The Balance of Power theory, which was formulated by Realist School thinkers, explains the 
behaviour of the Great Powers in time of peace and war, in a comprehensive manner. However, 
when it is applied to Third World countries, it loses much of its cohesion and analytical capabilities 
in relation to providing an adequate explanation for the behaviour of those countries to maintain 
their national security in an international system characterized by anarchy.113 Arguably, the reason 
for this is that it derives from a European view of history, which views the major powers in a 
permanent state of conflict and war that is radically different from the position of most Third World 
countries, including the UAE.114 Therefore, Realist School scholars, such as Van Evera, argue that 
Third World countries generally do not matter, whether in the theoretical domain or in the 
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international reality of the post-Cold War world, despite the fact that most of the world’s 
population live in those countries.115 
Furthermore, Liberal School thinkers ignore the political and social specificities and the economic 
conditions of the Third World. This School claims that peace and international cooperation are 
achieved through three elements. First, the unification of political systems across the world through 
pursuing the principles and values of liberal democracy based on democratic representation as the 
main priority of the state. The second is applying the free-market economic system, which restricts 
state interference in domestic markets, opens markets to transnational corporations (TNCs) and 
provides economic freedom for all members of society. The third is succumbing to the dictates of 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations in order to change the internal or 
external behaviour of states in the case of incompatibility with the values of liberal democracy. 
Thus, the achievement of peace between states depends on the presence of these three features; the 
absence of any of these features renders states unable to achieve cooperation and peace among 
themselves, which will reflect negatively on the security of the international system stability.116 In 
fact, the theories of Liberal School thinkers are ideologically biased as they are derived from 
Western ideas and philosophies.117 For example, according Mansour in his article, ‘Adam Smith 
and Economic Liberalism’, Smith’s Economic Liberalism has to be applied in order to establish 
global peace. This thesis emerged in the eighteenth century during a period of armed conflict 
between the European powers over the colonies scattered across the world because of the 
imposition of trading monopolies for their companies. Therefore, Smith called for the absolute 
freedom of trade for all the European powers in order to invoke fair competition instead of colonial 
conflict. Accordingly, thinkers associated with the Liberal School continue to pursue the idea that 
economic freedom is a way of eliminating conflict. However, they ignore the fact that their version 
of economic freedom creates monopolies for TNCs. Thus, by extension, world peace is a means 
by which to provide global security for capital, and the unification of the world under the banner 
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of global capital. Therefore, Mansour stresses that Liberalism School intellectuals paint a false 
ideological image of the reality.118 
Moreover, the Liberal School, with its emphasis on the importance of economics and economic 
interests taking precedence over other considerations, such as political and military interests, 
makes it incapable of interpreting the behaviours of Third World countries generally.119 This 
includes the UAE, which is situated in a neighbourhood dominated by the aggressive policies of 
the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The latter rejects the UAE’s repeated calls to solve the 
territorial dispute over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa by peaceful means 
through direct negotiations or by resorting to the International Court of Justice. Moreover, the 
UAE, despite being one of the richest countries in the world in per capita terms, has regional 
neighbours that have suffered economically because of the policies of their regimes, which have 
harnessed economic resources for regime survival at the expense of the development of their 
societies, such as the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. This has creating an incubator for 
al-Qaeda extremists in Yemen, which pose a direct threat to the security and stability of the UAE 
as well as the entire world.  
Meanwhile, the Constructivist School addresses the nature of the construction of international 
relations prevailing between the countries of the Third World. However, because of its ideologican 
cognitive roots, it produced a theory that is unable to explain the behaviour of Third World 
countries towards their national security. The Constructivist School is unable to interpret the 
existence of conflicts between states and groups that share common identities, values, ideas, norms 
and standards because the theory is based on an approach that these commonalities ensure peace. 
Furthermore, it ignores considerations of power and the chaotic nature of the international 
system.120 Nevertheless, the constructivist approach is useful in theorizing the UAE’s national 
security and the state’s behaviour towards perceived threats, especially in terms of shared values, 
identity structures, and interests. This is evident in the UAE’s engagement in the Yemen War as 
part of the international alliance to re-establish stability and combat Iranian interventionism in 
Yemen which is perceived to pose a major threat to Saudi Arabia, and consequently to the UAE. 
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However, Constructivism fails to explain certain international relations events such as the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which occurred despite the fact that the two countries are broadly 
compatible in terms of historical, social and cultural values, standards and ideas. 121Thus, 
constructivist theories find it difficult to explain and interpret certain events, especially with regard 
to processes of change in regional politics.122 However, constructivism can explain the changing 
nature of the structures of international relations but not the events that lead to the change. 
Furthermore, in relation to constructivists’ assumptions about the power structure of international 
relations, Walker explains that they believe that “it is important to recognize that ideas, 
consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of 
political, military and economic power”.123 Although, this approach can be projected on the UAE’s 
perceived power system, this is not appropriate because it is not directly related to the UAE’s 
reality; for example, the UAE’s economic power is not essentially bound by the established 
ideology or culture. Therefore, constructivism is not the ideal model to base an analysis framework 
for threats to the UAE’s national security.  
Meanwhile, the Copenhagen School’s approach identifies the state as the object of the threat, i.e. 
the ‘referent’, and as the securitizing actor. “Following Buzan, Waever and de Wilde the referent 
object for security has ‘traditionally been the state and, in a more hidden way, the nation’”.124 
Therefore, in order to apply the justification for securitizing a threat, the Copenhagen school 
applies a constructivist approach by which the “securitizing actors can attempt to construct 
anything as a referent object”.125 In this context, researchers argue about how securitization abuse 
is open to states, especially if national perceptions are manipulated to construct a reality that 
political conflict is a national security threat and then enforce securitizing measures on the political 
system. Furthermore, while states can securitize an issue, they can also de-securitize it depending 
on their political purpose, or when common interests and alliances with other international entities 
calls for de-securitizing an issue. The “process and possibilities for de-securitization are 
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undertheorized”.126 
The critique can be verified against the reality of the national security of the UAE. In reality, the 
outlined threats have not lead to securitization except where the sovereignty of the state and social 
cohesion were threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood’s secret UAE branch in 2012 and the 
subsequent decision to classify it as a terrorist organization. 
Furthermore, the Copenhagen School’s highlights how the use of language can raise an issue to a 
security threat. As Wæver states, “the utterance itself is the act...by uttering ‘security’, a state-
representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special 
right to use whatever means necessary to block it”.127 However, certain authors suggest that the 
reliance on language as a securitizing tool, neglects other forms of communication, such as images, 
or practices as in bureaucratic practices or physical measures through which an enforcement of the 
securitization concepts are communicated. Williams “has suggested that television images of 
September 11—and in particular those of the World Trade Centre towers—were central to the 
development of dominant perceptions of security and threat in the American context”.128 Similarly, 
Möller “discusses visual representations of the September 11 attacks—along with conflict in 
Iraq—in pointing to the ways in which photographic exhibitions are similarly able to communicate 
particular meanings of security and threat”.129 Hansen, “meanwhile, uses the example of the 
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 in pointing to the 
potentially central role of visual representations as forms of securitisation”.130 
In conclusion, the Copenhagen School, Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis is the most 
appropriate basis for analysing the national security of the UAE. However, not only it is based on 
European historical and cultural roots but it also has been deepened and expanded to take account 
of the cultures of other nations. Thus, the Copenhagen School is able to overcome the bias of the 
Realist, Constructivist or Liberal Schools. The School’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis is able to 
analyse the national security of the UAE using three basic elements. These elements are the idea 
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of the state, the institutions of the state, and the physical basis of the state. This hypothesis is 
flexible and can be applied to all forms of states whether a nation-state or a state that was part of 
a nation-state, a multi-nation state or an artificial-nation state. The hypothesis has distanced itself 
from alignment with particular polarity of values when discussing the inevitability of a state’s 
failure to survive in the event of any radical change to its ideology, upon which the idea of its 
establishment was founded, whether that ideology was based on Western democratic thought, 
communist thought or the values associated with the identity of its community. The ideologies, 
upon which the different states are based, are the foundations that determine the terms of harmony 
and conflict between governments and members of communities who are subject to its powers, as 
the state institutions are formed in accordance with the ideological framework upon which the idea 
of the state is based. These institutions then enforce and apply their mechanisms on both the 
government and the society in order to maintain the security and stability of the society and protect 
its survival in its territory. Therefore, in the event of any sudden and radical change to the ideology, 
the institutions will change, which could lead to the death of the state. Thus, the concept of security 
in the Copenhagen School is not static, but is a social structure formed through dynamic practice.131 
Furthermore, the Nature of the State hypothesis includes the presence of extremist groups in a 
state’s territory which isolate themselves from their communities and, when they have an 
opportunity, pose threats to the security and stability of the state. These groups can be extreme 
Christian or Islamic groups, or extremist groups based on other ideologies. In addition, the 
hypothesis includes the physical capabilities of the states in terms of resources or economic and 
military power. Thus, all nations are subject to the same standards of analysis. The Copenhagen 
hypothesis also has expanded the concept of national security through the introduction of new 
dimensions not addressed in the theories of the other schools. These dimensions include the 
environment and the technological dimension of cyber security, which is now one of the most 
prominent security challenges facing countries. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School’s Nature of 
the State hypothesis is used to analyse the UAE’s national security in order to answer the research 
questions. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviews the hypotheses of the most important theoretical trends in relation to national 
security in international relations theory, including Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and the 
Copenhagen Schools is reviewed. The discussion highlights the differences between the schools, 
despite the fact that each emerged in more politically advanced societies, which are radically 
different from the society of the UAE. The majority of the concepts and analytical frameworks for 
Security Studies adopted by those schools are not suitable for application to the UAE or to the rest 
of the Third World countries. This is because the majority of the explanatory theories of 
international relations are based on an idea that security issues are determined by the relationship 
between the major powers in the international system.  
Finally, a hypothesis belonging to one of the schools of international relations theory is chosen as 
the most appropriate for analysing the issue of national security of the UAE. The hypothesis on 
the Nature of the State by Buzan, as one of the pioneers of the Copenhagen School, is best able to 
conform to the reality of the international system, without any ideological or cultural bias. This is 
because it deepens and expands the importance of the ideologies of political systems and the 
cultures of nations and proposes a formula for security analysis for the states that reflects the 
changes which took place in the international system after the end of Cold War.  
The next chapter theorizes the UAE national security analysis in the light of Buzan’s hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORIZING THE UAE’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
This chapter identifies the nature of internal and external challenges facing the national security of 
the UAE by analysing the three constituent parts of the state identified by Buzan’s Nature of the 
State hypothesis. Buzan argues that if one of the three parts is exposed to a threat, it will damage 
other constituents of the state. Understanding the constituents helps to reach a broad understanding 
of the dangers related to the survival of the state. This chapter discusses the idea of the UAE, in 
terms of its institutional expression, its political and administrative system and its physical base. 
It also discusses the threats that affect the constituent parts of the UAE. 
3.1 THE IDEA OF THE UAE 
To understand the idea of the UAE’s state formation, it is necessary to understand the relationship 
between the nation and the state. According to Buzan’s theory regarding the nature of the state, 
the idea of any state can be defined through the nation and its organizing ideologies. Therefore, 
the first step in the case of the UAE is to trace the roots of the residents of this geographical area 
who decided to form their own state in 1968. The second step is to identify the ideology that they 
have chosen to form such a state, so that through these steps the threats to the idea of the UAE can 
be identified.  
In fact, the inhabitants who settled in the territory on which the UAE was founded were of an Arab 
ethnic origin. Arabs migrated from what is present day Yemen after the collapse of the Marib Dam 
in AD130 and settled in the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.132 This nation was divided 
into independent groups, with its members linked by the ties of kinship, language, religion, 
customs, traditions, ethics and values.133 The common values underpinning the societies saw 
power delegated to the chief of the tribe to which they belonged or with which they were allied. 
The chief protected the members’ interests in exchange for the members’ loyalty and obedience. 134
Thus, the tribe formed the basic framework for social, economic and political life in the territory 
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of the UAE before its independence. However, the tribal affiliation led to disagreement on the idea 
of the formation of a state that would gather their sheikhdoms under its framework. However, in 
1952, the idea of the state began to grow among these groups following the establishment of the 
Trucial States Council by the British authorities, who were extending their tutelage and control 
over the area. The Trucial States Council included the rulers of the seven sheikhdoms that 
eventually formed the UAE: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um Al Qaiwain, Al Fujairah and 
Ras Al Khaimah.135 The Council, headed by the British Commissioner, coordinated meetings 
between the member rulers in order to encourage them to work on adopting modern management 
methods for their sheikhdoms and develop security, economic and social services for their subjects. 
In 1965, a new phase began for the Council, when the it became under the administration of the 
rulers of the Trucial States, as the British Commissioner resigned from the presidency of the 
Council and asked the members of the Council to elect one of them for the post of President.136 
The post alternated between the members, and changed the view of the rulers from a narrow focus 
on protecting the interests of members of their tribe and its allies to a wider focus of protecting the 
interests of their fellow citizens of the same race. The process of development and advancement 
started in the Trucial States under the supervision of the President of the Council. This 
development included the construction of the electricity and water networks, roads and 
communications, as well as schools and hospitals.  
 
The next stage started in 1968 when the UK announced that it was planning to withdraw from east 
of the Suez Canal, which included the Arabian Gulf by 1971. Following the announcement, 
negotiations continued for three years between the rulers of the Trucial States in addition to Qatar 
and Bahrain to establish a federal state. The aim of the negotiations was to achieve survival for the 
Trucial States following the British withdrawal, which led to fears of a threat from an emergence 
of a power vacuum in the region. A bilateral federal union started between Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
in 1968, which encouraged the remaining sheikhdoms to join. The rulers of the nine sheikhdoms 
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met days after the bilateral federal union was created in Dubai and signed a cooperation pact to 
establish a federation; a committee was tasked with drafting the constitution for this union.137  
However, the proposed federation faced obstacles from the outset because of inconsistencies in 
the idea of the state in the communities of the nine sheikhdoms and the proposed federal state 
system. For example, the proposed federal government would undermine the authority and 
sovereignty of the local governments in the emirates. This was particularly the case in terms of 
security with the local rulers having to pass this mandate to the proposed federal state whose leader 
would be elected from among the rulers every five years. Furthermore, the issue of sovereignty 
over the individual sheikhdoms was a major hurdle in the negotiations. The rulers feared that 
handing over authority to the federal state would undermine the social, political and economic 
systems that formed the fabric of their societies. The populace still pledged allegiance to the 
individual ruler to protect their security, defend their interests and ensure their future rather than 
the leader of the proposed federation. As a result of the mounting differences over the role of the 
federal institutions, first Bahrain and then Qatar withdrew; each declaring independence. Qatar 
and Bahrain did not agree with the Trucial Council members about their idea of a state that would 
protect their nation under its framework. They did not develop the vision of the state reached by 
the rulers of the Trucial States.138 On 2 December 1971, the rulers of the Trucial States, with the 
exception of Ras Al Khaimah, agreed to an interim constitution for a federal state, which defined 
the political system and the state institutions in accordance with the idea of the state based on 
shared ideas, beliefs and values developed over hundreds of years. On 62 February 1972, Ras Al 
Khaimah joined the federal state after ratifying the interim constitution, giving birth to the UAE 
federation between the seven political units. Importantly, the creation of the national entity of the 
UAE has protected and maintained the values associated with the individual tribal identities, 
enabling a national identity to evolve. 
In summary, as Buzan proposes, the formation of the UAE saw the formation of the ideological 
underpinning on which the state is formed. The UAE as a nation was established on a shared 
ideology between the demographic constituents comprising the tribes, and their closely-knit social 
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fabric sharing a common value system derived from ethical and Arabic values. This coherence 
underpins the national identity of the UAE and had facilitated the cooperation between the different 
tribes to promote the country’s establishment and strengthen its base.  
3.2 THE UAE INSTITUTIONS 
The legislative, executive and judiciary institutions in the UAE relate to the idea of the state as 
agreed upon by the rulers of the UAE during the negotiations to establish the federal state. The 
institutions were defined in the draft constitutions before the declaration of the federal state. 
Therefore, it is important to discuss the political and administrative systems in the UAE in order 
to understand the relationship between the concept of the state and the institutions of the state.  
The nature of the composition of the Federal regime in the UAE differs from other federal regimes 
as the UAE adopts a hereditary regime based on the federation of seven tribal hereditary 
monarchies,139 from which two rulers are chosen for the positions of the president and vice-
president of the federal state. Each Emirate is ruled by a single family. The ruling family in Abu 
Dhabi is the Al Nahyan family, while in Dubai it is the Al Maktoum family, in Sharjah and Ras 
Al Khaimah it is the Al Qasimi royal family, in Ajman it is the Al Nuaimi family, in Umm Al 
Quwain it is the Al Mualla family, and in Fujairah it is the Al Sharqi family. The delegation of 
power in the individual Emirates is achieved through the heirs of the ruling family. Each emirate 
ruler appoints a crown price after consulting other members of royal family. The crown prince 
succeeds the ruler after the ruler’s death, which leads to a smooth transition of power; thus 
preserving the security and stability of the Emirate and the federal state. Since its establishment, 
the UAE has only experienced one case in which a ruler of an emirate died without a crown prince 
in place. The exception was in 1972 when Sheikh Khalid Bin Mohamed Al Qasimi, the ruler of 
Sharjah was assassinated during a coup attempt by Sharjah’s former ruler Sheikh Saqr Bin Sultan 
Al Qasimi. The coup was foiled by the intervention of the Union Defence Force of the UAE 
government.140 As Sheikh Khalid had not appointed a crown price before his death, members of 
the Al Qasimi royal family in Sharjah met to choose a ruler; after the consultations, they elected 
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Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohamed Al Qasimi. The criteria considered by the ruling families in the UAE 
for choosing rulers are based on the qualities of intelligence, martial skills, political acumen, piety, 
good character, and generosity.141 
Therefore, the traditional tribal system, as an essential pillar in the idea of the state, remained a 
key factor in the political structure of the UAE, as identified by the Federal Constitution of the 
State. 
3.2.1 The Federal Authorities in the UAE 
The UAE Constitution enshrines the authority of the Ruler of each Emirates as the highest 
authority in the federal state, through their membership in the Federal Supreme Council, which 
elect from its members the President and Vice-President of the federal state. The UAE Constitution 
gives the Federal Supreme Council the competencies and powers, which position it at the forefront 
of the five federal institutions that form the federal authorities. In order, these are the UAE 
President and Vice President, the Federal Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council and 
the Federal Judiciary (see Figure 3.1). 
According to Article 46 of the UAE Constitution, the Federal Supreme Council is the highest 
authority in the state and consists of the rulers of the seven member Emirates or those acting in 
their capacity in case of a ruler’s absence. At the internal level, the Federal Supreme Council draws 
up the principles governing the activity of the executive authority of the Federal State, which are 
based on the achievement of the goals for which the Union has been established. Such goals consist 
of maintaining the State’s security, sovereignty and independence, protecting the rights and 
freedoms of the people of the UAE, and establishing close co-operation among the Emirates for 
their common interest to achieve prosperity and development in all areas in order to provide a 
better life for all citizens.142 The supreme principles, set by the Council to govern the activity of 
the executive authority of the Federal State on the external level, are based on supporting Arabic 
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and Islamic issues and cooperating with all countries and peoples based on the principles and 
charters approved by the Arab, Islamic and international institutions.143 
 
Figure 3.1: The Federal Authorities in the UAE 
The Federal Supreme Council elects from among its members a President and a Vice-President for 
the State for a period of five years,144 with no limit on the number of terms the President and Vice 
President can hold the same position.145 If the office of the President or the Vice President falls 
vacant because of death or resignation, or because one ceases to be the Ruler in his Emirate for 
any reason, the Supreme Council is called into session within one month from that date to elect a 
successor to the vacant office.146 The President of the UAE manages the affairs of the Federation 
alongside with his duties as Ruler of an Emirate. The two roles are different; one is at the Federal 
level and the other at the Emirate level. This duality is similar for the Vice-President of the State,147 
who cannot exercise power in the Federal State when the President is present, but acts on behalf 
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of the President in his absence for any reason.148 While the President of the Federal State enjoys 
executive powers in addition to other limited legislative powers, the Constitution obliges the 
President to exercise the powers in coordination with the Supreme Council of the Union because 
of the possible impact on national security of the Federal State such as the declaration of a 
defensive war.149 
The role of the Federal Council of Ministers in the UAE is to act as an executive body, empowered 
to follow up the implementation of the general policy of the UAE, which is drawn by the Federal 
Supreme Council. The aim is to achieve the goals for which the Union was established. Therefore, 
it is exercising its powers under the oversight of the Federal Supreme Council and the President 
of the UAE.150 
The Federal National Council role in the Federal State is authorized to discuss and express an 
opinion on the draft federal laws referred to it by the Federal Council of Ministers. The opinion 
can include approval, amendment or rejection. The draft laws, which include the draft General 
Budget of Federal State, in addition to the Final Account of Federal State, are then submitted to 
the President of the UAE who forwards them to the Federal Supreme Council for approval.151 The 
Federal National Council is also empowered to discuss constitutional amendments received from 
the Federal Supreme Council, which should achieve the majority of at least two-thirds of the votes 
of the members present for approval. In addition, the Federal National Council formulates an 
opinion on international treaties, conventions and agreements concluded by the State with other 
States and international organizations.152 Moreover, the Federal National Council oversees the 
actions and activities carried out by the Federal government, such as directing the questions to the 
ministers of the Federal government about internal matters within their jurisdictions. In addition, 
it considers complaints submitted to it against Federal government agencies, and make 
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recommendations to the Federal Council of Ministers on issues concerning the UAE public 
political, economic or social activity.153 
The UAE constitution makes the Federal Supreme Court the highest authority in the judicial 
system within the federal state. The Federal Supreme Court is independent from the federal and 
Emirati governments. The judicial system has a bilateral framework that includes the local 
judiciary and the federal judiciary. While the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah 
retain their judicial bodies, the judicial authorities in the Emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al 
Quwain and Fujairah have merged with the federal judiciary while federal first instance courts and 
federal appellate courts have been established in each emirate affiliated to authority of Federal 
Supreme Court. The independence of the Federal Supreme Court f enables it to provide a balance 
between the federal government and local authorities in order to ensure the achievement of the 
objectives for which the federal state was established. In this context, the UAE Constitution grants 
the Federal Supreme Court the authority and power to adjudicate in the following matters:154 
1. Decide on different disputes among the member Emirates of the UAE, or between any one 
or more Emirates and the federal government in the case that the dispute is remitted to the 
Court upon the request of any of the concerned parties. 
2. Consider the constitutionality of a federal law if it is challenged by one or more of the 
Emirates on the grounds that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the UAE. The Court 
also has the power to consider the constitutionality of legislation enacted by an Emirate if 
it is challenged by a federal authority on the grounds that it is in conflict with the 
Constitution of the UAE or the federal laws. 
3. Consider the constitutionality of laws, legislation and regulations in general, if it is 
requested by any court in the country while hearing a relevant case. 
4. Interpret the provisions of the Constitution, if it is requested by any federal authority or by 
the government of any Emirate. 
5. Call into account the ministers and senior officials of the UAE appointed by decree for 
their actions while performing their official duties upon the request of the Supreme 
Council. 
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6. Decide on the crimes, which directly affect the interests of the UAE, such as the crimes 
relating to the UAE’s internal or external security, forgery of the official records or seals. 
7. Hear the cases of conflict of jurisdiction between a federal court and a local court in an 
Emirate. 
8. Hear the cases of conflict of jurisdiction between a court in an Emirate and a court in 
another Emirate.  
9. Any other powers provided in the Constitution or which may be conferred upon the Federal 
Supreme Court by a federal law. 
3.2.2 The Organization of the Federal and Local Institutions in the UAE 
The UAE Constitution organizes the institutions between the federal government and local 
governments of the seven Emirates of the UAE (see Figure 3.2). The member Emirates have 
retained their tribal system exercised on their territories,155 as they did not lose their identities upon 
their accession to the Union.156 However, they have become internal constitutional units, which 
exercise a semblance of independence and self-governance on their territories. In this context, 
Article 5 of the Constitution stipulates that: 
A member Emirate shall exercise sovereignty over its own territories and territorial 
waters in all matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the UAE federation under 
the Constitution. So, the semblance of the independence and autonomy principle for the 
member Emirates of the Federal State is expressed in retaining their own flags for use 
within their territories.157 …  
In addition, Article 3 states that “the natural resources in each emirate are publicly owned by the 
emirate”.158Thus, each Emirate possesses its own legislative, executive and judicial authorities. 
The Federal Constitution gives each emirate the powers that do not fall under the authority of the 
Federal government as set out in Articles 120 and 121.159 
                                                          
155 Ibid, p. 46. 
156 The member Emirates, by joining the federal state, gave up their international characters and some of their 
executive, legislative and judicial powers and certain aspects of their sovereignty in return for the establishment of an 
independent and sovereign federal state with a new international character which is the UAE and in return for a better 
standard of living, greater stability and a heightened international status. See Karam, Ghazi (2010), op. cit., p. 311. 
157 Article 5 of the Constitution of the UAE. 
158 Article 3 of the Constitution of the UAE. 
159 Article 120 stipulates that 
The UAE has exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following matters: (1) Foreign affairs. (2) 
Defense and the federal armed forces. (3) Protection of the UAE’s security against internal or external threats. (4) 
The matters pertaining to security, order, and government in the permanent capital city of the UAE. (5) The matters 
relating to federal officers and the federal judiciary. (6) The federal finance, taxes, duties and dues. (7) The federal 
public loans. (8) Post, telegram, telephone, and wireless services. (9) Paving, maintaining, and improving such roads 
as the Supreme Council may deem main roads, and regulating the traffic movement on those roads. (10) Air control 
48 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Central Federal Government and Local Governments in the UAE 
The distribution of powers between the federal and local institutions for managing the internal 
affairs plays a basic role in supporting the idea of the UAE, which is, as already highlighted, based 
on the tribal system. This tribal system has guaranteed the security and stability of the member 
Emirates’ citizens since ancient times. Although all UAE citizens hold one nationality, the 
subordination of their nationality and issuance of their passports lies under the authority of the 
member Emirates to which they belong. The local government assume responsibility in terms of 
providing public services and developing the infrastructure of the areas that lies under its authority, 
with the assistance of the federal government. For example, local governments provide lands free 
of charge to their citizens in order to build houses. However, citizens, in conjunction with their 
local governments, can seek assistance from Sheikh Zayed Housing Program, a federal 
government institution, to assist them in building those houses, whether by giving them interest-
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- Importation of arms and ammunitions except for use by the security forces of any Emirate;  
- Other aviation matters that do not lie within the federal executive jurisdiction;  
- Delimitation of the territorial waters and regulation of navigation in the high seas; and  
- Regulation of the free financial zones, the manner in which they are established, and how far they are excluded 
from scope of application of the federal legislative provisions. 
The Federal 
Government
Abu Dhabi 
Government
Dubai 
Government
Sharjah 
Government
Ajman 
Government
Umm Al 
Quwain 
Government
Ras Al 
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Government
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free loans or build such houses free of charge. This is done to raise the standard of living and social 
level of the citizens in all Emirates.  
However, foreign affairs are monopolized by the federal government in order to ensure the 
protection of the national interests of the State, which may conflict with the interests of a member 
Emirate, and may affect the survival of the State in the future. 
3.2.3 State Protection Institutions in the UAE 
The security system of UAE has experienced many changes since the announcement of the 
independence of the State. The Ministry of the Interior has been responsible for all aspects of 
internal security operations in the State; however, in recent years federal agencies have been 
established to work with the Ministry of the Interior in strengthening internal security in the federal 
state. Consequently, the Ministry of the Interior and security agencies that help and support the 
internal security of the UA are discussed in this section. 
3.2.3.1 The armed forces and its role in maintaining security in the UAE 
Ahead of the UAE’s independence, the Trucial States had six military units. “the Trucial Oman 
Scouts, the Defense Army of Abu Dhabi, the Defense Army of Dubai, the National Guard of 
Sharjah, and the Motorized Force of Ras Al Khaimah”160 along with the National Guard of Umm 
Al Quwain. The Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) were formed by the UK in 1951, to act as police and 
peacekeeping forces across the Trucial States.161 British officers and Jordanian warrant officers 
trained and led the forces.162 They gained the confidence of the population over two decades, as 
they played an impartial role in protecting the coast’s public order.163 During the talks over the 
federal union, the emirates’ rulers agreed unanimously to make the TOS the core of the Union 
Defence Forces for defending the country after the British troops’ withdrawal.164 However, the 
forces of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah were not integrated into the federal 
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country's armed forces. The four emirates announced that they would keep their forces independent 
from the Union Defence Forces; Article 142 of the provisional constitution stipulated that member 
emirates had the right to build local armed forces that could be integrated into the Union Defence 
Forces when necessary to repel foreign aggression.165 
The integration of military forces in the UAE passed through a number of stages. The first stage 
started when the British government handed over the TOS to the UAE on 21December 1971 after 
the declaration of independence.166 The Scouts formed the nucleus of the federal state security 
forces. They were renamed the Union Defence Force, which was officially established on 27 
December 1971, following the decision of the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE 
President. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the UAE Minister of Defence, was 
charged with leading and supervising the force.167 In 1975, members of the Federal Supreme 
Council invited an Arab Committee comprised of Arab military leaders from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
and Kuwait to provide advice about the best method for the integration of the Armed Forces in a 
formula acceptable to the rulers and that would conform to the Constitution.168 The Committee 
opted to unite the forces of the individual Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm Al Quwain, 
and Ras Al Khaimah) under one central command. The Committee also proposed making three 
separate commands in military zones for the forces of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Ras Al Khaimah, 
and merging the forces of Sharjah and Umm Al Quwain under one command. On 6 May 1976, a 
meeting of the Defence Supreme Council was held, led by the UAE President,169 in which they 
discussed the decision to integrate the Armed Forces under one central command, i.e. the General 
Headquarter of the UAE Armed Forces. Subsequently a meeting of the Federal Supreme Council 
was held on 6 November 1976 to discuss the integration decision. The Council agreed to issue a 
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constitutional amendment, abolishing the provisions of Article 142 of the temporary constitution, 
in order that the state could be granted the sole right to establish ground, marine, and air forces.170 
Moreover, it was agreed to form commands of military zones led in each case by the son of the 
ruler of the Emirate in which the force was located. Hence, the Command of Western Region 
Military Zone was formed in Abu Dhabi led by Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Command 
of the Central Military Zone was led by Sheikh Ahmed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and the Command 
of the Northern Military Zone was led by Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi.171 The forces of 
Sharjah and Umm Al Quwain were merged in Yarmouk Bridge led by the General Headquarter of 
the Armed Forces.172 The merger of the forces was purely formal. In 1978, Sheikh Zayed bin 
Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE President, issued a resolution to reorganize the Armed Forces through 
the full integration of the air and marine forces, and abolition of the military zone commands, 
turning them into brigades and organized military groups directly linked to the General 
Headquarter of the Armed Forces.173 Abu Dhabi turned the Command of the Western Military 
Zone to a brigade formation directly affiliated to the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces.174 
Sharjah, which had earlier been committed to the full integration of the Sharjah National Guard in 
the units of the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces following the integration resolution in 
1976,175 formed other forces in 1984 under the name of the Sharjah Amiri Guard.176 In 1990, 
Sharjah merged that force into the units of the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces.177 
Moreover, the Command of the Northern Military Zone of Ras Al Khaimah was turned into a 
brigade formation under the name, Second Badr Brigade.178 The brigade remained under the 
command of Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi until he retired in the mid-1990s, upon which the 
brigade was fully integrated in the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces. Dubai maintained 
its forces under the name of Command of the Central Military Zone, until the force was fully 
integrated in the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces in 1997.179 2006 marked the last stage 
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in the integration of the UAE Armed Forces, when Umm Al Quwain issued a resolution to merge 
its forces, known as the Umm Al Quwain National Guard, into the General Headquarter of the 
UAE Armed Forces.180 
Furthermore, the UAE government has focused on modernizing its Armed Forces, and enhancing 
its defence capabilities according to the latest developments in the weapons industry, for the sake 
of maintaining security and stability. In 2001, the UAE Armed Forces were assigned a mission to 
contribute alongside the Ministry of Interior to the internal security of the State based on a decree 
of Federal Law No. 1 of 2001. This Law stated that the mission of guarding the sea and marine 
borders is assigned to the Armed Forces, and consequently the personnel of the Coast Guards 
currently with the Ministry of Interior along with all facilities were to be moved to the Coast 
Guards of the Armed Forces. It also stated that all powers assigned to the Ministry of Interior for 
guarding the coasts and borders were cancelled. The decree assigned the Armed Forces to carry 
out all the necessary missions for the sake of securing the land and marine borders, as well as to 
implement all laws and exercise the powers stipulated in all the applicable laws and regulations. 
The Armed Forces were given the right to shoot trespassers crossing the land and marine borders, 
according to the regulations issued by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The decree stated 
that the land border guards were responsible for the security of all passages and paths, fighting 
smuggling and infiltration, providing help in search and rescue operations, and securing all 
monuments, archaeological sites and all objects relating to the heritage and the water resources in 
the areas of marine borders. The decree also stated that the missions of the Coast Guards was to 
guard the marine borders with the neighbouring countries, promptly report any suspect activity, 
and to prevent the violation of state laws and the customs and security systems or those relating to 
immigration, health, or preserving environment and natural wealth. They were also tasked to carry 
out search and rescue missions and offer help in emergencies, perform surveillance of navigation 
in cooperation with the Ministry of Transportation and the port authorities, report any navigational 
threats, and protect the oil facilities and cables as well as the marine pipes. They were further 
assigned to protect marine means of transportation, navigational and other facilities. Moreover, the 
UAE government tasked the Armed Forces to provide medical services for citizens in the furthest 
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border points, whether such spots lie in the desert or in the distant valleys and islands; such 
treatment and medical services are provided free of charge.181 
Furthermore, the State President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and after 
obtaining the approval of the members of the Supreme Council of the Union, ordered that the UAE 
government task the armed forces with participation in international peacekeeping forces under 
the banner of the United Nations in several operations. The UAE government has also dispatched 
forces on a number of external missions to participate with the international community in 
preserving the security and stability of many of the tense spots in the world. 
The first participation of the UAE Armed Forces outside its territory was in Lebanon in 1976, 
where a UAE Armed Forces battalion has participated within the Arab Deterrent Force. This force 
was formed by Arab countries, based on a decision by the League of Arab States, in order to 
contribute to the maintenance of internal security of Lebanon at the beginning of the outbreak of 
the civil war.182 The mission of the UAE Armed Forces in Lebanon continued until 1979.183 In 
addition, squads of the UAE Armed Forces took part in the international alliance and with the GCC 
Forces in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm for the liberation of Kuwait in 
1990-1991.184 Moreover, a battalion of the UAE Armed Forces also took part in the operation of 
stabilizing Somalia with the UN forces in 1993 in Operation Hope Restoration; the mission of the 
UAE Armed Forces continued until 1994.185 In 1999, the UAE Armed Forces participated with 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the White Hands Operation for the rescue of 
Kosovo refugees who fled to Kukes in Albania,186 because of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated 
against them by the Serbian forces. The UAE Armed Forces established a camp for 10,000 
refugees from Kosovo,187 with the participation of national and charity organizations in UAE, they 
provided the necessities for refugees.188 The UAE Armed Forces established an airport, called 
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Sheikh Zayed Airport, in the region to facilitate the delivery of rescue materials for refugees.189 
Furthermore, the UAE Armed Forces took part, with Kosovo Forces (KFOR) led by the NATO, 
in the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo from 1999-2001.190 
In 2001, a UAE Armed Forces mission participated in clearing mines in the south of Lebanon, 
within the framework of a special agreement signed between the UAE government and the 
Lebanese government. Under “Operation Emirates Solidarity”, the UAE pledged to help clear 
mines from the southern areas of Lebanon from which the Israeli forces withdrew in 2000, at a 
cost of USD50m. The project continued until it ended successfully in 2009.191 In addition, in 2003, 
a mechanised unit of the UAE Armed Forces was established in Kuwait among the GCC Peninsula 
Shield Forces. Kuwait had sought the help of the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces to abort any 
potential attacks from Iraq, and the participation of the UAE Armed Forces continued from 9 
February 2003 until 15 May 2003.192 After the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the 
UAE Armed Forces offered humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. Sheikh Zayed hospital was 
opened in Baghdad,193 which is one of the most modern and biggest hospitals to be opened in Iraq 
since the ousting of Hussein. The hospital is one of the best diagnosis centres in Iraq, in which 
Iraqi patients are treated and are provided with medication for free. It is run and managed by the 
UAE Armed Forces.194 Moreover, the UAE Armed Forces with the help of the UAE Red Crescent 
Authority have taken part in refurbishing and maintaining orphanages in Iraq.195 
The UAE Armed Forces also provided humanitarian aid for the Afghan people after the Taliban 
were toppled in 2004. They are based in the tense south part of Afghanistan, where they have been 
welcomed by the residents.196 The UAE Armed Forces have sought the help of national and charity 
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organizations in UAE to implement a number of development projects.197 The Forces have also 
supervised the construction of a number of mosques, schools and vocational institutes, and 
universities in a number of areas in Afghanistan.198 In cooperation with relevant authorities in the 
UAE and Afghanistan, the Forces have implemented a number of health projects, such as the 
Sheikh Zayed hospital and a number of clinics in the different states, providing them with the 
necessary medical equipment, medications, labs, and scan labs.199 With the help of the UAE Red 
Crescent Authority, the UAE Armed Forces has provided various forms of aid in different Afghan 
states,200 such as the construction of Sheikh Zayed City in Kabul in Afghanistan, as a residential 
city for orphans and those afflicted by the war in Afghanistan.201 
In March 2011, a UAE force joined the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces based in Bahrain, in response 
to an official request by the Kingdom of Bahrain. The demands were raised by groups, which were 
loyal to the ‘Welayat al Faqih, which is the guardianship of the Jurist system established in Iran. 
Therefore, the roots of the demands are of a religious nature with a political front to legitimize the 
demands.202 The protests created dangerous chaos in some areas in Bahrain. For example, a group 
of demonstrators closed main roads and streets in the heart of the capital, Manama, with the aim 
of holding a coercive general strike, isolating it from the remaining governorates in the Kingdom. 
When the unarmed Bahraini police forces attempted to negotiate with some of the demonstrators 
to open one of the roads, the demonstrators attacked them, and a number were injured. 
Furthermore, a demonstrator crashed into a police officer is his car.203 Therefore, Bahrain 
summoned the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces to protect the public organizations, public sites, and 
strategic facilities in the Kingdom, in order that the Bahraini security systems could organize the 
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internal security. The Bahraini security then dispersed the demonstrations, and arrested the 
outlaws. After restoring security in the country, the Bahraini authorities held national 
reconciliation talks with more than 300 Bahraini personalities representing the different political 
and social societies, as well as women, young people, public figures, and members of both the 
People's Assembly the Shura Council and the Unions’ representatives. The aim of the dialogue 
was to reach common principles to re-launch the path of political reforms in Bahrain.204 
In addition, in March 2011, the UAE Air Force joined NATO Air Forces in military operations in 
Libya, aiming to implement the UN Resolution No. 1973,205 which declared Libya a no-fly zone. 
The Resolution was aimed at protecting civilians against the attacks by the regime of Colonel 
Muammar Al Gaddafi, which committed crimes against humanity using military planes and jets 
against the Libyan people, who initially peacefully revolted against the regime on17 February 
2011.206 
The UAE Air Force has also participated, in September 2014, in the international coalition led by 
the USA to launch air strikes against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group had 
gained control of large parts of Iraq and Syria.207 
Lately, the UAE Armed Forces have been participating with the international coalition forces led 
by Saudi Arabia to return legitimacy to Yemen. Since March 2015, the Yemeni regime has faced 
armed rebellion consisting of military forces belonging to the former Yemeni president, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, fighting alongside a militia belonging to the Houthi group.208 The Houthis are 
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financed by the Iranian regime in order to destabilize the security and stability of the Arabian 
Peninsula region. Rebel troops have seized control of large parts of northern Yemen and the 
government institutions in the capital, Sanaa. The legitimate president of the Republic of Yemen, 
Hadi Abed Rabbo Mansour, has called for help, through an official letter, from his neighbours in 
the GCC. He has requested their assistance by all possible means, to protect Yemen and its people 
from the continued aggression of rebel military forces and deter the attacks. His call is based on 
the Principle of Self-Defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Arab League Charter and the Joint Arab Defence Treaty. Furthermore, he argues that the constant 
status of instability in Yemen creates a vacuum for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to fill, further 
destabilising Yemen and the GCC countries. Accordingly, military operations were launched in 
Yemen by international coalition forces in an attempt to restore security and political stability. The 
coalition has managed to regain control of areas, which had been under the control of rebel military 
forces, in addition to regions in the south previously controlled by al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula. In addition, while the military operation is running political negotiations between the 
conflicting parties are on-going. 
3.2.3.2 Ministry of Interior of the UAE 
The Ministry of Interior was established according to Article 58 of the UAE Constitution209 and 
Article 3 of the Federal Law No. 1 of 1972.It was given responsibility for all issues relating to 
nationality, passports, immigration and residence, state security against all internal threats, 
organizing and supervising the federal security forces, and coordinating and enhancing 
cooperation between the police forces in all the emirates members of the federation. The Ministry 
of Interior was further assigned the supervision of the spending of the financial allocations of the 
Federation Budget on internal security according to the needs of each Emirate. It was tasked that 
in coordination with the concerned authorities, it should supervise security affairs, order, and local 
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management in the permanent federal capital, traffic in the permanent federal capital and the main 
federal roads which the Federal Supreme Council declared shall be main roads, as well as the other 
tasks assigned to the Ministry according to any other laws.210 
The Ministry of Interior has both central and de-centralized authority. All police powers are under 
the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the Ministry representatives in the UAE (police 
commanders, Directors of the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, Directors 
of the General Civil Defence Administrations) have no authority to tackle issues relating to the 
national security without referring first to the Ministry. The federal government may narrow or 
widen the scope of the issues, which are mostly of an executive or organizational nature, that these 
representatives can independently handle. This is undertaken according to the Ministry's public 
policy.211 
Overall, the objective of the general police command at the level of the state (Abu Dhabi General 
Police Command, Dubai General Police Command, Sharjah General Police Command and 
Fujairah General Police Command) is to keep peace and security in their individual Emirates. The 
Ministry of Interior seeks to provide the necessary resources in order to achieve this target in the 
best way. Police colleges in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah have been established for graduating 
national cadres to work in the different security sectors in the state. The Ministry provides its staff 
with frequent security courses to enhance their performance and equip them with the necessary 
knowledge and experience for their work. The Ministry of Interior also sends staff to other states 
to undertake special security studies, to learn other languages, and to learn more about the cultures 
of such countries. The overall aim of this policy is to ensure a security strategy that protects the 
UAE’s national identity from being obliterated as a result of the demographic weakness created 
by the large migrant population.212 Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior has a communications 
network linking it to all operation rooms of the police general commands. In addition, the banks, 
private companies and public organizations are linked by a warning system to the police general 
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commands in order to respond to any emergences as rapidly as possible. The police command 
centres, stations, patrols, and ambulances are linked through the developed communications 
network, which enables them to send patrols and ambulances to the site of an incident as soon as 
possible. The Ministry of Interior has also provided the most developed and fastest means of 
transportation to the general police commands in Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al 
Khaimah and Fujairah. This includes helicopters, which are mostly used in search operations for 
those missing on land or at sea, and in the surveillance of traffic, in rescue operations and in the 
transportation of the injured. Finally, the Ministry of Interior and some of the general police 
commands in the state provide online services in order to guarantee a speedy provision of services 
for nationals and residents in the state. For example, the website of Dubai Police Command enables 
community members to communicate with Dubai Police Commander, his Deputy, Directors of the 
general departments and police stations in Dubai. Among other services, the website also provides 
legal consultations, as a free service to all nationals and residents, which contributes to raising the 
level of legal awareness.213 
Meanwhile, the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, which supports the 
Ministry of Interior, supervises the implementation of the nationalization law, processes passports 
of nationals, and ensures the implementation of the laws governing the visa and residency of 
foreigners in the state. The Central Command in Abu Dhabi is in charge of issuing a UAE family 
registration record and passports for nationals, as well as visas and residency for foreigners in the 
state. It further supervises the entry and exit of individuals from airports, as well as the land and 
sea border points. A number of regional departments in each Emirate support the Central 
Command in Abu Dhabi in order to provide services to nationals and foreigners. Moreover, the 
General Directorates of Residency and Foreigners Affairs across the state enter information 
relating to nationals and residents in a unified database system attached to the Ministry of Interior. 
Similarly, data of those travelling to and from the state is entered into the system at all airports, 
ports and border points.  
In addition, the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs uses an eye print system 
for foreigners. The eye print system is one of the most accurate systems for identifying people; it 
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is “based upon mathematical analysis of the random patterns visible in the iris of a person’s eye”.214 
The iris print system takes a picture of the iris, which is stored, and then coded symbols are made, 
which saved alongside the data of the person in one unified central database.215 The iris print is 
taken of all foreigners who have an entry visa to the state the first time they arrive in all airports, 
ports, or border points. Then, the print is compared to those saved in the database, and if the system 
identifies the print among those saved in relation to those previously deported or have transgressed 
any laws, the necessary legal measures are taken. In this case, the person would be regarded as 
attempting to illegally enter the state with fake official documents. Through the iris print system, 
between 12 October 2002 and 31 March 2011, 295.088 people who have been deported or legally 
sentenced were caught while attempting to re-enter the country.216Thus, this system has proved to 
be highly efficient, because the violators could have posed a threat to the safety and security of the 
state. By 2011, the total number of iris prints entered into the database of the UAE Ministry of 
Interior has reached 2,132,568 persons, which means that the UAE has the biggest approved 
database of iris prints in the world.217 
The Civil Defence Administration of the Ministry of Interior is one of the basic pillars for 
maintaining security and stability in UAE. The Civil Defence Administration provides protection 
for all citizens and residents in the state, as well as for public and private property. It also secures 
the safety of the transportation and guarantees the progress of work in the public sector. The 
Administration aims to protect the sources of national wealth in war, peace, emergencies, and 
catastrophes.218 Civil Defence Units in the UAE in 1976 were integrated in one system that 
supports the Ministry of Interior, following a resolution issued by the Federal Supreme Council. 
Previously, the Fire Brigades were affiliated to the respective municipalities of the Emirates, and 
had limited capabilities. The Civil Defence System has witnessed tangible development following 
its integration under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, which has expanded the construction 
of Civil Defence Administration centres to cover all parts of the state. The Abu Dhabi Civil 
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Defence Central Command has established regional departments in each Emirate. Furthermore, 
the Civil Defence Central Command provides the latest equipment to its centres. It also trains its 
job cadre by providing basic and specialized courses in the fields of firefighting, rescue, aid, and 
evacuation. The Civil Defence Administration also holds simulated experiments with the 
authorities directly involved with civil defence, such as airports, oil refineries, ports, government 
organizations, and private companies, to train their workforce to face all eventualities. Moreover, 
it carries out the mission of enforcing compliance with regulations in terms of fire prevention in 
buildings, factories, warehouses, companies working with hazardous materials, and buildings for 
the distribution, storage, and trade of gas cylinder. This role is based on Cabinet Decree No. 154 
of 1991, which issues such regulations according to international standards. The Civil Defence 
Administration has been assigned the mission of ensuring such conditions are implemented in 
order to protect life and property, and limit the losses resulting from fire accidents. Such 
regulations have led to a decrease in the number of fires.  
3.2.3.3 The Federal Demographic Structure Council 
In 2010, the Federal Demographic Structure Council was established by the resolution of Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai. 
The Federal Demographic Structure Council, which reports directly to the Cabinet, is a legal entity 
that is financially and administratively independent. The Council is led by the Deputy Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Interior, with five members, the Minister of Labour as Deputy 
Director, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and the General Secretary of the Council who is appointed by resolution of the Director.219 
The Federal Demographic Structure Council is tasked with the mission of studying and evaluating 
the status of the demographic structure in the state. It proposes demographic strategies, policies, 
and systems aimed at enhancing the role of citizens, maintaining the national identity, and 
achieving the desired demographic balance. Moreover, the objectives of the Council include 
following up the implementation of the rules, laws, and regulations relating to the demographic 
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structure on the part of local and federal authorities. Such laws and regulations include 
nationalizing the important productive sectors, taking the necessary corrective measures within the 
framework of ensuring jobs for Emiratis, proposing the necessary legislation to handle any deficit 
in the demographic structure in cooperation with the concerned authorities, and laying down the 
required programmes relating to the demographic structure.220 
3.2.3.4 The State Security Department of the UAE 
The State Security Department was established according to Federal Law No. 6 of 1976, according 
to which the intelligence departments in all Emirates were merged into the State Security System. 
The Department reports directly to the President of the State. Moreover, this Department was given 
responsibility under Law No. 4 of 1974, which were previously assigned to the State Security 
Force that was supervised by the Ministry of Interior.221 
3.2.3.5 The Higher National Security Council 
The Higher National Security Council was established according to Federal Law No. 17 of 2006. 
The Council is chaired by the UAE President, while the UAE Vice-President is the Vice-Chairman 
of the Council. Other members include the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed 
Forces, the Defence Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, the Minister for 
Presidential Affairs, the Chief of National Security, the Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces 
and the National Security Advisor. In addition, the Higher National Security Council has a General 
Secretary and a General Assembly who are appointed by the Chairman.222 
The objective of the Higher National Security Council is to pursue the successful achievement of 
the UAE’s national security in all areas, including the economy, as well as the nation's social, 
cultural and environmental security.223 The Higher National Security Council discusses the 
federation security policies, directs the various state security organs towards improving their 
strategies in the interest of national security, ensures coordination among them, and boosts their 
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capabilities to face and handle efficiently any crisis or disaster. It is also tasked to supervise the 
preparation and approval of the National Council Strategic Plan to ensure that all threats that could 
jeopardize the national security are efficiently handled. Other tasks include stating an opinion on 
the drafts of agreements and pacts relating to national security before they are issued, declaring 
Martial Law.224 The National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority, the National 
Electronic Security Authority and the National Search and Rescue Centre has been established 
under the supervision of the Higher National Security Council (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: The Structure of the Higher National Security Council 
The National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority is tasked by the Chairman of the 
Higher National Security Council to be the major national standard-setting body responsible for 
regulating and coordinating efforts relating to emergency and crisis management across the UAE, 
as well as the development of a national plan for responding to emergencies. The Authority aims 
to boost the UAE’s capabilities in facing cases of emergency and crisis. Therefore, its work focuses 
mainly on the development, consolidation and maintenance of laws, policies and procedures 
related to emergency and crisis management at the federal, local, and private level. The aim is to 
maintain the safety of nationals and residents, as well as public and private property in the state.225 
The General Authority of Ports, Border and Free Zones Security was established by the chairman 
of the Supreme Council for National Security in order to propose draft federal laws related to the 
security of ports, borders and free zones in the State. It is also charged with developing a national 
strategy for the security of ports, borders and free zones, in coordination with the concerned 
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authorities in the federal and local institutions. The Authority is also tasked with following up the 
implementation of security standards, procedures and requirements, which are designed to control 
the entry and exit of people and goods through the UAE’s ports and free zones. Furthermore, the 
Authority follows up the implementation of international commitments and requirements in 
relation to border, ports and free zones security across the State. In addition, the Authority has 
been commissioned to forward recommendations relating to the issuing of licenses for the 
establishment of ports and free zones, as well as the renewal and cancellation of licenses. These 
tasks are set within the goal of the Authority, which is to promote the State security capabilities in 
ports, borders and free zones in order to ensure and achieve effective response to threats affecting 
its national security. 
The National Electronic Security Authority is affiliated to the Supreme Council for National 
Security in order to organize the protection of the communications network and information 
systems in the State. In addition, the Authority is tasked to develop, modify and use the necessary 
means in the area of cyber security. Furthermore, it works to raise the efficiency of methods that 
are used to preserve and exchange information among all federal and local institutions within the 
State, either through information systems or any other electronic means. The Federal Decree grants 
the Authority the competencies and powers, which include proposing legislation on electronic 
security, and setting the standards that ensure the provision of electronic security within the State, 
as well as supervising its implementation. Other competencies and powers include: the preparation 
of a national plan to face any risks, threats or attacks on cyber security, in coordination with the 
concerned authorities; and, ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems protecting the 
communication networks and information systems across government institutions and the private 
sector in the State. The main goal of the National Electronic Security Authority is to create a safe 
and secure national digital environment.226 
Finally, the National Search and Rescue Centre, which is affiliated to the Supreme Council for 
National Security, assumes tasks relating to the provision of land, sea and air search and rescue 
services throughout the State, in coordination with the relevant local authorities. The Centre also 
performs the tasks of preparing the general framework of the National Plan for Search and Rescue 
at the national level. It also proposes legislation and regulations relating to search and rescue to 
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the Supreme Council for National Security. In the case of approval by the Council, the Centre 
takes the necessary measures to implement them at the level of the Ministry of Interior’s search 
and rescue teams, which operate in each Emirate. The Centre’s objective is to achieve the goal of 
ensuring the safety of the UAE citizens and residents living on its territory. 
3.2.3.6 Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation 
The UAE established Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation in 2006, following a study 
evaluating energy in the UAE.227 In 2008, the UAE government stated that “the UAE’s annual 
peak demand for electricity would be likely to rise by 9 percent per year, from around 13,000 
megawatts (MW) in 2007 to over 40,000 MW by 2020”.228In this context, the UAE decision-
makers focused on a number of areas in order to preserve the future energy security in the State. 
The first area is the ability to produce electrical energy on time. The second area of focus is to 
build autonomy from a reliance on other countries in terms of electricity production. The third area 
is to develop a long-term infrastructure for future generation, in order to meet their needs. The 
fourth focus is ensuring energy is economically feasible and uses reliable and secure resources for 
its generation. Finally, the report highlights the need to diversify energy sources.229 
As a result of the report, the government adopted a decision to diversify its energy sources from 
non-renewable energy sources such as oil, natural gas and coal, through the development of 
sustainable and varied energy sources.230 The government is balancing the increasing need for 
electricity production with its responsibility to find eco-friendly technologies and low carbon 
emissions.231 The UAE is one of the signatories to The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol, which aims to stabilize greenhouse gases emissions at a level 
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that prevents damage to the climate.232 In this context, Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, which is one of 
the world’s most sustainable cities, hosts the headquarters of International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA). This is an intergovernmental organization that aims to promote the adoption of 
renewable energy worldwide. Furthermore, the UAE has built solar power plants for renewable 
energy rather than wind or water based plants, because of the nature of the climate and geography 
of the UAE. These plants include Shams 1 in Abu Dhabi, which is the largest concentrated solar 
power plant in the Middle East and Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Solar Park in Dubai. In 
addition, the government is developing peaceful nuclear energy to produce electricity, as it is an 
eco-friendly technology because of its low-carbon emissions.233 Thus, the UAE will reduce its 
dependence on non-renewable through its increasing reliance on nuclear power and renewable 
energy to produce electricity. This will help to maintain environment and energy sustainability, 
and the fight against global warming in addition to ensure energy security in the UAE.234 
The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation was established by Article 4 of Federal Law No. 6 
of 2009.The Authority is responsible for regulating and licensing all activities related to nuclear 
energy in the UAE, while ensuring public safety as a primary objective. While the Authority also 
determines and specifies all matters relating to the control and supervision of the nuclear sector in 
the State, particularly those related to safety, nuclear safety, nuclear security, radiation protection, 
safeguards and implementing any obligation under the relevant international treaties, conventions 
or agreements entered into by the State. The UAE signed the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, and the IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in 2003, 
and the IAEA Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention. In addition, the UAE has 
bilateral cooperation agreements in the areas of the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the world's 
leading nuclear powers such as the US, the UK, France, Canada, Russia, Australia, Argentina, 
South Korea and Japan.    
On 23 December 2009, the President of UAE established by decree the Emirates Nuclear Energy 
Corporation, which is assigned to establish and manage four nuclear power plants in Abu Dhabi. 
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Each plant, which will have a capacity of 1,400 MW, is run in cooperation with the Korean Electric 
Power Corporation, which is the third-largest nuclear power company in the world. The first plant 
is expected to start operating in 2017 and the last plant to be completed by 2020.235 The Federal 
Authority for Nuclear Regulation will monitor and control the construction of the four nuclear 
reactors, and verify and ensure the implementation of activities conducted by the Emirates Nuclear 
Energy Corporation, in accordance with the regulations of the Emirates Nuclear Energy and the 
terms of its license. The decision granting the license by the Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation has been taken after examining all the security and safety factors, including the 
suitability of the reactor site, the design of the facility and the analysis of safety and management 
systems and upon ensuring the quality of construction and measures for radiation safety, physical 
protection, safeguards and assurances; in order to ensure the security and safety of nuclear energy 
in the UAE.236 
3.2.4 Summary of the Institutional Base of the UAE 
In summary, the UAE has successfully established its institutional base, which is the second pillar 
of Buzan’s idea of the state. The institutional structure has evolved since 1971, responding to 
continuous environmental, political, technological and growth instigated changes. The investment 
in the development of the institutions, despite the challenges, has been enormous unlike other 
Middle Eastern countries in which prioritizing internal infrastructural development, the legal 
framework, and economic growth have not been major goals. As the institutions form the 
organizational pillar of the idea of the state, the threats to their security is more real especially 
against the changing political environment across the region. 
3.3 THE PHYSICAL BASE OF THE UAE 
The physical base of the UAE is distinct from many of the surrounding countries in terms of its 
geographical location, the composition of its population, the economic structure, the level of digital 
development and the development of environment-related legislation. The physical base, 
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according to Buzan, is the real expression of the state existence and is prone to direct attacks and 
threats to its national security. 
3.3.1 The Geography of the UAE 
The UAE is in the heart of the Arabian Gulf. It lies between the longitudes 51°and 56° 31’ east 
and latitudes 23° and 26° 50’ north. It is bordered to the east by the Gulf of Oman and the Sultanate 
of Oman, to the west by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to the north by the Arabian Gulf, and to the south 
by the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia.237 The Al Hajar al Gharbi mountain chain extends 
along the eastern borders in an arc stretching from the north-eastern border with the Sultanate of 
Oman in Musandam Peninsula to the south-eastern border in Al-Ain.238 In addition, plains cover 
the UAE to the Arabian Gulf in the north and Saudi Arabia in the west and south. The country has 
a total of 700 km coastline of which 100 km are on the Gulf of Oman and 600 km on the Arabian 
Gulf.239 The UAE has a total area of 83.600 sq. km,240 including about 200 natural islands.241 
3.3.2 Demographics of the UAE 
The UAE is distinct from its neighbours in terms of the diversity of its demographic composition. 
The total population is 8,264,070, according to the latest census conducted by the UAE National 
Bureau of Statistics in 2010. The number of UAE citizens total 947.997, i.e. 11.5% of the 
population of the state; the remainder are migrant workers and their families (see Figure 3.4). 
According to the latest census, the native population in Abu Dhabi is 404,546, while the population 
in Dubai is 168,029, in Sharjah 153,365, in Ras Al Khaimah 97.529, in Fujairah 64,860, in Ajman 
42,186, and in Umm Al Quwain17,482 (see Table3.1). Detailing the population composition of 
the UAE is important for understanding the physical base of the UAE because UAE nationals 
compose only 11.5% of the total population. This poses a risk to the continuity of the established 
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political system in the long run as the majority migrant population could eventually raise political 
demands or work through pressure groups to influence the country’s policies. 
 
Figure 3.4: Population Composition of the UAE 
Emirate Total Number of Emirati Population 
Abu Dhabi 727,271 
Dubai 611,201 
Sharjah 626,612 
Ras Al Khaimah  14,201 
Fujairah 17,112 
Ajman 70,611 
Umm Al Quwain 64,710 
Total Number 947,997 
Table 3.1: Total Number of Emirati Population242 
Table 3.2 shows the changes in the population by gender and national and non-national according 
to the censuses of 1980, 1995 and 2010. The data highlights that the changing demographics 
potentially forms a challenge to the stability of the State, because the majority of the population 
are expatriate residents.  
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Year 1980 1995 2010 
Nationals 
Male (no.) 150,502 297,060 479,109 
Male (%) 51.63 50.58 50.54 
Female (no.) 141,021 290,270 468,888 
Female (%) 48.37 49.42 49.46 
Total  291, 523 587,330 947,997 
Non-Nationals 
Male (no.) 569,139 1,295,735 5,682,711 
Male (%) 75.73 71.05 77.67 
Female (no.) 182,416 527,976 1,633,362 
Female (%) 24.27 28.95 22.33 
Total  751,555 1,823,711 7,316,073 
Overall Total 1,043,078 2,411,041 8,246,070 
243national, 1980, 1995 and 2010-onNational/Nender and GPopulation by  Table 3.2: 
This situation is reflected in the composition of the UAE demographics, where male foreigners 
comprise 69% of the UAE’s population. The variety of nationalities, predominance of males and 
the economic motivation for their presence in the country does not encourage social inclusion in 
most cases. The majority of the migrant workers are in low-skill jobs with temporary short-term 
work contracts, which further acts a barrier to social inclusion. Finally, the growth rate of non-
nationals has been faster than that of Emiratis in the past three censuses, again threatening the 
stability of the demographic base of the country. The unique nature of the demographics in the 
UAE requires a broad range of national security policies in order to maintain the social coherence 
and stability. 
3.3.3 The Economic Base of the UAE 
Prior to its independence, the UAE was not ready on the economic level to become a state. At the 
economic level, the vast majority of the Trucial States population lived at subsistence level, which 
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was little different from the conditions their ancestors lived previously.244 The economic base of 
the new state was fishing, growing date, fruits and vegetables, breeding cattle and camels, and 
hunting. Although the pearl trade was important, its importance fell in the 1930s, due to the 
international economic depression, and the introduction of the industrial pearl from Japan. The 
economic difficulties contributed to the educational weakness of the community. Thus, prior to 
independence, the UAE lacked the factors necessary for establishing an economically viable state; 
it had a poor infrastructure, under-developed human resources, and weak natural wealth.245 
Following the discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi in the 1950s, and the start of its export in 1962,246 the 
Abu Dhabi government initiated a program of infrastructure in the Emirate. Because of its small 
native population, thousands of foreign workers were imported in order to build the infrastructure 
and to start economic development in the Emirate. In contrast, the emirates in which oil was not 
discovered—Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah—were left behind the 
development procession. Therefore, Abu Dhabi promised during the negotiations for the creation 
of the federal state to bear the major burden of the federation's budget. In addition, it pledged to 
establish a substantial fund for the sake of promoting development in the other Emirates.247 
Oil is an important nature resource in the UAE. The huge revenues earned from its export from 
the 1970s fuelled the rapid development of the county’s institutional and physical base. The build-
up of oil revenue, especially between 1974 and 1980 when there was an exponential rise in oil 
prices due to high global demand, contributed to growth in GDP. In contrast, economic growth 
slowed as a result of falling oil prices between 1982 and 1986 as global demand fell sharply, 
particularly from Western countries.248 
However, in the past three decades, the UAE economy has undergone profound changes from an 
economy that derived its wealth from oil to a more diverse and open economy. The economic 
transition process began with the fall of oil prices in the 1980s and the accompanying economic 
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and financial negative repercussions. These necessitated a reconsideration of its production, 
investment and foreign trade structures in order to diversify the sources of national income.249 The 
planning has led to a growing role played by non-oil sectors in the UAE’s national economy (see 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4).  
Transport and 
Communication  
Real Estate and 
Business Services 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
Building and 
Construction Manufacturing  
0.7 -0.2 1.8 -0.7 2.6 2010 
4.6 11.1 0.6 -1.8 9.7 2011 
5.0 12.1 0.3 5.5 5.6 2012 
-1.1 6.6 4.9 3.4 1.2 2013 
8.6 -4.1 5.6 7.3 3.2 2014 
2502014-Oil Sectors, 2010-Percentage Real GDP Growth of Selected Non Table 3.3: 
GDP (in 
constant 
prices) 
Real GDP growth of 
the non-oil sector 
Real GDP growth of 
the oil sector 
 
0.7 3.8 1.6 2010 
4.5 6.6 5.2 2011 
6.6 7.6 6.9 2012 
5 2.9 4.3 2013 
4.8 4.0 4.6 2014 
Table 3.4: Real GDP Growth in the Oil and Non-Oil Sectors, 2010-2014251 
In terms of the non-oil sectors, according to the latest statistics issued by the Central Bank of the 
UAE in 2015, the banking sector, which consists of 23 national banks and 26 foreign banks,252 
enjoys a strong capital base. In part, this is a result of the ability of the country to preserve its 
position as a safe haven in the Middle East. Customer deposits increased in local banks from 
AED50.3 billion in 2014 to AED142.4 billion in 2015.253 
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In addition, the free zones in the UAE have played a significant role in the economy. The 
Federation has more free zones (36) than any other country in the Middle East.254 The free zones 
are present in each Emirates; Abu Dhabi has five, including the Media Free Zone (Two Four 24), 
Khalifa Port, Khalifa Industrial City (Kizad), Abu Dhabi airport, (Sky City) and Masdar City Free 
Zone. There are also 23 in Dubai, covering the sectors of information and communication 
technology, media, industry, commerce, finance, gold, diamonds, flowers, education, health care 
and human services sectors. These include Dubai Media City, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Jebel Ali 
Free Zone, Dubai Science Park, Dubai Flower Center, Dubai Knowledge Park, Dubai Healthcare 
City and International Humanitarian City. There are also two free zones in each of Sharjah, Ajman 
and Ras Al Khaimah, while Umm Al Quwain and Fujairah have one each.  
The free zones conform to international standards and have become a desirable investment 
destination for foreign industrial, commercial and media companies. They are served by a modern 
infrastructure, in addition to other privileges, which include the quick processing of visas/residence 
transactions for the employees. The free zones also allow 100% foreign ownership of companies, 
as the free zones are not subject to the UAE Companies Law, which stipulates that the foreign 
equity in the company within the State may not exceed 49%. In addition, the free zones permit 
free transfer of capital and profits in full to investors, and exemption from taxes and customs duties. 
Thus, the total trade volume of free zones in the country in 2015 have amounted to about AED 
497 billion.255 
The real estate sector is another influential sector in terms of the economic growth of the UAE.256 
The real estate sector is among the biggest sectors in terms of using inputs from other sectors, such 
as construction materials, public services, natural resources, energy and land, as well as its 
extensive use of labour. These linkages increase its interdependence with other sectors and its 
importance to the overall economy. Based on data published by the Economic Supplement of UAE 
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newspaper, Al Bayan, the total value of real estate projects launched in the UAE in 2015 amounted 
to about AED 111 billion, which exceeded the value in 2014.257 
3.3.4 The e-Infrastructure 
In an attempt to mirror the rapid technological developments in the world, the UAE federal and 
local governments has been transforming the provision government services into e-services since 
2003.258 The first project was the Emirates Identity Authority, through which the Authority issues 
identity cards with a unique identification number to all citizens and legal residents. The card bears 
an electronic chip carrying personal data of its holder, including copies of his/her official 
documents, such as passport and birth certificate, and biometric data (i.e. facial, iris, and 
fingerprint). These are provided when applying for the card at registration centres; biometric 
technologies provide a high degree of accuracy to verify and confirm the identity of a person.259 
Furthermore, the digital security on the identity card chip in terms of the user signature and 
encryption features meets the highest international security levels.260 The identity cards have 
become the backbone of the e-government initiatives, and the main hub for the services and e-
commerce in the public and private sectors.261 The identity card is the primary source of 
identification in the federal and local institutions as well as private companies and through related 
Internet and smart applications. The government also established the Federal Electronic Network 
in the virtual world with the aim to consolidate the ideas of electronic and smart government at the 
federal and local level. The Network is now one of the fundamental cornerstones of smart 
government in the UAE, as it connects the database of all federal and local authorities in the 
country in order to provide electronic and smart services to citizens and residents within the state 
or abroad. Moreover, the design of UAE Smart Cloud, emanating from the Federal Electronic 
Network, was launched in order to provide the cloud infrastructure service to the federal and local 
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institutions. Officials of General Authority for Regulating the Telecommunications Sector; 
supervisors of the project, state that this infrastructure enables the federal and local institutions to 
raise the efficiency of computing resources as well as its capabilities of storage effectively, with 
low costs. In addition, the cloud infrastructure service can be used as a joint platform for the 
government institutions to recover from disasters that may affect the communication system.262 
In addition, the UAE is developing smart cities, using on information and communication 
technology. This enables officials to manage, control and monitor the critical infrastructure, 
including roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, trains tunnels, airports, seaports, telecommunications, 
water and energy, in order to achieve the optimum level of resources and security. In turn, this 
helps contributes towards a sustainable environment, which promotes a feeling of happiness and 
wellness for the residents.263 In 2014, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President 
and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, announced the start of a project to transform 
the Emirate of Dubai into a smart city within three years.264 
The Dubai Smart City project is based on three main concepts (see Figure 3.5). The first concept 
is promoting communication between residents and the different institutions and facilities by 
facilitating access and the sharing of information and data. This enables Dubai’s population to stay 
informed and linked with all the data related to government entities, the stock exchange, schools, 
universities, hospitals, weather, road conditions and traffic jams, emergency services, shops, etc. 
All of Dubai City will be covered by broadband and high-speed wired and wireless optical 
networks to ensure communication between the population and its institutions and various 
facilities, which will form the backbone of the future Dubai Smart City.265 Second, the various 
databases will be integrated to make them available to all via the ‘My window to Dubai’ program, 
which offers a live feed through an online virtual embodiment of Dubai City. Third, cooperation 
and coordination between all concerned parties will contribute on an ongoing basis to the design 
and development of smart solutions in the city through applications, initiatives and electronic 
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programs.266 The process of transforming Dubai into a smart city will be supervised through a five-
dimensional room. This will control and monitor the management of all facilities and services of 
the city through interconnected and sophisticated electronic systems, 267in order to ensure they 
achieve the city’s goal of ensuring the happiness of its residents.  
 
Figure 3.5: Dubai’s Smart City Circle268 
3.3.5 Summary of the Physical base of the UAE 
In summary, as outlined by Buzan’s Nature of the State hypothesis, the physical base of a state is 
the concrete expression of the state’s existence. The state’s physical base includes its population 
(rapidly growing in the case of the UAE), its natural resources (such as oil in the UAE) or lack of 
them, its territory (including the disputed islands of the UAE) and investment in all types of 
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infrastructural assets. These elements can be exposed to internal or external threats of varying 
degrees. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyses the UAE through the three components to the Nature of State hypothesis—
the idea of the state, its institutions and its physical base. The chapter discusses the formation of 
the UAE in 1971, which is still based on a tribal ruling system that has governed the territory for 
more than 1,500 years and has contributed to the security and stability of those who were subject 
to its authority. In addition, it discusses the nature and functions of the UAE’s legislative, executive 
and judiciary institutions, which were negotiated ahead of the declaration of independence. These 
institutions help to maintain the stability and security of the citizens. Thereafter, the chapter 
reviews the physical base of the UAE. In addition, it also highlights the threats faced by the UAE, 
including external threats from foreign governments, international criminal organizations and 
individuals, as well environmental threats, all of which can adversely affect the security and 
stability of the society of the UAE.  
The next chapter addresses the threats to the three components of the state in more detail.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE THREATS TO UAE’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
In the preceding chapter, a framework based on Buzan’s hypothesis is proposed in order to analyse 
the threats to the UAE’s national security. Threats to the idea of state, the physical base and the 
institutions supporting the existence of this state are addressed in this chapter. Importantly, 
exposure to threats in any one of the three components may expose other components to further 
threats. Although critics argue that this relationship is exaggerated, in reality it may find resonance, 
especially in critical times. This chapter addresses the definition of national security threats in the 
UAE as a construct based on Buzan’s hypothesis. The chapter discusses the risks that threaten the 
UAE’s national security; based on Buzan's hypothesis on ‘The Nature of the State', by discussing 
with the threats to the idea of the state, then the threats to the state’s institutions and finally the 
anticipated threats to the physical base of the state. Securitising an issue, in Copenhagen school’s 
approach, provides a useful tool by which to analyse the changing perceived potential threats 
highlighted by the author to the UAE national security. 
As is apparent in the discussion, matters of national interest from a security perspective, which 
some may consider as challenges rather than threats to the country’s security, call for securitization 
measures as long as they persist. These threats (or challenges depending on one’s perception) 
identified by the researcher include population imbalance, illegal immigration which assists the 
infiltration of terrorist organizations, the threat to the national economy by over-dominance of 
foreign business, and the weakening of the collective national identity, and negative population 
growth (leading to national population shrinkage). 
4.1 THE THREATS TO THE IDEA OF THE STATE IN THE UAE 
This section highlights the most significant threats to the idea of the state in the UAE following Buzan’s 
analysis. The identity and the ideology of the nation that were adopted influenced the creation and mandates 
of the institutions of the state which ensure the protection of its interests on its territories (see Figure 4.1). 
Thus, the following threats to the idea of state in the UAE are discussed because in the view of the 
researcher these are of major importance and form on-going challenge which if unresolved are 
elevated to the status of a threat.  
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Figure 4.1: Threats to the Idea of the UAE State 
This section discusses the imbalances in demographic structure in the UAE, which resulted in 
tension between the national identity of the UAE and the influence of the cultures and identities 
huge diverse migrant community, which is frequently at odds with the essence of the UAE national 
identity. The increase in the number of expatriates residing within their state led to attempts to 
impose their foreign identities on UAE nationals in their own country, which imposes a perceived 
threat to the idea of the state. Also, the section discusses the private education in the UAE, which 
attracts the majority of citizens because of the failure of the state schools’ curricula to keep pace 
with the requirements of universities and the labour market in the UAE. These private schools pose 
a threat to the national identity of the UAE, because of weak supervision by the Ministry of 
Education.  
4.1.1 Conflict of Identities 
A serious threat to the idea of the state has emerged due to the UAE's demographic imbalance. 
This resulted from the UAE's aspiration to develop the country rapidly supported by the huge 
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inflows of oil revenues and the small size of its indigenous population. In order to meet the 
development objectives, the country saw a massive influx of foreign workers and investors. 
Economic, social and cultural development projects are still on going across the Federation, along 
with attempts to expand economic diversification from oil to other sectors such as tourism, real 
estate, and medium and heavy industries, in turn necessitating the employment of more foreign 
employees.269 
The influx of foreign labour to the UAE and other GCC countries evolved through five stages. The 
first stage, from the beginning of the 1940s to the early 1950s, coincided with the start of oil 
exploration in the region, which necessitated importing labour for use in such operations, with 
India and Iran as the main sources of the expatriate labour.270 The second stage lasted from the 
early 1950s until 1973, during which the Arabian Gulf entities started to invest the oil revenues 
for the development of their societies. The majority of workers coming to the UAE and the other 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula were Arabs.271 As highlighted previously, this period was 
characterized by the rise of Nasserist thought. During this period Egyptian President Nasser stirred 
up unrest against British forces in the Gulf region in order to force their withdrawal and seize the 
oil fields to finance his political project of the United Arab Republic (UAR), extending from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf.272 In this context, he encouraged Egyptians belonging to the 
Nasserist thought and their allies from the Arab Nationalist Movement from other Arab countries 
to travel to countries in the Arabian Peninsula that were under British tutelage. These migrants 
contributed to the establishment of schools in the different emirates and taught Nasserist ideas to 
the students.273 These ideas included the fight against colonialism as well as working to overthrow 
the traditional ruling regimes to enable the creation of the UAR.274 
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The third stage for the arrival of foreign workers began in the autumn of 1973 after the surge in 
oil prices and ended when oil prices fell sharply in 1983. During this period, the UAE received 
substantial oil revenues because of escalating oil prices, which led to a significant increase in 
government spending on infrastructure projects, health care services and education. The high level 
of projects and small population prompted the UAE government to import many foreign workers 
with the requisite skills. These migrants were mainly Asian workers from India and Pakistan.275 
The fourth stage of the influx of foreign workers to the UAE spanned the period from 1983 to 
August 1990. The period was marked by a decrease in the pace of the arrival of foreign workers 
to the UAE because of falling oil revenues. Indeed, arrivals stopped entirely at the start of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 because of the instability in the region. The fifth stage began 
with the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 and continues to date,276 during which the characteristics of 
the third stage re-emerged, with foreign labour from more than 203 countries coming to work in 
the Federation,277 as job opportunities were created in relation to development, economic and 
social projects.278 The local governments in the UAE spent billions of US dollars implementing 
infrastructure projects, especially in the energy and transportation sectors, and building 
international airports, seaports, railways, metro lines, roads, bridges and tunnels, in addition to 
developing national airlines.279 
4.1.2 The Increasing Demographic Imbalance 
The phenomenon of rapidly growing foreign population residing in the UAE has resulted in a 
decreasing proportion of UAE citizens in terms the total population (see Table 4.1). This changing 
demographic is creating a threat to the idea of the state in the UAE. According to official census 
data, the population of the UAE has increased eightfold over 25 years, from 1,043,078 in 1980 to 
                                                          
275 Shamsi, Maitha. (2021). “Evaluation of Labour Immigration Policies in the GCC: Lessons for the Future”, Paper 
presented at United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, 
Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations 
Secretariat. UN/POP/EGM/2006/05. (In Arabic). 
276 Al-Shamsi, Maitha Salem. (2062). Expatriate Migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council States: Current Problems 
and Future Prospects. Abu Dhabi: ECSR, pp. 46-47. (In Arabic). 
277 Ibid, p. 44. 
278 El-Kardousy, Adel Abdelgawad. (2009). UAE’s National Identity and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-First 
Century. Cairo: Aladab Bookshop, p. 153. (In Arabic). 
279 WAM. (18 June 2013). “United Arab Emirates the first regionally in the quality of infrastructure”. Alittihad 
Newspaper. Available at: <URL: http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=59023&y=2013> Access Date: 16 July 2013. 
(In Arabic).  
82 
 
8,264,070 in 2010. State with the highest rate of natural growth of population can only double their 
population every 25 years.280 Thus, the increase in the population of the UAE over the 25 years, 
would in normal circumstances have taken around two centuries. 
 
Year 1980 1995 2010 
Nationals  291,523 587,330 947,977 
% of Total Population 27.92 24.36 11.47 
Expatriates 751,555 1,823,711 7,316,073 
% of Total Population 72.08 75.64 88.53 
Total Population 1,043,078 2,411,041 8,264,070 
Table 4.1: The Growth of the Demographic Imbalance 
Importantly, the increase in expatriate residents (873%) had been significantly larger than the 
increase in UAE citizens (225%). This is an important factor for the idea of the state as the majority 
of the population have identities that differ from the identity of the state.281 Accordingly, the 
nation-state society has turned to be a de facto multi-identity community. Therefore, it is an 
important indicator of a potential threat to the idea of the state.   
The presence of a huge number of foreign nationals from 203 nationalities inside the UAE, with 
different languages, religions, and cultures from those of the indigenous minority, threatens to 
obliterate the identity of the current and future UAE generations. This is because the UAE identity 
formed since independence in 1971 is based on an allegiance to the nation and its leadership, the 
rulers of the seven Emirates. The internal and external policies of the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan 
Al Nahyan, the UAE’s founder, who developed the federal state from an idea to a reality, changed 
the identity from mere allegiance to the ruler of the local Emirate to a much wider allegiance to 
the Federal state and its president. UAE nationals who witnessed the establishment of the 
Federation and their offspring have a deeply-rooted allegiance to the Federal state and its president, 
while simultaneously maintaining allegiance to the Emirates and their rulers. However, over the 
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years later generations have changed as a result of several factors, the most important being the 
obliteration of the national language, increased social interaction between nationals and non-
national residents and the education policy in the UAE.  
First, the UAE’s language, which is Arabic but with a specific UAE dialect, is threatened with 
marginalization. This dialect differs from those of the neighbouring GCC countries, and is 
culturally distinctive, reflecting the unique UAE national identity. However, because of the 
continuous interaction inside the multi-cultural UAE community with foreign employees, whether 
in the market, the work place, at home, school, university, hospital and all aspects of life, a number 
of UAE nationals have learned to speak and understand other languages such as Urdu, Persian and 
English, in order to ease transactions within the community.282 In contrast, most foreign workers 
are not interested in learning Arabic, the official language of the state; being fluent in Arabic is 
not a condition for acceptance into the local community. However, the UAE government has 
recently approved Arabic as the official language of communication in the federal government 
sector.283 Meanwhile, English is still the dominant language in all transactions in the private sector, 
which is a major player in the UAE national economy.284 
At the level of social interaction, the Federal government has pursued a policy of multiculturalism 
because of its dependence on foreigners to drive national development. Culture is a basic resource, 
like power, food and air, required by groups and individuals for life.285 Hence, the UAE 
government allows the building of houses of worship for free for all divine religions. It also grants 
residents freedom of worship, provided that public order and rules of conduct are maintained.286 
Moreover, the UAE government permits foreign communities to establish societies, schools, 
hospitals, clubs, and commercial councils, which enhance their cultures. In addition, in 2015, the 
President of the UAE issued Federal Decree Law No. 2 on Combating Discrimination and Hatred. 
This law guarantees equality among members of society of citizens and foreigners residing on the 
territory of the State and criminalises discrimination among them based on religion, creed, 
doctrine, denomination, caste, race, colour or ethnic origin in addition to rejecting hate speech 
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through different ways, means or forms of expression.287 This law was promulgated despite the 
fact that the UAE Constitution had already addressed these rights in chapter No. 2 titled “The 
Fundamental Social and Economic Bases of the Union” and chapter No. 3 titled “Public Freedoms, 
Rights and Duties” of the Constitution. In addition, discrimination and hatred issues are dealt with 
in the provisions of the Federal Penal Law in Part 5 titled “Crimes Affecting Religious Doctrines 
and Rites”, as well as chapter 6 of Part 7 concerning Crimes Perpetrated against Reputation. The 
issues of hate and discrimination were also addressed in miscellaneous articles within the Penal 
Law in relation to incitement to commit such crimes, which may destabilize society by spreading 
hate. In addition, the cyber-crimes law increased the penalty of a number of crimes contained in 
the Federal Penal Law if any of the electronic or smart devices have been used in such crimes; 
such as social media and similar cyber platforms; in spreading sedition, hatred or contempt in 
society.288 However, the escalating threat of extremist ideologies fed by radical groups promoting 
a clash of civilizations and a rejection of the other in terms of ethnic, cultural and religious 
identity,289 has led to the UAE regime codifying and criminalizing such acts in order to maintain 
the integrity and existence of the society, through the specific Law No. 2 of 2015.290 Furthermore, 
in 2016, the Council of Ministers of Federal Government created two new posts the Minister of 
State for Tolerance and the Minister of State for Happiness. The former is charged with creating a 
compatible system consisting of plans, programs and community initiatives. The system aims to 
consolidate the values of tolerance, pluralism and acceptance of others in terms of thoughts, 
culture, sects, confessions and religions among the citizens and foreigners residing on the territory 
of the State. This aim should ensure peaceful coexistence among the different groups within the 
community. The Minister of State for Happiness is charged with ensuring the happiness of citizens 
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and foreigners residing in the UAE. This is achieved through the harmonization and conformation 
to all plans, programs and policies adopted by the State’s Federal Institutions in order to advance 
economic development and promoting the security, cohesion and stability of society in the state.291 
However, the multiplicity of cultures in the UAE community could pose a threat to the cohesive 
social unity and social fabric of the tribal society that shares many common values, customs and 
traditions. Unlike federal states, such as the UK and Canada, the UAE is a nation-state formed by 
one nation, not a multinational state. The influx of expatriates has resulted a failure to respect the 
UAE’s national values and norms. According to Rasmussen, the cultural inheritance constitutes 
the backbone of the nation-state in keeping with the emotional values of the nation, to the extent 
that any attack against them would result in a sense of violence towards the aggressor.292 For 
example, some foreigners wear clothing that is deemed indecent according to custom in the UAE. 
This clothing does not cover the shoulders and knees in public places as therefore offends the 
public decency of the conservative residents in the State. This constitutes a crime punishable by 
UAE law. Therefore, the authorities have compelled all shopping centres to put up signs at 
entrances to alert people about the necessity to wear modest clothes. However, abuses still take 
place. For example, in Dubai Mall one foreign tourist, after an Arab woman criticized her for 
wearing a blouse that exposed part of her breast, took off her clothes and wandered about in her 
underwear in protest against the criticism.293 Furthermore, some foreigners in UAE commit acts, 
which offend the customs and traditions of the UAE, such as sexual harassment, flirting with 
women or kissing women in public places. Such acts violate the public order and deserve a penalty 
according to the UAE laws.294 There are also foreigners who drink alcohol in public, although 
UAE law bans drinking alcohol except in licensed places such as certain hotels, bars, and licensed 
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restaurants.295 Another complaint is of foreigners drinking, eating and smoking in public during 
the day in the month of Ramadan, during which Muslims fast from sunrise until sunset, despite 
UAE laws imposing a penalty for this, whether or not the person is Muslim.296 
However, abuses by foreign residents and visitors still occur in public places in the UAE because 
of the lack of familiarity with the laws, rules and regulations to maintain the values and customs 
in the conservative society. In part, this is because of the failure of The National Council for 
Tourism and Antiquities, which is responsible for educating tourists about the customs and 
traditions of the community in UAE, before their entry into its territory.297 The National Council 
for Tourism and Antiquities could have cooperated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Interior in the publication of brief guidance on the behaviours, which are prohibited 
within the UAE. This could be distributed through the official websites of the Embassies of the 
State and through the official website of the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners 
Affairs, through which, the application of electronic visas to enter the State are processed. In 
addition, brochures could be printed containing concise guidance and distributed by the staff of 
the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs to all foreigners arriving by air, land 
or sea. This would reduce unfamiliarity with the rules and help deter behaviour that offends the 
values and customs of the UAE citizens; which is one of the most important elements of their 
national identity. 
4.1.3 The Private Education System 
In relation to the education system in the UAE, the Ministry of Education (MOE) adopts 
conflicting strategies that may contribute to undermining the national identity of the UAE’s current 
and future generations. Education is a cornerstone of a state’s national security and hence is central 
to achieving the state’s comprehensive development. Education also plays a major role in 
enhancing the national identity and in forming the character of national students. This is because 
school is the most influential social institution that shapes the behaviour and psychology of the 
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emerging generations.298 However, it appears that the powers of the MOE have declined. 
Previously, the MOE enjoyed wide powers over all government and private schools through its 
sub-divisions in each of the Emirates. However, since 2009, Abu Dhabi and Dubai sought 
independence from the MOE, especially in the supervision of the private schools. Abu Dhabi 
Education Council (ADEC) and the Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) in 
Dubai now exercise independent powers over schools in those Emirates. Both governments of Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai adopt special strategies in relation to education. Nevertheless, despite this 
independence the ADEC and KHDA are still required by the MOE to file lists of students 
registered in private schools at the beginning of each school year, as is the case in all other 
educational areas. Such lists enable the classification of national and non-national students 
registered in private schools (see Table 4.2). 
Emirate Total Number of 
Emirati Students 
Total Number of 
Foreign Students 
Total Number of 
All Students 
Abu Dhabi 54,250 120,750 175,000 
Dubai 27,011 164,325 616,661 
Sharjah 15,519 104,911 120,430 
Ajman 0,141 26,241 29,120 
Umm Al Quwain 216 2,893 6,717 
Ras Al Khaimah 3,347 13,932 17,279 
Fujairah 2,865 8,685 11,521 
Total Number 106,462 441,708 071,845 
Table 4.2: National and Non-National Students in Private Schools in the UAE: 2010/11299 
The large number of students enrolled in private schools can be attributed to the policies adopted 
by the MOE in the 1970s and the 1980s in developing the curricula, and the lack of attention to 
teaching students English in primary schools. Therefore, it became common for UAE nationals to 
send their children to private schools in order to learn English and benefit from the foreign 
educational curricula. Some private schools, due to their material capabilities and efficient human 
resources, managed to attract UAE nationals. These schools provided curricula that met the market 
                                                          
298 Al-Bahli Mohammed, (2009). Education and National Identity. Abu Dhabi: Ministry of Culture, Youth & 
Community Development and Emirates Writers Union, p. 17. (In Arabic). 
299 Sources: The UAE Ministry of Education, ADEC & KHDA. 
88 
 
requirements and managed to keep pace with educational changes including new methods such as 
preparing students for university and meeting market requirements. They taught students skills of 
scientific thinking, debate and problem-solving. Those schools succeeded in running their 
education and financial matters without the bureaucracy of the centralized management of public 
schools. As private schools are investment projects, any weakness in its performance would lead 
to its losing money and eventually being closed.300 This trend towards private education endangers 
the UAE identity for the current and future generations for a number of reasons. First, the 
educational climate in some foreign private schools is very different from that of the UAE 
community. The UAE nationals found they were in a minority in terms of students and teachers. 
As a result, they had to interact with other nationals, and hence came to develop a mix of 
conflicting identities. Second, some foreign private schools are not committed to teaching the three 
compulsory subjects imposed by the MOE for Arab and Muslim students in the public and private 
schools, namely, Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies.301 In this context, certain 
foreign schools did not raise the UAE flag or play the UAE national anthem at the beginning of a 
school day, which is required in all public schools, because the flag is “a symbol for defining both 
political and national identity”.302 This created a generation of students who did not feel a sense of 
belonging to their country. In 2009, the UAE government became aware of this issue. As a result, 
the MOE issued a binding resolution requiring all schools to raise the UAE flag and play the UAE 
national anthem at the beginning of a school day.303 Third, the private education sector in the state 
has been transformed from a sector limited to foreign residents into a system for all individuals, 
through its different educational systems. By 2009, the number of foreign educational curricula 
taught in the foreign school was 18: three were British, three Canadian, two Indian, one Australian, 
one American, one French, one German, one Russian, one Japanese, one Pakistani, one 
Bangladeshi, one Philippine, and one Iranian.304 Although Article 32 of Federal Law No. 28 of 
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1999 stated that private schools may not teach any curriculum without the prior approval of the 
MOE, officials confessed that they did not scrutinize foreign curricula due to the insufficient 
numbers of staff with knowledge of the languages involved.305 Instead, they depended on the 
students and parents to inform them of any violations in books used in the private schools.306 
Therefore, the lack of supervision over the school curricula could lead to the spread of ideas that 
contradict the values and traditions of the Muslim UAE community. In educational terms, this is 
referred to as “the inherent curricula”. The danger of this approach lies in the fact that the student 
is educated through different ways and in different cultures from UAE nationals in other schools. 
In part, this is because some of those teachers or supervisors are foreigners who have different 
intellectual and religious ideologies.307 This could lead to the creation of an entire generation of 
religious extremists, which is what happened in the case of the Afghan Taliban movement,308 
whose leaders graduated from Islamic schools in Pakistan. Finally, the private schools pose a threat 
to the UAE identity, since they affect language, religion, culture, history, national allegiance and 
national identity in general. Private schools may create non-allegiance in the case of current and 
upcoming UAE generations. In turn, this could lead to the emergence of a spirit of intellectual and 
psychological defeat.309 The new generations in UAE no longer speak, write, think, or read in 
Arabic. For example, one UAE mother told a MOE official that when she went with her son, who 
is studying in a foreign school, on a tourist visit to Canada, her son expressed his relief at finally 
being able to understand the Friday sermon for the first time, because it was in English.310 
To summarize, the continuing influx of foreign nationals, many of whom are settling for long 
periods and who do not hold the traditional values upon which the UAE was founded, pose a threat 
to the generic national identity. Former migrants had a degree of association and appreciation for 
the UAE culture and therefore did not form a noticeable threat to the identity of the UAE society. 
The threat to the idea of the state in the UAE will be manifested when the national identity is 
subsumed by other cultures and identities. In the foreseeable future, this would require a reshaping 
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of the idea of state in order to encompass the foreign identities. In turn, this would impact the other 
constituent parts of the state, namely the physical base and the institutions of the state.  
In addition, the education system of the UAE, which helps to reinforce the traditional idea of the 
state, is under pressure from the plethora of curricula based on imported education systems in the 
private sector. The curricula are not subject to an effective monitor and approval system, which 
results in an unstructured value system being communicated to the Emirati and non-Emirati 
students. This heterogeneous value system undermines the base for future generation attitudes 
towards the traditional idea of the state in the UAE. 
4.2 THE THREATS TO THE UAE INSTITUTIONS 
This section focuses on the threats to the UAE’s national security through the institutions of the 
state. The idea of the state in the UAE evolved from the existing political structure of the seven 
local emirates which were independently ruled by the royal families. The need to develop a 
communal approach to the newly created Federation was expressed in a new institutional 
framework. It is important to recognise that in the UAE and the individual emirates the line 
between the state and the regime is a thin one, as both are interdependent and the continuation of 
the established model calls for regime stability. That said, this analysis outlines existing threats 
and potential challenges to security on a state level. 
 
Figure 4.2: Threats to the UAE Institutions 
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In the context of institutions, Buzan’s hypothesis limits the internal threats to small groups of militants, 
relatively isolated from the society, who reject the idea of state and the existing institutions implementing 
it. Therefore, the militants use force to weaken these institutions in order to overthrow the regime and obtain 
gain access to power. The groups that pose a threat to UAE institutions are the Muslim Brotherhood, al-
Qaeda and ISIS (see Figure 4.2). The following sections address the threats from these three groups 
to the institutions in the UAE. 
4.2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood 
The UAE institutions under threat from a small radical group, isolated from the Emirati 
community. The Muslim Brotherhood Group branch in the UAE is part of an international 
organization, which has been recently classified as a terrorist group by a number of countries.311 
The majority of Sunni Islamic radical movements have emerged out of its school,312 including al-
Qaeda and ISIS. Since Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 in 
order to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate regime,313 which was abolished in Turkey in 1924 by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at the end of the Ottoman Empire.314 Al-Banna laid down the 
organizational framework, objectives, implementation stages, and methods for the achievement of 
its objectives. Importantly, the Brotherhood’s objective of reinstating the Caliphate are not 
confined to Egypt, but extend to the entire Islamic world.315 In order to implement its objective, 
members across the world are required to be loyal to the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and to follow their instructions.316 Despite the group’s global intentions, it was until the 
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mid-1950s that members of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt explicitly started to spread their call to 
other countries.317  
There is a similarity between the attempted global reach of Communism and the Muslim 
Brotherhood; the loyalty of the communist parties in other countries was given to the leaders of 
the former Soviet Union, while the same approach exists with the affiliates of the International 
Organization of Muslim Brotherhood, even if it is against the national interest of their own 
states.318 The theorist of Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, who is considered as “the father of 
militant jihad”,319 called his followers, in his book ‘Milestones’, to abandon their loyalty to their 
homeland if it does not apply shari’a. For Qutb the homeland is no more than a piece of land that 
does not have any weight or consideration if it does not apply the provisions of Islamic law.320 
Muslim Brotherhood members are obliged to protect the land, establish the caliphate on its 
territories, and overthrow regimes that do not apply Islamic law.321 Qutb obliged members to 
establish an independent community isolated from their societies as he predicted that they would 
be attacked when they came to the notice of the infidel societies. At this point, he argued members 
would be entitled to defend themselves by force to protect their independent community.322 He 
added that God granted them the right to destroy and undermine the institutions of the state by 
ignoring regulations and laws that curtail access to power, in order to establish an Islamic 
caliphate.323 
Meanwhile, the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood spread its ideas in the UAE 
after independence. The aim was to attract UAE nationals and create a secluded community in 
order to undermine the state institutions and establish a theocratic state. This base could be used 
to establish a launching pad to undermine the regimes of neighbouring countries bringing them 
into the Islamic Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood started to create the institutional framework 
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in the region in 1972, when Hassan Hudaibi, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, held 
the first meeting of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in the world during the hajj (pilgrimage) 
in Saudi Arabia. This meeting led to the formation of committees in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar 
and the UAE.324 In 1974, the first official branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE was 
established in Dubai under the name of the Reform and Social Guidance Association. Thereafter, 
two further branches were established in Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah (1976), while the 
headquarters of the Social Guidance Committee of the Reform and Social Guidance Association 
opened in Ajman (1981).325 
The nominal objective of the Association was to gain more members for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
They attempted to achieve this by various means. From the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood 
gained controlled of the Ministry of Education in the UAE in order to influence national students, 
and embed the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas in their minds. Through their control of the education 
sector, they were able to write the curricula. In addition, its members, who worked as teachers, 
were able attract students to the Reform and Social Guidance Association, through football 
matches. Teachers, who were members of the Reform and Social Guidance Association, would go 
to students’ homes after school to take them to the Association headquarters. After the games, they 
would invite students to attend religious lectures, during which they encouraged students to join 
the Association.326 Furthermore, followers of the Reform and Social Guidance Association 
controlled the scouting activities and summer camps in some emirates, during which they 
propagated the dogma of the Muslim Brotherhood.327 
These attempts were supported by the presence of a media arm highlighting the activity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in UAE. The outlet was the Reform Magazine, which portrayed a good image 
of the members of the Reform and Social Guidance Association328 and promoted the thoughts and 
the ideas of their extremist organization within the UAE. For example, in 1982, the Islah magazine 
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published a statement that was attributed to a fake organization named the Federation of Islamic 
Organizations in Europe,329 which demanded the abolition of the death sentences in Egypt that had 
been issued against Khaled Al-Islambouli and his colleagues who were convicted of the 
assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. The call was not based on any legal or 
humanitarian rights as is usual with the international human rights organizations. However, they 
argued that the assassination of Sadat was not a crime according to Islamic law, as he was an 
infidel governor since he made a peace treaty with ‘the Jews’, who are perceived as enemies of 
God. In addition, Sadat did not apply shari’a in Egypt. Therefore, God has permitted to kill him, 
according to statement in Islah.330 
Members of the Muslim Brotherhood made use of mosques to spread their message through Friday 
prayers, which are supposed to address religious matters. However, preachers started to tackle 
political issues. For example, in the late 1980s, in a Friday sermon, a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Ras Al Khaimah accused the UAE Minister of Education of being a disbeliever.331 
In addition, the Reform and Social Guidance Association used other methods to attract young 
people. It took part in charitable activities, through the establishment of a branch that offered aid. 
Donations were collected from mosques and schools, through activities, speeches, coupons and 
other methods.  
Despite the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE to attract young people, many nationals 
withdrew from the Reform and Social Guidance Association after the disclosure of its links to a 
foreign organization aimed at toppling the ruler. For instance, Rashid Al-Jumairi, a former member 
of the Association in the UAE, stated that in 2000 he travelled to Kuwait with some of Association 
leaders and members. At the meeting, a leader of the UAE Reform and Social Guidance 
Association gave a speech in the presence of Jassim Yassin, a prominent figure of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood in Kuwait, in which he emphasised the need to follow the lead of Hassan Al Banna 
to be loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate.332 
A further escalation in activities took place in 2011. According to Abdul Rahim Ali, Director of 
the Arab Centre for Research and Studies, the members of the International Organization of 
Muslim Brotherhood held a meeting in Istanbul on 12 November 2011headed by General Guide 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the meeting, they took the decision to run for the presidential 
elections in Egypt. They also sought to increase their penetration of the Arabian Gulf region, in 
order to exploit the progress achieved by the organization's branches in Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco, and benefit from the general revolutionary mood with the youth of the region. This 
included encouraging the existing cells in Kuwait and the UAE to conduct a systematic escalation 
in order to undermine and overthrow the institutions of their ruling regimes. The ultimate aim was 
to harness the wealth of these states to finance their project of the Islamic Caliphate, which was to 
be established from the ruins of states entangled in the wave of revolutions of the Arab Spring that 
broke out in late 2010.333 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s escalation against the UAE regime depended on three basic elements. 
First, the members of the Brotherhood in the UAE focused on portraying themselves to the West 
and the international human rights organizations as human rights activists and leaders of the 
opposition. They claimed that their group was a national opposition movement, which aims to 
reform the political system in the UAE. Furthermore, they claimed they were not affiliated to the 
International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, but carry the message of Islam and help to 
reform the UAE through the provision of advice and guidance according to Islamic law.334 Second, 
the members of the organization questioned the role of the institutions of the state, such as the 
state’s security apparatus, the judiciary, police, media and the General Authority of Islamic Affairs 
and Endowments, which oversees the mosques in the country. Using social communication, the 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to portray the state security apparatus as an 
authoritarian institution unrelated to the rulers of the state, but which has the ultimate power to 
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control the police, the judiciary, the state’s official mass media and the Authority of Islamic Affairs 
and Endowments. Moreover, they accused the members of the state security apparatus of being 
infidels because they fight against Islam by not permitting members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
to deliver speeches in mosques on Fridays on the grounds that they use their sermons to promote 
the organization's thoughts, as well as infidelizing and criticizing their opponents. Third, Muslim 
Brotherhood members used slander and libel against the systems of governance and its legitimacy 
through social communication and religious preachers from abroad belonging to the International 
Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. This followed the Brotherhood’s failure to gain 
popularity among the tribal community of the UAE, which was adhering to its identity and its 
customs, traditions and teachings of Islam. The ideas of reform and overthrowing the ruling 
regimes contradict with the provisions of the Shafi’i and Maliki doctrines followed by the majority 
of the population in the UAE. Therefore, the policy of labelling the regime in the UAE as infidels 
reflects on the people of the UAE who are loyal to their ruling regime, in accordance with the 
principles of their ideology.  
Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood group in the UAE moved outside their independent society into the 
wider society for the first time in order to publicly escalate their activities against the regime. This 
action immediately met with the decision to withdraw Emirati citizenship from certain members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood because of their involvement in acts that were proven to pose a threat 
to the state’s security, according to the Emirates News Agency (WAM).335 All those involved were 
previously granted Emirati citizenship through naturalization. Therefore, their Emirati citizenships 
were withdrawn in accordance with Article 16 of the Naturalisation Law No. 17 of 1972 and its 
amended law, which provides for the withdrawal of nationality from any naturalized person “if he 
commits or attempts to commit an act that poses threat to the security and safety of the State”.336 
The Article does not require the person to be prosecuted and the UAE regime gave them a deadline 
to adjust their residency status in the state.  
                                                          
335 WAM. (22 December 2011). “Citizenship of 6 naturalised Emiratis revoked by President”. Gulf News Newspaper. 
Available at: <URL: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/government/citizenship-of-6-naturalised-emiratis-revoked-
by-president-1.955438> Access Date: 15 January 2013. 
336 WAM. (22 December 2011). “UAE citizenship of 6 persons revoked”. Emirates 24/7 News. Available at: <URL: 
http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-citizenship-of-6-persons-revoked-2011-12-22-1.434127> Access 
Date 7 January 2012.  
97 
 
In response, the Muslim Brotherhood strengthened its policy, first adopted in 2004, of addressing 
foreign human rights groups and foreign media on issues relating to the rule of law, human rights, 
and civil society institutions.337 This policy was assisted by the growing role of non-state actors in 
the international arena and pressure by the US on the Middle Eastern countries to adopt ideas 
associated with the liberal democratic doctrine of individual freedom and political pluralism and 
the western model of democratic rule.338 In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood group in the 
UAE cooperated with foreign human rights organizations, some of which are credible. However, 
others are connected with terrorists groups; for example, the Al-Karama Foundation, the former 
Chairman of which and one of its members in Yemen were convicted of funding al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and other terrorist organizations in the region.339 The Brotherhood’s 
cooperation included providing the groups and media with false information about the practices of 
the UAE security and justice institutions in order to put pressure on the UAE regime and to allow 
the Muslim Brotherhood to undermine the state’s institutions.340Although human rights 
organizations claimed that they obtained these reports from independent sources, it was 
subsequently confirmed that source was a person required to appear before UAE courts for trial 
on terrorism charges.341 The source was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE 
who then became a member of al-Qaeda. After leaving the UAE in 2013, he oversaw the 
graduation of a battalion consisting of citizens belonging to the GCC in Syria to fight alongside 
with fighters of al-Nusra Front and the ISIL,342 which were proscribed by the UN Security Council 
as terrorist organizations in 2013.  
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The Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE also raised the subject of the lack of freedom of speech, 
despite the fact that this right is granted in the UAE constitution since 1971. Article 30 of the 
Constitution provides for the freedom of opinion and expression in speech, writing, and other 
means of expression within the limits of the law. An example of this type of attack was by Saleh 
Al-Dhufairi, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE, who wrote on his Twitter 
page that the UAE will not enjoy security until the organization members are liberated from the 
constraints of laws and regulations.343 In addition, one female member claimed that through 
freedom of expression young people in our communities who do not belong to the organization 
could be convinced of the idea of changing the regime. However, because of the lack of freedom 
of expression, young people are satisfied with their ruling regimes and they are indifferent about 
participating in governance because all their material needs are met.344 Thus, in addition to 
appearing in the foreign media, members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE openly used the 
Internet and social networks to gain the local and global support to mobilise against the regime of 
the UAE.  
The leader who wrote on Twitter about the need to allow members to be liberated from the 
repressive laws, also stated at one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s secret meetings that in order to 
succeed in seizing power in the UAE, bloodshed and loss of lives would have to be made. In 
January 2013, the UAE security services arrested the leader and other members of the group for 
planning to overthrow the government. The members were referred to the public prosecutor for 
investigation by the public prosecutor.345 The public prosecutor then referred them to the Federal 
Supreme Court, which considers crimes that affect the federal structure of the state, for trial. 
The trial was conducted in the presence of the relatives of the defendants, and representatives of 
the Emirates Association for Human Rights, of civil society organizations and of the local press. 
At the trial, evidence, including audio and video tapes of secret meetings held by the defendants, 
such as the meeting mentioned previously, was presented. The evidence revealed that the 
                                                          
343 Twitter. (9 April 2012). Available at:  <URL: https://twitter.com/SalehAlDhufairi/status/18930057845 3700608> 
Access Date: 9 April 2012. (In Arabic). 
344 Adel, Wael. (April 2011). “The Concept of Power Lecture”. The Second Youth Rising Forum in Qatar.  Available 
at:  <URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0721QqbdxE&feature=plcp> Access Date: 23 April 2012. (In 
Arabic). 
345 The details of the trial highlight that the UAE security agencies monitored the defendants since 2010, after acquiring 
written permission from the public prosecutor. 
99 
 
defendants were managing a secret organization. The organizational structure of the Muslim 
Brotherhood group branch in the UAE was similar to that of a state.346 A Consultative Council 
(shura) consisting of 30 members elect the organization’s Board of Directors from among its 
members. The Board of Directors consists of the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary-general, and 
a further five members. Moreover, the Board of Directors has three bodies under its supervision. 
The first body is the Areas Office, which is a centralized leadership body that manages the 
organization’s administrative offices across different areas of the UAE (Abu Dhabi, Bani Yas city, 
Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah and the rest of the regions of eastern 
coast overlooking the Gulf of Oman). Each office is composed of around seven persons and has a 
chairman, vice-chairman and a secretary, in addition to representatives from the Office of Local 
Committees, such as the Educational Committee, which educates the families of members. This 
was based on the system developed by al-Banna and is considered to be one of the most important 
practical areas of spiritual education in the Muslim Brotherhood.347 In this system every 
responsible member of the committee presides over no more than five new members through 
weekly meetings at one of their houses on the pretext of increasing harmony among them and 
teaching them the Islamic religion subjects, using the books of Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, but 
primarily Qutb.348 The members of the Student Action Committee, which is another local 
committee supervised by the administrative offices, work on attracting young people in schools, 
colleges and universities to enter the ranks of the secret organization.349 In addition, the 
administrative offices supervises the Social Action Committee, the members of which aim to 
control associations of public benefit with the aim of creating a popular base.350 Overall, the task 
of the administrative offices is managing the organizational work in areas that fall within their 
jurisdiction, in addition to collecting information that serves the organization's interests. Reports 
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are submitted by the administrative offices periodically to the management office, which, in turn, 
are presented to the Board of Directors.  
The responsibility of the second body, called the Office of Central Committees, is to support the 
work of the organization across the country. The Office of Central Committees includes the 
Planning Committee, which has the task of developing the organizational plans followed and 
applied by the organization in order to seize power. It also includes the Committee of Expat 
Communities, which aims to attract members from the Asian Muslim communities, particularly, 
those from India and Bengal, to support the organization in the future as they form the majority of 
the population in the UAE. These expats are thought to be more likely to support the Muslim 
Brotherhood in overthrowing the UAE regime than the indigenous population. There is also the 
Rights Committee, which includes a number of lawyers and university graduates, is tasked with 
communicating with human rights organizations abroad and to provide them with reports to incite 
world opinion against the UAE regime and to put pressure on it to permit the activities of the 
organization's members in the UAE. The Charity Committee, which also falls under the umbrella 
of the Office of Central Committees, is charged with collecting donations, alms and zakat 
(taxation) from benefactors in order to support both the activities and programs of the organization 
within the state,351 and charity associations outside the UAE belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Finance Committee is responsible for collecting the subscriptions of members, with each 
member paying an amount of 5% to 7% of his/her monthly income to support the goal of 
establishing an Islamic State on the territory of the UAE.352 This Committee also determines the 
organization’s annual budget and diverts surplus funds to the Investment Committee, which is 
responsible for the management of organization’s longer-term investments, including trading, 
lands, real estate and stocks. These assets are registered in the names of members in order to 
safeguard the confidentiality of the organization. The Media Committee has the mission to 
promote its message by means of audio-visual media and social communication. As highlighted 
previously, the Committee attempted to incite the people of the UAE against the regime of their 
own country through the means of social communication. The International Relations Committee, 
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which also falls under the aegis of the Office of Central Committees, is charged with 
communicating with the Muslim Brotherhood’s regional or international organizations. One 
example is when the Organization brought to the UAE scholars and preachers from the 
International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood after it failed to gain popularity among the 
tribal UAE community. Furthermore, the Education Committee oversees the private schools 
owned by the organization and administers the affairs of education in general within the UAE by 
penetrating the national educational institutions, such as the Ministries of Education and Higher 
Education and Scientific Research, in addition to educational councils and educational zones. 
Lastly, the Dialogue Committee aims to open dialogue with community groups and the political 
leadership in the UAE in order to gain recognition for the legitimacy of the organisation within the 
UAE.353 
The third body, which is under the direct supervision and leadership of the organization’s Board 
of Directors, is known as the External Action Group. The members of this group focus on three 
committees, which were created after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, in order to expedite their 
grab for power in the UAE. The first is the Supporting Committee, through which the leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the UAE communicate with the other organizations 
affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, whether at a regional or international level, in order to gain 
political support for mobilising against the regime in the UAE.354 The leaders of the organization 
travelled to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco after the political parties affiliated to the international 
organization of the Muslim Brotherhood gained access to power in those countries.355 In addition, 
some Muslim Brotherhood leaders communicated directly with the embassies of foreign countries 
in the UAE in order to promote the organization and provide foreign diplomats with information 
to discredit the role of government institutions in the UAE. Furthermore, the Committee members 
demand assistance from other countries to put pressure on the authorities to recognize their secret 
organization, while the board members have revealed to the membership that there are foreign 
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countries, which support their aspirations to gain power. The second committee under the aegis of 
the External Action Group is the Media Committee, which communicates with the outside world. 
The Media Committee commissioned members of the International Organization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to establish the Emirates Centre for Human Rights in London and trigger media 
campaigns in Europe to distort the role played by the institutions of the UAE in maintaining its 
security. This was achieved by creating allegations about human rights violations by these 
institution, in particular the security agencies, against what were described as political opponents 
of the ruling regime. In this context, the Emirates Centre for Human Rights, since its inception, 
has adopted the cause of the members of the secret organization in the UAE and promoted their 
alleged suffering to the international media and international human rights associations in order to 
incite international public opinion against the UAE regime. Moreover, The Telegraph newspaper 
confirms that the Emirates Centre for Human Rights is a front created by the wife of the CEO and 
founding member of the Cordoba Foundation in the United Kingdom. The newspaper reported that 
“the Cordoba Foundation works closely with other British extremist groups which seek the 
creation of an Islamic dictatorship, or caliphate, in Europe”.356 In addition, the British ex-Prime 
Minister David Cameron listed this organization as a “front for the Muslim Brotherhood” in 
2008.357 In addition, in 2004, UK bank accounts of the Cordoba Foundation and its chief executive 
and his wife were closed, not because of their religious affiliation, but because the bank felt that 
they represent a “potential risk for the future”,358 according to Hara Rafiq, Head of Outreach for 
Counter-Extremism at the Quilliam Foundation.359 The listing of the Cordoba Foundation was 
taken following a review conducted by Sir John Jenkins, the UK ambassador in Saudi Arabia.360 
The review investigate the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, its values, policies, and the 
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extent of its connections with extremist organizations, as well activities carried out by its members 
in the UK, and its impact on the national security of the UK.361 
The third committee under the aegis of the External Action Group is the Legal Committee, which 
is responsible for building legal relations international organisations. These include the Federation 
of Islamic Organisations in Europe, which is affiliated to the International Organization of Muslim 
Brotherhood,362 whose leaders in the 1980s issued a statement of support in the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the UAE’s Islah magazine for the terrorists who killed Sadat at the military parade 
in 1981. The Legal Committee requested the support of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in 
Europe, as one of the organizations under the umbrella of the European Network on Religion and 
Belief that participate in formal and informal consultations with the European Union, to gain 
access to the European Parliament. Furthermore, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe 
has worked with other organizations belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood attempting to influence 
the decisions of the European Parliament in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE. This 
influence resulted in the European Parliament passing a resolution condemning the human rights 
record in the UAE, without giving the opportunity to present its point of view or the right of reply 
to the UAE authorities to the charges contained in the report. The influence was also demonstrated 
in the formulation of the European Parliament’s decision to issue two resolutions: the first 
specifically addressed the issue of the detainees belonging to the organization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, while the second referred to other aspects of human rights. According to Al Bayan 
newspaper, the second resolution was drafted after the interventions of organizations belonging to 
the Muslim Brotherhood to suggest that concerns are not limited the detainees.363 Furthermore, in 
2014, Ewald Stadler, a member of the European Parliament from Austria presented a parliamentary 
submission questioning the impact of organizations affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood on the 
decisions of the European Union. He raised the subject of consultations with the Cordoba 
Foundation and the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe by the Directorate-General for 
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Justice (DG JUSTICE) in the European Commission.364 Stadler also demanded clarification from 
the Commission on whether it allowed for one or more of those organizations to use facilities in 
the EU, and how the Commission classifies such organizations enabling them to gain an advisory 
position in the European Union.365 
However, the internal campaigns launched by the Muslim Brotherhood through social networks 
along with their external campaigns with some human rights organizations failed to force the UAE 
authorities to cancel the trial the Muslim Brotherhood members at the Federal Supreme Court. The 
case continued in accordance with the principles of a fair trial enshrined in the UAE constitution, 
with the presence of the defendants’ relatives, representatives of civil society associations and the 
local media. Since the beginning of the trial, the Federal Supreme Court ensured the defendants’ 
freedom to choose their defence team, and has provided the indictment and its annexes to their 
lawyers immediately. In addition, upon referring the case to the judiciary the defendants were able 
to contact and meet their lawyers. Furthermore, the usual guarantees provided for defendant were 
available, including which include enabling the accused to present their defence personally, giving 
them complete freedom to provide proof of their innocence in word and in writing, providing 
defence witnesses, enabling them to question the prosecution witnesses, technical experts and 
financial experts on their own and through their lawyers. Finally, the accused were able to review 
the audio and video evidences presented in the case file and to respond to the requests of some of 
the defendants to listen to them in closed secret sessions. At the end of the trial366 the defendants 
who were convicted of membership in a secret organization were sentenced to prison for varying 
durations, while those whose involvement was not proven were declared innocent.  
However, since the end of this trial, further cases against other members of the International 
Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood within the UAE have been opened. A cell composed of 
foreign residents and UAE citizens working within the state was arrested in 2012. This cell sought 
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to establish a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organization within the UAE, and create 
offices across the various emirates. The cell was to summon members belonging to the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and to consolidate the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood Organization in 
their families. In addition, it was to recruit other Egyptian residents along with UAE citizens in 
order to spread the ideology and thoughts of Muslim Brotherhood Organization. Furthermore, it 
was to assist members to undermine and demolish the state institutions with an aim to gain power 
in the state. At the end of the trial, the Federal Court sentenced the convicts to terms ranging from 
three months to five years in prison.367 Then, in 2016, the Federal Supreme Court issued its 
judgment on Yemeni members of a Muslim Brotherhood cell, which was active in the UAE passing 
sentences ranging upwards from three years but freeing two of the 19 accused. Those found guilty 
were accused of establishing a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the state, collecting donations 
and funds without prior authorization from the competent authority, and cooperating with the 
secret UAE-branch of Muslim Brotherhood organization in order to implement its plan to gain 
power through the overthrow of state institutions.368 The members of the cell formed an executive 
office for their organization in the UAE, to which other administrative offices distributed across 
the state, were affiliated. This was done in coordination with the UAE branch of Muslim 
Brotherhood in order to achieve their goal to seize power in the State. The Yemeni Muslim 
Brotherhood organization in the UAE was supporting the UAE-branch of secret Muslim 
Brotherhood organization with funding of AED 200,000 a year from donations and funds collected 
illegally by its members in the UAE. The remaining funds were sent to Yemen to support the 
Muslim Brotherhood there. The funds transferred by UAE-based organization to the Yemeni 
organisation reached about AED2 million.369 
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4.2.2 Al-Qaeda 
The ideas of Sayyid Qutb, the theorist of Muslim Brotherhood, have provided the inspiration to 
radical Islamic groups against the perceived infidel regimes.370 In this context, AQAP sought to 
establish of an Islamic emirate across the Arabian Peninsula by dismantling the ruling regimes in 
the region.371 This was to be carried out mainly through destabilizing such states, by launching 
attacks against oil facilities, foreigners, and security forces, which would weaken regimes allowing 
them to be toppled. AQAP was established in the Arabian Peninsula through a merger of its two 
branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen,372 but its development has passed through five stages. 
The first stage was laying down the foundations. The origins of Al-Qaeda as an organization 
inspiring terrorism around the world and training operatives can be traced to the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan from the early to the late 1980s. At first militants were recruited from the Arabian 
Peninsula and other Arab countries in training camps in Afghanistan in order to fight for the 
Afghans against the communist Afghans supported by Soviet forces.373 The Cold War prompted 
the US to seek the help of militants from Arab and Islamic countries to fight the Soviet forces. 
According to the Green Belt Strategy, the US’ plan was to stop the Soviet expansion into the non-
communist mid-south Asia, and to dismantle the mid-Asian Soviet Republics by stoking militant 
and vehemently anti-communist Islam in the countries and neighbouring regions. The approach 
was adopted because the vast majority of the population in those areas embraced Islam.374 The US 
urged Arab and Islamic regimes to open jihad for Muslims375 by supporting the Afghans in their 
fight against the communists. Some Arab and Islamic regimes allowed their citizens to travel to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight for the Afghans or to take part in aid operations.376 Volunteers 
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included the youth of the Arabian Peninsula who received training in Afghanistan under the 
supervision of Osama Bin Laden.377 In these camps, militants were trained in the use of guns, 
explosives, and detonators. Furthermore, they received lectures378 about Qutb’s thoughts, which 
were adopted by Al-Qaeda as the pillar of its ideology. Abdullah Azzam379 taught his vision about 
global jihad.380 Azzam is of the view that regimes are based on man-made laws and regulations 
and such regimes, whether Arab, American, Afghan or Russian, do not believe in God. He argues 
that this is because those who apply judgments that are not based on Qur’an and Sunnah are 
disbelievers, even if they are Muslims. Thus, according to Azzam, the laws that govern the 
community set the identity of the individual whether or he/she is a believer.381 This stage came to 
an end in the late 1980s with the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, and the militants, 
including Osama Bin Laden, returned to their homelands. 
The second stage was that of exploration. This stage was primarily an attempt to find the best 
regions from which to run the Islamist struggle. In the late 1990s, Bin Laden based himself in 
Saudi Arabia with a cell of Saudi and Yemeni mujahideen who returned with him from 
Afghanistan. They chose to launch their attacks against the Marxist pro-Russian Republic in South 
Yemen. However, the Yemeni government arrested a number soon after they crossed the border. 
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Correspondence took place with the Saudi Arabian government and Bin Laden was officially 
charged with responsibility for the attacks.382 However, the Saudi regime failed to take any 
measures against him. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bin Laden suggested to the Saudi 
government that he should take over defence in Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait through the Arab 
mujahideen who had fought by his side in Afghanistan, but the Saudi regime rejected this 
suggestion. Later, the US-led coalition of foreign forces was called to defend Saudi Arabia and 
liberate Kuwait. This deployment angered Bin Laden, as he believed the presence of foreign troops 
or “infidel militaries”383 on the Holy land of Mecca and Medina, profaned sacred soil. 
In 1991, Bin Laden left Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan. However, conditions in Afghanistan were 
unstable due to armed conflict between the various Afghan militias, and Bin Laden moved again, 
this time to Sudan, which was ruled by the Islamic-oriented National Islamic Front. There Bin 
Laden launched a number of construction and agricultural projects. Moreover, Bin Laden 
summoned the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan to Sudan, along with their families, to reside 
there. In 1992, Bin Laden launched his first terrorist attack in which two bombs were detonated in 
Aden, Yemen, targeting US forces at the Golden Moor Hotel, killing three people and injuring five 
others.384 In 1994, Al-Qaeda downed two Blackhawk helicopters in Mogadishu, leading to the 
withdrawal of US forces from Somalia.385 The same year, the Saudi government revoked Bin 
Laden’s citizenship and froze his wealth on grounds of funding terrorist groups.386 In 1996, Bin 
Laden and his group left Sudan for Afghanistan after the Sudanese authorities made it clear that 
they were no longer welcome there.387 In 1998, Bin Laden declared the World Islamic Front for 
Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. Bin Laden escalated his speeches at the time in the Arabian 
Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He stated that the US’ presence in Saudi Arabia 
was an occupation of a country of sacred places, classifying it as second only to the Palestinian 
occupation.388 
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The third stage was the stage of the structural organization of AQAP.389 1998 marked the inception 
of a local organization of al-Qaeda in Yemen,390 which launched a number of terrorist attacks in 
Yemen, the most prominent of which was the bombing of the missile destroyer U.S.S. Cole in 
2000, killing 17 US soldiers.391 In 2002, the UAE security authorities arrested one of the 
perpetrators of the attack Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, a Saudi national. He was arrested while in 
the final stages of launching “attacks on vital economic targets” to cause “the highest possible 
casualties among nationals and foreigners in the UAE”.392 In 2003, another local Al-Qaeda 
organization was established in Saudi Arabia,393 which launched a number of terrorist attacks, the 
most important of which was the attack on the US Consulate General in Jeddah in 2004, killing 
five of the consulate employees.394 
The fourth stage is the stage of disobedience,395 in which both local branches of Al-Qaeda in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen united under the regional leadership in Yemen. This came as the Saudi 
authorities heightened their activities against the organisation on its territories, which forced a 
number of the members to flee to Yemen, making use of the poor security situation in the country. 
The central government was at war with the Al Houthi rebels in the north and faced separatist 
action in the south. Moreover, the geography of Yemen, characterised by mountains, valleys, 
deserts, and coasts, and its demographic structure with its tribal nature suited the demands of an 
armed organization such as Al-Qaeda. It offered a refuge for strangers and good support. In this 
phase, AQAP launched a number of attacks inside and outside the Arabian Peninsula. In 2009, it 
attempted to assassinate Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud, the Saudi Assistant Minister of 
Interior, during a suicide attack,396 which led to the death of the mastermind of the assassination 
attempt, while Prince Nayef was saved. In the same year, one of AQAP’s members attempted to 
bomb Northwest Airlines flight no. 253 on its way from Amsterdam to Detroit, but the attempt 
                                                          
389 Ibid.  
390 Ibid.  
391 Morgenstem, Henry and Falk, Ophir. (2009). Suicide Terror: Understanding and Confronting the Threat. N.J.: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p. 4. 
392 Davidson, Christopher M. (Summer 2008). “Dubai the Security Dimensions of the Region’s Premier Free Port”. 
Middle East Policy. Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 155. 
393 Shaye, Abdul-llah Haider . (21 January 2010), op. cit.  
394 Giduck, John. (2005). Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools.  Golden, CO: 
Archangel Group, Inc., p. 409.  
395 Shaye, Abdul-llah Haider . (21 January 2010), op. cit.  
396 Teitelbaum, Joshua. (2010). Saudi Arabia and the New Strategic Landscape. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 
Press, p. 24.  
110 
 
failed.397 In 2010, the Brigades of Abdulla Azzam of Al-Qaeda bombed the Japanese oil tanker M 
Star near the Hormuz Straight. The terrorist group hit the tanker with a small boat laden with 
explosives,398 leading to the destruction of one side of the tanker hull, and one crew member was 
slightly injured.399 No oil leakage resulted, although the tanker was on its way to Japan with two 
million barrels of oil shipped from Port of Umm Said in Qatar and the Port of Das Island in the 
UAE.400 Immediately after the attack, the vessel headed to the Port of Fujairah in the UAE, to 
inspect the damage and check the reason for the explosions, as the crew did not know the actual 
cause of explosion.401 Finally, in 2010, based on information obtained from Saudi Intelligence, 
security officials in the UK and the UAE found two booby-trapped pieces of cargo sent from 
Yemen to Chicago, US transiting via Dubai (UAE) and East Midland (UK) international 
airports.402 Security officials at the East Midlands airport and officials in Dubai International 
Airport found plastic explosives inside laser printer cartridges, just before they were shipped on 
board the planes.403 The bombs were intended to explode over the Atlantic or just prior to landing 
in the US.404 AQAP was charged with this plot, as the evidence pointed to them.405 
The fifth phase started with the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Syria and Yemen, which resulted in radical groups taking advantage of the poor security 
situation.406 Thus, AQAP was able to exploit the chaos in Yemen in 2011 during the period of 
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opposition protests against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Indeed, it was able to gain 
control of the province of Abyan in the south,407 albeit only for one year, as they retreated after an 
attack by the Yemeni army forces allied with local resistance fighters, to liberate the region from 
their grip.408 Thereafter, AQAP elements took refuge in the desert and rugged mountainous areas 
in southern Yemen.409 It was only after the outbreak of the civil war in 2015 between the Houthis 
forces and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on the one hand, and the forces loyal to Yemeni 
President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi on the other hand, that AQAP was again able to take 
advantage of the chaos and increase its active presence in the country.410 Inside Yemen, AQAP 
managed to regain control of the province of Abyan,411 and expanded into the city Al Mukalla, the 
capital of Hadramaut province, as the state institutions collapsed. It was able to exploit the 
discontent resulting from the killings and repression of civilians by the Houthis in the south by 
using the tribal structure as a social incubator for its presence in the region.412 
The Arab coalition, which entered the civil war in Yemen in support of the legitimate president, 
has reduced the risk of AQAP expanding further. In 2016, Yemeni armed forces loyal to President 
Hadi; with the support of the UAE armed forces and other coalition forces liberated Hadramout 
province from AQAP.413 The AQAP forces made a tactical withdrawal from the province and 
returned to the desert and rugged mountainous areas in southern Yemen, vowing revenge against 
the UAE, which led the liberation process of the city. The liberation saw the killing of nearly one 
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thousand AQAP fighters, as well as the seizure of huge amounts of heavy, medium and light 
weapons of all kinds, in addition to tons of ammunition, bombs, rockets, and explosives.414 
In 2013, in the UAE, the security agencies uncovered an al-Qaeda cell, which was planning to 
implement operations affecting homeland security, as well as seeking to expand its activities to 
the regional countries, according to an official statement published by the WAM.415 The 
circumstances of the case were made clear during the trial of cell members at the Supreme Federal 
Court. The Public Prosecution charged the nine foreign defendants with the formation of a cell 
belonging to al-Qaeda organization, with the aim to promote the objectives of the organization and 
attract new members to join them. In addition, they sent others to fight with Jabhat Al-Nusra 
(Victory Front), the (then) branch of al-Qaeda in Syria. Jabhat Al-Nusra are involved in the Syrian 
civil war in order to establish the Islamic caliphate. The defendants also collected money and sent 
it to Victory Front. At the end of the trial, the Federal Court sentenced the accused to sentences 
ranging from life imprisonment to seven years, but freed two innocent defendants.416 In addition, 
in 2015, the UAE security agencies caught a terrorist group called Al Manara Youth Group, formed 
by a UAE citizen, who was an ideological supporter of al-Qaeda. The group, consisting of 41 
persons, were planning to carry out operations with the aim of destabilizing the stability of the 
state in order to seize power and establish an Islamic caliphate state on its territory. In addition, 
firearms, ammunition and materials used for making explosives were found in their possession. 
Furthermore, the security agencies uncovered the organizational structure of the group, which 
includes a chairman, vice-chairman and committees, in addition to cells with assigned tasks.417 
The defendants were referred to the Supreme Federal Court for trial following the public 
prosecutor’s investigations. The defendants were charged with joining a terrorist group. The court 
listened to statements from the accused and the arguments of their lawyers. The court ruled at the 
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end of the trial, which lasted for several months, with sentences against the convicts of the case, 
ranging from life imprisonment to six months and acquitted seven.418 
In 2016, the Supreme Federal Court had also considered the case of 23, 21 of whom were Yemeni 
and two Emiratis, accused of joining al-Qaeda in Yemen.419 At the end of the trial, the court 
sentenced two of the accused, in absentia, to life imprisonment and 12 others to three years 
imprisonment, while the court acquitted another nine defendants.420 Also in 2016, the Supreme 
Federal Court sentenced an Emirati citizen to life imprisonment, after he was caught by the UAE 
security forces and charged with planning to carry out terrorist acts. The security services found 
plans to blow up vital civilian and military facilities in the UAE. The defendant’s house contained 
prohibited chemicals, tools, equipment and devices, which are used in the explosives and arms 
industry. In addition, the public prosecutor found that the accused was running social networks 
that promoted extremist ideas, and that he was collecting funds for AQAP before declaring his 
allegiance to ISIS and setting himself as the Emir of the organization in the UAE.421 After the trial, 
which included a review of a medical report on the accused’s mental health, the court found him 
guilty.422 
4.2.3 ISIS 
In a different arena, at the end June 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and in the Arabian states as Daesh, announced the 
establishment of an Islamic caliphate under the name of the Islamic State. The Caliphate, which 
extended across Iraq and Syria, was led by the self-appointed Caliph of Muslims, Abu Bakr al-
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Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS. The group evolved from the nucleus of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia 
(also known al-Qaeda in Iraq), which was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004. Salem Al-
Jamili, a former officer in the Iraqi intelligence, revealed that the then Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein tried in the 1990s to attract al-Qaeda to overthrow the Saudi regime. When al-Qaeda 
started to launch terrorist attacks on Saudi government institutions in order to force the regime to 
expel foreign forces from its territory, Hussein sent a message in 1995 to bin Laden in Sudan 
offering cooperation against the foreign troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. The message was sent 
via a mediator belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which had a close relationship with 
bin Laden. However, the mediator informed Iraqi intelligence that bin Laden refused to cooperate 
with Saddam Hussein because he viewed his Ba’ath regime to be an infidel regime and that he was 
responsible for bringing foreign troops to the Arabian Peninsula. Other attempts by the former 
Iraqi regime were mediated by Hassan al-Turabi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, 
but bin Laden continued to refuse.423 
Upon the fall of Hussein’s regime in Iraq, militants from a number of countries joined the forces 
associated with the former Iraqi regime against occupying forces in Iraq.424 Thereafter, the 
militants and the former Iraqi army officers came under the framework of al-Qaeda in Iraq under 
the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.425 The organization evolved after the death of Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 at the hands of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, whom Osama bin Laden called 
on to pledge allegiance as an Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2007, at which stage most of 
militant groups in Iraq pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi.426 As the organization took control of a 
vast swathe of territory in the Sunni areas of Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq transformed its 
organization-style management structure to that of a state-style management structure. Many 
former Iraqi army officers assumed leadership positions in the military organization and the shura 
(Consultative) Council of Islamic State of Iraq. These military leaders developed the military 
forces along the lines of a nascent state, in terms of regulation, plans and military equipment.427 
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For example, Haji Bakar, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq organization who reached the rank 
of colonel in the Iraqi army before the invasion, was assigned the role of following up the 
production of chemical weapons, in addition to weapons development. He also played a big role 
in the enrolment of a large number of Iraqi officers, who had been discharged from the service 
after the Iraqi occupation. He was eventually killed in January 2014 in fighting between the 
militant groups in Syria.428 Moreover, the military leaders developed multiple sources of funding 
for the organization. They adopted a more pragmatic approach than bin Laden, the leader of the 
organization, who stuck to his convictions, despite offers from countries that were in conflict with 
the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood to provide logistical assistance to his organization. In 
contrast, the organization in Iraq started to receive financial funding from countries across the 
Middle East through unofficial funding from individuals running humanitarian and charitable 
associations linked to ruling regimes.429 Moreover, the former Iraqi officers used the tactic of 
waging military operations that had an economic return for the organization, such as taking control 
of energy sites and marketing products through indirect network affiliated to the organization. In 
addition, the organisation imposed taxes in the areas under its control. The organization also 
resorted to the kidnappings of foreigners for ransom.430 
Following the killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State in Iraq, and Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri his number two in April 2010 in a joint attack by US and Iraqi forces in Tikrit city,431 a 
new stage started. The group was experiencing a series of failures as a result of the rebellion of 
local Sunni tribes following aggressive acts by the members of the organization against the local 
population. At the time, al-Qaeda was in retreat not only in Iraq, but also across the whole region. 
At this stage, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of the organization.432 
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The background of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is subject to speculation, although it is generally agreed 
that he is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, born in 1971 in the city of Samarra in Iraq, and that he 
moved to Baghdad where he gained a BA, MA and PhD in Islamic studies at the Islamic University 
of Baghdad.433 He worked as a professor and imam of a mosque during Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
However, reports differ concerning his affiliation and progression in al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some 
reports indicate that after the occupation of Iraq, al-Baghdadi founded an armed group bearing the 
name of Army of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah (Adherents to the Sunnah and Community Army) 
to resist the foreign presence. The group is reported to have joined al-Qaeda in Iraq through the 
Mujahideen Shura Council, which was founded by jihadist groups at the beginning of 2006. 
However, the umbrella organisation only lasted for six months, when it was agreed to dissolve 
their individual jihadist organizations and incorporate them under the authority of the Islamic State 
of Iraq. The new group was led by elements from al-Qaeda in Iraq who were the most qualified 
leaders in terms of both shari’a and jihad, and had the aim of restoring the Islamic caliphate in the 
region.434 However, this hypothesis is not consistent with reports, which confirm that Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi was arrested by the US military and held in Camp Bucca from 2005 to 2009. In 
addition, according to the official announcement, the group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not 
among the jihadist organizations that joined under the framework of the Mujahideen Shura 
Council; only six were named: al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the Army of the Victorious Sect, Ansar 
al-Tawhid Brigades, the Islamic Jihad Brigades, the Strangers Brigades, and the Horrors Brigades.  
During the first few months of taking control al-Baghdadi started to tactically withdrawal from the 
areas under the control of Islamic State of Iraq where the inhabitants rejected its presence. 
However, a new trend started in 2011 with the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The group 
implemented large-scale attacks on Iraqi prisons to free hundreds of their members, while its forces 
attempted to occupy government sites, such as the building of the Council of Salahuddin 
Governorate for several hours. In addition, the organization built many camps in the desert areas 
in Iraq. Moreover, the organization forces extended its operations into Syria under the pretext of 
participating in the jihad against President Bashar Assad’s regime. The organization’s fighters 
were easily able to cross the 600km border between the two countries. In addition, in Syria in 2011 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created the al-Nusra Front (known in Arabic as Jabhat al-Nusra), under the 
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leadership of a Syrian called Abu Mohammed al-Golani. This policy attempted to gain the 
confidence of the various Syrian armed groups, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was 
backed by regional and international countries that had begun fighting the regular forces of Syrian 
government. Al-Baghdadi’s plan was to mislead the Syrian opposition in believing that Islamic 
State in Iraq forces were supporting the Syrian people against the Assad regime, rather than 
spreading the ideology of Sayyid Qutb and annexing Syria into the Islamic caliphate. Al-Baghdadi 
revealed the nature of the relationship between the al-Nusra Front and Islamic State in Iraq, when 
he announced the establishment of an ISIL in an audio tape on 9 April 2013 on jihadist websites 
and broadcast by Al Jazeera. In the tape, he stated that:  
We assigned Al-Golani, who is one of our soldiers, with a group of our sons and pushed 
them from Iraq to Al-Sham to meet with our cells in Al-Sham and set for them the plans 
and drew for them the policy of work and supplied them with half of what is in the 
treasury every month and supplied them with men who became experienced from the 
battlefields from Muhajirin and Ansar so they did well next to their brothers from the 
ardent sons of Al-Sham, and the influence of the Islamic State expanded to Al-Sham 
and we didn’t declare that for security reasons for the people to see the reality of the 
State away from the distortion, forgery and fabrication of the media and time has come 
to declare before the people of Al-Sham and the whole world that Jabhat Al-Nusra is 
only an expansion for the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it and we are determined after 
making Istikhara of Allah Almighty and consulting whom we trust in his religion and 
wisdom to continue in the journey of ascending of the group by passing all that will be 
said since the pleasure of Allah is above everything, and no matter what happens to us 
because of that so we declare keeping our trust in Allah abolishing the name of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and abolishing the name of Jabhat Al-Nusra, and joining them 
under one name ‘The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham’ and also uniting the banner 
which is the banner of the Islamic State the banner of the Khilafah Insha’Allah.435 
However, only two days only after the declaration, the al-Nusra Front implicitly rejected his 
leadership by pledging their allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaeda leader, who intervened 
through a message published on the Al-Jazeera Net website discouraging al-Baghdadi from 
announcing the new organization. 
Nevertheless, al-Baghdadi continued to operate in Syria, where his group fought against al-Nusra 
Front, the FSA (which is affiliated to the coalition of Syrian opposition), and the Syrian Kurds 
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who had established a kind of autonomy in the north of the country. He managed to subdue much 
of Syria, in addition to forming military bodies, public headquarters and shari’a courts for his state 
on Syrian territory. The organization also managed, through the use of social networks and smart 
phone applications, to attract new fighters to the organization from around the world. ISIL has 
used Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media to showcase its brutality, role in the 
insurgency, influence, power and ascendancy. These messages attract young people who suffer 
from a feeling of marginalization and who find in the organization a way to take revenge, reprisal 
and retaliation. Despite its brutality, the organization attracted foreign girls, especially minors, by 
deceiving the min to relationships with its members through social networking, thereby tempting 
them with marriage. Upon arrival, the girls are subjected to a professionally planned brainwashing 
process, which books their travel tickets, send its cadres to receive them at the airport and facilitate 
their entry into the territories under its control. The girls are then directed to use social media to 
promote the story of their affiliation to the organization in order to attract more girls.  
The next turning point came in June 2014, when the fighters of ISIL which had been based in the 
city of Fallujah in Iraq since the beginning of 2014, took Iraq's second biggest city Mosul, Tikrit, 
and parts of Samarra. Around 30,000 government forces fled, leaving their weapons, equipment, 
vehicles and military bases to the several thousand fighters from ISIL.436 It also gained control 
over four oil fields to the north of Mosul city and south of Tikrit city,437 making the organization 
one of the richest extremist groups in the world. As a consequence of their gains, they announced, 
at the end of June 2014, the establishment of the ‘State of the Islamic Caliphate’ and changed the 
title of their organization to the ‘Islamic State’ (IS). They also asked those who believe in the ideas 
of Sayyid Qutb to pledge allegiance to the organization’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as ‘Caliph’ 
to the Muslims of the world.  
This declaration faced opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Its spiritual leader, 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi stated that the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate was a false step that did not 
serve the Islamic project. He explained that the appointment of al-Baghdadi as a Caliph to Muslims 
does not meet several shari’a conditions, including linking the Caliphate to an organization with 
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a reputation for strictness that would damage the Caliphate project.438 As is evident from al-
Qaradawi’s statement he does not oppose the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, but he opposes 
its control by al-Baghdadi. Al-Qaradawi argues in an interview published on the web that al-
Baghdadi was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, who left in order to 
become the leader of the IS after his release from Camp Bucca prison.439 
However, the international community only took action against IS after it began its incursion into 
the Kurdistan region of Iraq and committed genocide crimes against more than 500 people from 
the Yazidi minority,440 in addition to capturing more than 300 women.441 Dabiq magazine, issued 
by IS in English, claimed that the women and their children were spoils of war, and therefore can 
be sold in a slave market.442 The incursion created a humanitarian disaster as thousands of Yazidis 
were displaced into Kurdistan and the surrounding areas. Accordingly, the international 
community started to provide humanitarian aid to those displaced and provided military assistance 
to stop further gains by IS. Moreover, the US formed an international coalition to bomb positions 
held by IS in both Iraq and Syria in order to weaken their power and support government forces in 
Iraq and the forces of the moderate Syrian opposition in Syria. Military personnel from Bahrain, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE participated in coalition.  
Support from the Muslim Brotherhood Organization for IS was given by al-Qaradawi who 
condemned the air attacks on his official page on Twitter. He declared that he would not support 
the US attacks on IS as they were not driven by the values of Islam, but by national interests.443 
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This support came despite his previous statements that he was opposed to the previous incarnation, 
the ISIL, and he opposed the establishment of IS.  
In response to the attacks by the international coalition, IS called for members of Islamic extremist 
groups across the world who support the Islamic Caliphate State to kill the citizens of countries 
that were participating in the coalition. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the spokesperson for IS, stated 
in an audio recording broadcast in more than one language on jihadist websites, that:  
If you can kill an American or European, especially the French, or an Australian, or a 
Canadian, or any other one, whether he is civilian or military, from the citizens of those 
countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, put your trust in God 
and kill him in any way or manner whatsoever.444 
Accordingly, the countries participating in the international coalition have tightened their security 
procedures.  
Meanwhile, the security services in the UAE arrested elements of a cell belonging to Jabhat al-
Nusra and Ahrar Al Sham, offshoots of al-Qaeda,445 several months before the UAE joined the 
international coalition against IS in Iraq and Syria. The investigations by the UAE Public 
Prosecution showed that the suspects were part of al-Qaeda support groups; some of whom had 
fought for militant groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in Syria. Those arrested had various roles, 
including: attracting UAE citizens to fight in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham; 
collecting and transferring money to Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar Al Sham in Syria; providing these 
groups with the necessary equipment and devices needed to support terrorist acts; manufacturing 
bombs inside the UAE and conducting tests by detonating them in the mountainous areas in the 
emirate of Ajman; possessing firearms without a license; and managing a website that 
disseminated information about al-Qaeda with a view to promoting its ideology and attracting new 
members. The accused were tried before the Federal Supreme Court, in the presence of their 
lawyers, relatives, representatives of the media and members of civil society organizations 
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operating in the state.446 During the trial, two of the defendants admitted participating in fighting 
with terrorist groups in Syria. The prosecuting witnesses also confirmed that two of the defendants 
had received military training from ISIS, adding that the defendants were members’ cells which 
were connected with IS.447 
To summarize, the UAE institutions still face threats from extremist groups, such as IS- or al-
Qaeda-linked organisation, which follow the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and which are 
seeking to establish the so-called Islamic Caliphate State. 
4.3 THE THREATS TO THE PHYSICAL BASE OF THE UAE 
This section assesses the most significant threats identified to the physical base of the UAE using Buzan’s 
hypothesis (see Figure 4.3). It discusses the Iranian regime’s threat to the UAE, which began in 1971 
when the forces of the Shah occupied islands that were under the UAE’s sovereignty. Furthermore, 
the regime, which gained power in Iran after the fall of the Shah, continued its occupation of the 
islands and continues to pursue an aggressive policy towards the UAE. The threat to the control 
over the air, land and sea ports in the UAE are included because the flexible visa system provides 
on opportunity for subversive elements to enter the country, as does illegal border-crossing. In 
addition, technological threats that may affect the security and stability of the UAE are discussed, 
especially as the country's technical development programs are accelerating in a way that could 
lead to a loss of control by the state over the volume of government-specific data that is hosted in 
off-state data centres. The nature of the UAE economy and the rapid development phase through 
which the state is going in parallel with the lack of the necessary legislation to curb the effects of 
economic downturns and their impact on the stability of the state also constitutes a source of 
security risks, such as the volume of money transfers abroad and the increase in investment in the 
real estate sector, which consumes a large proportion of financial liquidity. In addition, 
environmental threats that could affect the physical base of the UAE are a concern, particularly 
because of the UAE’s arid environment, the shortage of water resources and dependence on 
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seawater desalination for fresh water supply. Other environmental threats to the Gulf region 
discussed include a leakage of Iran's nuclear reactors which are located on the opposite coast of 
the Gulf. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The Threats to the Physical Base of the UAE 
 
4.3.1 Iran 
The UAE and Iran have strong bilateral diplomatic and trade relationships, but the ties are 
complicated, as since 1971 Iran has continued to occupy the islands of Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb 
and Abu Musa, territories which the UAE claims as its own. The roots of the dispute began in 
1968, when the UK declared its intention to withdraw from the Gulf region by the end of 1971.448 
Iran’s Reza Shah Pahlavi stated to the UK that he would not support UAE’s independence unless 
he occupied the three islands (Greater and Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa).449 British diplomats held 
talks with the various parties, with the result was that Ras Al Khaimah’s ruler refused to assign 
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sovereignty of Greater and Lesser Tunb islands in return for financial compensation from the 
Shah’s government.450 
However, the ruler of Sharjah allowed the peaceful deployment of Iranian forces on Abu Musa 
Island in areas specified on a map attached to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
concluded between his government and the government of the Shah of Iran dated 25 November 
1971.451 The preamble of the MOU stipulates that the government of Sharjah shall not waive its 
claim to sovereignty over Abu Musa Island and also will not recognize Iran’s claim to the 
ownership of the island, while the Iranian government held the same beliefs. The MOU stated that 
Iran shall have full jurisdiction within the boundaries referred to in the map that were seized by its 
military forces, and over which the Iranian flag flies. In addition, the government of Sharjah shall 
maintain full jurisdiction over the rest of the island and the Sharjah flag will continue to fly on its 
police station in the island. In addition, the agreement stated that Iran and Sharjah recognize the 
extension of the territorial waters of Abu Musa island to a distance of 12 nautical miles, in which 
all citizens of Iran and Sharjah shall enjoy equal rights for fishing.452 It can be understood from 
the MOU that the government of Sharjah was compelled to accept these arrangements so as not to 
lose the entire island; the Iranian acts of aggression on 30 November 1971 that came before the 
independence of the UAE confirm the reality of this hypothesis. The Iranian forces landed on Abu 
Musa Island and occupied the areas identified by the MOU, while its forces also occupied Greater 
and Lesser Tunbs by force. The Iranian troops faced by weak resistance from Ras Al Khaimah 
forces on Greater Tunb: four Ras Al Khaimah police and three Iranian soldiers were killed and all 
the Arab families were displaced to Ras Al Khaimah on the same day.453 
The UAE continued to claim the three islands after the overthrow of Mohammad Pahlavi and the 
rise of the Iranian Islamic Republic in 1979. It insisted on its ownership of these islands, but Iran 
citing historical reasons rejected any dialogue. In 1992, Iran breached the MOU, by seizing full 
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control over Abu Musa.454 The Iranian forces on Abu Musa prevented UAE nationals and some 
foreign teachers affiliated to the UAE Ministry of Education, and members of their families, who 
were returning to resume their work on the island at the start of the school year, from disembarking. 
Iranian breaches to the terms of the MOU have been on-going from the 1980s with the aim to put 
the island under Iranian full sovereignty. These measures include:  
1. Aggression against the territories belonging to the jurisdiction of the UAE by building 
roads and an airport in addition to civilian and military facilities within such 
territories.455 
2. Putting restrictions on the daily life of the citizens of the UAE and the residents of the 
island in order to force them to leave the island, by preventing them from building new 
houses or service facilities or renovating their old homes only within narrow limits.456 
The Iranian military authorities on the island have also closed the shops located within 
the part that belongs to the jurisdiction of the UAE and did not allow such shops to be 
re-opened unless they obtain a license from the Iranian authorities.457 
3. Compelling the island’s population to enter and leave the island through the seaport 
located in the area belonging to the Iranian jurisdiction.458 
4. Interceptions by Iranian military ships against the fishing boats belonging to the UAE 
in the territorial waters belonging to its jurisdiction.459 
5. Flying the Iranian flag on a part of the island, which is located under the jurisdiction of 
the UAE in 2014.460 
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Iranian systematic breaches of the terms of the 1971 MOU have progressively emptied the 
document of its value, until it has become worthless, as, implicitly, the intention of Iran is to annex 
the island permanently to its sovereignty.461 Although the UAE still seeks an end to the crisis, 
either through direct negotiations or by referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice, 
Tehran continues to reject this proposal.  
Since the 1979 Iranian revolution erupted, Tehran has appeared to pose a threat to the national 
security of the GCC countries.462 The Iranian regime has adopted hostile policies towards the 
neighbouring countries. Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution, declared that Iran 
aimed to export its revolution outside the borders of the country in order to protect its security. 
The statement is attributed to Khomeini’s belief that all the neighbouring countries were agents of 
the West and could annihilate the new order in Iran. Hence, Khomeini stated clearly “If we remain 
in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat”.463 Consequently, the Iranian regime 
aimed to destabilize the security and stability of the neighbouring countries, namely Iraq and the 
GCC countries, in order to topple their regimes. This resulted in the eruption of the Iranian-Iraqi 
war from 1980 to 1988. After the war was over, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, leading to an 
increased foreign military presence in the GCC countries, which resulted in the liberation of 
Kuwait and the termination of the Iraqi military power in 1991. In 2003, the Iraqi role against Iran 
came to an end following the US-led occupation of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime.  
Nevertheless, Iran is still surrounded by powerful powers, whose intentions cannot be fully 
predicted by Iran. Such powers include Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal and shared borders, across 
which elements of the Jundallah group are fighting against the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Iraq 
is not stable from a political or a security point of view, while the Iraqi-Iranian borders are home 
to the attacks of militants of the anti-Iranian regime Party of Free Life of Kurdistan. Another 
regional power is Turkey, which has the biggest and strongest army in the region, the government 
of which is opposed the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, a strategic ally of Iran. In addition, 
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Israel opposes the Iranian nuclear programme. Finally, there are US military bases in the Arabian 
Gulf region. Therefore, arguably, the Iranian regime has many reasons to adopt both defensive and 
offensive attitudes towards the neighbouring countries.464 
Five major current and potential threats to the national security of the UAE and other GCC 
countries from Iran can be identified.465 The first threat is from Iran’s conventional military 
power.466 Although its armed forces have limited capacities and could have been much stronger, 
if the basic elements in Iran's armed forces were updated,467 the Iranian land forces include about 
1600 to 1750 tanks including Chieftain Mark 3/5s, M-47/M-48, M-60A1, T-72/T-72S, T-69II, and 
T-62s.468 However, according to some experts, “Iran's sustainable operational tank strength may 
be fewer than 1,000 tanks. Further, its Chieftains and M-60s are at least 16-20 years old, and the 
T-72 is Iran’s only tank with advanced fire control systems, sights, and anti-armour 
ammunition”.469 Iran’s ground troops have access to around 720 armoured vehicles, 650 troop 
carriers, more than 2000 artillery trailers, and 9000 missile launchers. The ground troops also have 
a huge number of mortar guns, and anti-tank guided weapons. However, most of these weapons 
are outdated, while the artillery trailers, on which the Iranian ground troops mainly rely, are weak 
and their control over targeting is unreliable. Meanwhile, Iran has only 55 obsolete helicopters 
with limited operational capabilities, while the air short-range defence is said to be ineffective in 
the face of the modern long-range fighters and accurate fire systems. Most of Iran’s missile 
launchers and ground weapons have cluster warheads, which are inaccurate unless used against 
static objects and huge targets. They are more likely to cause injuries rather than kill. In addition, 
the Iranian marine and air forces suffer from the embargo imposed on the import of spare parts 
and military equipment following the Iranian revolution by the US, the UK, and France. During 
the Shah's regime, 70% of the air fighters and military vessels in the Iranian armed forces were 
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produced in these countries.470 The Iranian marine forces have three Russian Kilo class 
submarines. Offshore, they have old-fashioned three missile frigates and two armoured cruisers, 
which are out-dated, with limited amphibious potential,471 and are not fit for purpose.472 The 
marine forces have a huge number of minelaying vessels, patrol canoes, sea patrol lanes, and 
minelayer helicopters.473 Nevertheless, the capability of the Iranian marine forces to fight in a 
traditional sea battle is well below the level during the 1987-88 Tankers War, in which they were 
defeated by the US marine forces.474 
The second threat is asymmetric.475 The Iranian regime seeks to terrify the GCC countries in which 
foreign military bases are located, or attack them using untraditional capabilities such as the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is different from the Iranian army, 
particularly from an ideological perspective, the method of running its operations, and its 
functional role in Iranian society and policy. The IRGC was formed in 1979, following the Iranian 
revolution.476 Al Khomeini established the corps under his direct leadership in order to protect the 
new regime against internal and external threats. This nucleus of the Revolutionary Guards 
contributed to toppling the Shah’s regime and helped in aborting the rebellion of a number of 
ethnic groups in the country, as well as an insurrection that was carried out by a the Organization 
of the Iranian People's Fedayeen Guerrillas.477 Following the Tehran bombings in 1981, in which 
a large number of Iranian leaders were killed, the IRGC coordinated efforts with the Internal 
Security Forces in order to reassert internal stability.478 Moreover, the IRGC fought with the 
Iranian Army in the 1980-1988 war against Iraq.479 
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The role played by the IRGC has developed until it has become a major economic, military, and 
political power in Iran.480 From the end of the war with Iraq in 1988, the IRGC has taken part in 
the reconstruction of Iran. Over time, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually 
every aspect of the Iranian economy. Recently, the IRGC has been involved in construction, oil, 
gas, and telecommunications sectors. In 2009, a financial group affiliated with the IRGC bought 
51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran for the sum of almost USD8 billion. 
Due to its strong relations with the Iranian political leadership, the IRGC often wins commercial 
contracts for government projects, undermining private sector companies.481 Furthermore, the 
IRCG engages in illegal activities such as “smuggling government-subsidized gasoline, 
contraband, and narcotics”.482 
From a military perspective, the IRGC operates independently of the regular armed forces. In 1985, 
the IRGC established naval and aviation troops, and specialized units for the use of more developed 
weapons, such as armour, air defence systems, missiles, and other systems.483 It has established a 
purchasing authority that is independent of those of the regular army484 and has built facilities for 
the military industries.485 Moreover, the IRGC established an official structure by the name of the 
Al Quds Force, which works towards recruiting and training the Iranian Republic Front to handle 
activities abroad in favour of the regime.486 It also trains agents of the Iranian Islamic Revolution 
who seek to import the revolution to their countries by any means, including violence.487 For 
example, in 2011, elements of the Al Quds Force planned the assassination of Adel Al Jubeir, the 
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Saudi ambassador to the United States.488 However, the US security forces arrested one of the 
suspects before the assassination could be carried out.489 
In general, the IRGC and the Iranian regular army forces have adopted the strategy of asymmetric 
warfare, following its success in the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war. Furthermore, in the event of attacks 
against its nuclear facilities, Iran has threatened more than once that it would launch its missiles 
against US bases located in the GCC countries, which would lead to high levels of civilian 
casualties in the GCC countries due to the inaccuracy of the Iranian missiles. Iran might also resort 
to closing down the Strait of Hormuz by planting mines at its entrance, or by using small explosive-
laden boats that depend on speed, benefiting from the fact that they could not be seen when they 
are close to any ship. Iran could also target ships with anti-ship missiles; reportedly, Iran has 
hundreds of anti-ship cruise missiles.490 
The third threat from Iran is the use of agents and partners to carry out acts of sabotage in the GCC 
countries.491 It may seek the help of agents such as Hezbollah to carry out terrorist attacks in the 
Arabian Gulf states. Following the Iranian revolution, the new regime established Hezbollah 
organizations in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon.492 The Iranian regime provided money, 
weapons, training, strategic and ideological support in order for such organizations to serve as an 
appendage of Iranian foreign policy493 (see Figure 4.4). 
Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was established in Saudi Arabia in 1987. This party has cooperated with Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards by launching terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, including destabilizing the 
security situation in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj in 1987. A huge demonstration by Shiite Hajjis 
in Mecca, the Muslim sacred city, destroyed public property, spread chaos, terrified other Hajjis 
from across the world, and killed and injured a large number of Hajjis. In addition, in 1988, 
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Hezbollah Al-Hejaz claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sadaf Petrochemical Plant in 
Jubail, in the east of Saudi Arabia; a Hezbollah cell with four members from Tarut had carried out 
the attack. One of them had earlier fought with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Furthermore, in 1996 
elements of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz bombed the Khobar Towers housing complex at the US Air Force 
base in Dhahran, killing 19 US soldiers and injuring 347 people.494 In 2014, the UAE government 
proscribed Hezbollah Al-Hejaz as a terrorist organization. 
  
Figure 4.4: Hezbollah Organizations in the Middle East 
During the 1980-1988 Iranian-Iraqi war, Kata'ib Hezbollah fi al-Iraq (Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq) 
was created. It acted as a proxy for Iran in launching attacks against the Iraqi forces in Ahwar, in 
the south of Iraq. After the regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003, Hezbollah Brigades 
in Iraq resumed activity and played a major part in stirring sectarian tensions between 2006 and 
2007. During this action, a number of pilots and officers of the Iraqi army who had taken part in 
the Iranian-Iraqi war were assassinated, as well other distinguished Iraqis, including scientists, 
doctors and university professors.495 In 2011, Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq issued a statement 
threatening to target Kuwait with missiles if it resumed the construction of a port in the disputed 
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region with Iraq.496 Accordingly, in 2014, the UAE government proscribed the group as a tourist 
organization. 
The Lebanese Hezbollah was established in 1982 during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. The 
Iranian regime dispatched some of its Revolutionary Guards to establish military camps for 
Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, and pumped in money and weapons to support the resistance to the 
occupation.497 Hezbollah eventually forced the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern 
Lebanon in 2000. The Israeli withdrawal popularised Hezbollah in Lebanon and the wider Arab 
and Islamic world. However, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2004, 
the role of Hezbollah in the political arena in Lebanon took a different course. The assassination 
divided Lebanon into a pro-Syrian camp including Hezbollah, as the Syrian regime was a strategic 
ally of Iran, and an anti-Syrian camp. In 2008, Hezbollah forces and its allies occupied areas in 
West Beirut, in response to Lebanese Cabinet resolutions to shut down Hezbollah’s military 
telecommunications network and to remove Beirut Airport’s security chief over alleged ties to 
Hezbollah.498 After the Lebanese government reversed its decision, Hezbollah forces and their 
allies withdrew from their locations.499 Furthermore, the actions of Hezbollah are not confined to 
Lebanon, but it operates outside the country in order to implement the agenda of Iran to destabilise 
the security and stability of the surrounding states. 
In 2009, in response to Hezbollah’s attempts to destabilise the UAE, the authorities deported 150 
alleged members to Lebanon.500 As a result, the Hezbollah organization was included in the list of 
terrorist organization in the UAE in 2014. However, the Lebanese Hezbollah has not stopped 
operations in the UAE. Three foreigners were arrested by the UAE security services and were 
referred to the Public Prosecution for trial, accused of creating and managing a group affiliated to 
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Lebanese Hezbollah inside the country at the beginning of 2016.501 After the accused were 
presented to the court, evidence reviewed, witnesses heard, and the defence submitted by their 
lawyers, they were sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and deportation from the state after the 
court found them guilty. In addition, the UAE security forces have arrested another seven, two of 
whom are UAE citizens. The arrestees are accused of forming a cell related to the Lebanese 
Hezbollah organization, and passing on confidential information related to the UAE armed forces 
to the organization and security data for the purpose of planning to target oil and gas wells in the 
country. During the trial, the Public Prosecution has stated that one of the accused was tasked by 
the Lebanese Hezbollah organization to compile information about types of armament for the 
military aircraft of the UAE armed forces, as well as details of the military deal between UAE and 
French company agreed at IDEX exhibition 2015. The assignments also included obtaining 
information about the UAE security agencies knowledge of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian 
revolutionary guards and Iranian intelligence.502 The Public Prosecution also gave evidence that 
one of the accused has passed to her husband, a co-accused, maps and photos of oil and gas 
installations run by an oil company in Abu Dhabi, in which she worked. She also provided him 
with data including names and numbers of wells, production quantities and marketing prices. Her 
husband confessed to delivering the information to the organization. According to the local 
newspaper Al Bayan he was a member of the Iranian intelligence service since 2006, and 
participated in developing a plan by the Lebanese Hezbollah organization and Iranian intelligence 
to target interests of the UAE.503 
The fourth threat is the potential emergence of Iran as a nuclear power.504 Any Iranian success in 
obtaining nuclear weapons would be far more important than its regional conventional weapons 
superiority. In fact, the Iranian ambitions to develop nuclear weapon can be traced back to the 
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Shah’s reign.505 Iran’s civil nuclear power programme had started as early as 1975 when it signed 
an agreement with Kraftwerk Union for the construction of two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) 
with a power of 1200 MW in Bushehr.506 At the same time, the US signed a number of cooperation 
agreements and pacts that enabled it to sell nuclear technology to Iran. Furthermore, the US offered 
an irradiated fuel chemical reprocessing plant for the procurement of plutonium from the nuclear 
fuel cycle.507 At the time, the Shah launched a secret programme with the aim of developing 
nuclear weapons.508 However, following the Iranian Revolution, the nuclear projects came to a 
halt as all foreign agreements and other technical cooperation programmes collapsed. Kraftwerk 
Union withdrew and failed to complete the construction of the two reactors in Bushehr. In addition, 
France terminated an agreement for the provision of depleted uranium to Iran, while the US 
reneged on its obligations to provide Iran with new fuel cores for the research reactor in the Tehran 
Nuclear Research Centre.509 
The Iranian regime resumed its nuclear fuel activities in the mid-1980s. However, the full 
framework of the program was not publicly revealed until August 2002, when an opposition group, 
the National Council of Resistance of Iran, revealed detailed information about two secret nuclear 
facilities, and about companies involved in the purchase of materials and equipment required for 
the Iranian nuclear programme. One of the facilities, near Arak, is a plant for the production of 
heavy water, the basic material used in certain types of reactors for the production of nuclear 
weapons-grade plutonium. The other facility was still under construction near the city of Natanz. 
In December 2002, the Institute for Science and International Security published further details 
including satellite pictures of the facilities. The Natanz facility was identified as a plant for the 
depletion of uranium by centrifuging. Depletion plants can be used for the production of low-
depleted uranium, for use in the manufacture of civil nuclear power reactors, or high-depleted 
uranium for use as a fuel for nuclear weapons.510 
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The Iranian regime has sought to develop nuclear weapons in order to deter any Arab or US 
attempts to undermine its dominance in the Gulf region or overthrow its regime.511 If Iran had 
nuclear weapons it would affect the stability of the Gulf region, especially in relation to the effect 
on the balance of power. Iran already far outweighs the combined GCC countries in terms of 
traditional military power. In order to counter-balance this power, instead of engaging in an arms 
race, the GCC countries have sought protection through common-defence agreements with the US 
and other international powers.  
However, the main UAE and GCC national security concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme 
have to do with the resulting environmental damage. For instance, the Bushehr reactor, which is 
one of the most important facilities of the Iranian nuclear project, lies 280km from Kuwait. The 
reactor depends on technologies imported from Russia, which lacks nuclear security. In the light 
of the West’s ban on the machines and equipment used in the nuclear industries, Iran might seek 
to complete its nuclear programme using less secure nuclear equipment.512 Hence, the GCC 
countries sit within a circle of environmental danger in the event of a technical error, an earthquake, 
or if the reactor was bombed. Such a disaster could lead to the immediate death of about 200,000 
people, and would cause pollution in the Gulf waters, leading to a cessation of operations of the 
desalination plants lying on the Arabian Gulf shores.513 
As a result of Iran’s nuclear program, it was subjected to economic sanctions by the international 
community for 12 years in an attempt to curb its development of uranium enrichment programmes. 
After rounds of negotiations with the P5+1 group of world powers (the US, the UK, France, China, 
Russia + Germany), an agreement was concluded to lift the sanctions after the International Atomic 
Energy Agency certified that Iran has restricted its sensitive nuclear activities. The suspension of 
the sanctions regime is dependent on Iran’s fulfilling the conditions stipulated. If it is found to 
have contravened the agreement sanctions will be reinforced. Therefore, the threat to the UAE is 
ongoing, as the agreement is subject to political changes, especially following election is Iran in 
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2017 and the US presidential election in late 2016. A new administration in either country could 
revoke the agreement.514 
The fifth threat is the religious and ideological threat posed by Iran in the Gulf region, in an area 
where support is given on sectarian grounds.515 In Iran, ideology and Shiite Islam cannot be 
separated. Iran operates in accordance with a unique political ideology created by Khomeini, who 
formulated the idea of the state as a Shiite Islamic Republic, which replaced the Imperial State of 
Iran. In Khomeini’s formulation of the idea of the state, the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
embodies the authority of Shiite Islam on earth, and to give up that responsibility is to abandon the 
will of Allah. Thus, the survival of the regime and its formula is an existential need and expression 
of the self-interest and the Iranian nationalism.516 Indeed, the integration of the Shiism into the 
Persian national project did not materialise in 1979, but can be traced back to 1501 with the 
announcement of Twelver Shiism,517 as the official religion of the Safavid Empire, which ruled 
Persia (the old name of Iran) at that time.518 The Safavids sought to convert tribal groups and social 
classes across Persia from the Sunni faith to Shiism; “clerical discipline and orthodox Shiism with 
its detailed legal ordinances coincided with the Safavids political vision and gave the empire its 
formative image”.519 
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The use of Shiism by the Safavid State was not based on religion per se, but was used to integrate 
the passion of sectarian into the Persian national identity. This was because the regime aimed to 
differentiate Persian nationalism, from the Ottoman Empire in the west and Sunni kingdoms in 
Afghanistan and India in the east.520 Nevertheless, the Safavids used Shiite Arab scholars from the 
Jabal Amil region of southern Lebanon to teach the Persians the fundamental concepts of the 
religion. Eventually, they succeeded in making Shiite Islam the main religion in Persia after 
decades.521 Although the Safavid dynasty has ended, the merger of Shiism into Persian national 
project, or more precisely the turning of Shiism from a doctrine to a tool serving the Persian 
national tendency has again been invoked by Khomeini since 1979.522 In this context, Khomeini 
stopped Arab Shiite scholars from reaching the upper ranks in Shiite religion, in order to equate 
Shiism with the Persians.523 The Iranian regime has confined Shiite references to the city of Qom, 
Iran, and not to other areas such as the city of Najaf in Iraq. Najf is an important city in Shiite 
Islam because the tomb of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Imam of the Twelver Shiism is located here. 
In addition, Arab and Iranian senior religious scholars have graduated from its religious schools. 
In addition, the Jabal Amil region in Lebanon, whose religious scholars played a major role in the 
establishment of Shiism in Iran during reign of the Safavids, is also marginalised.524 
The Iranian regime has opposed the Arab school of Shiism in order to introduce wilāyat al-faqīh 
(the theory of the guardianship of the jurist) as the core doctrine of the duodenum.525 This concept 
was included by Khomeini in the idea of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has been formulated in 
its constitution. Thus, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, who is the head of political regime 
in Iran, has the power of divine governance on the earth as a deputy of the absent twelfth Imam. 
He also has absolute authority over the affairs of human beings as the guardian of the country's 
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affairs in the absence of the missing Imam. The executive, legislative and judiciary authorities in 
Iran exercise their powers with his absolute supervision according to Article 57 of the Iranian 
Constitution.526 His spiritual powers cross over the borders of Iran to encompass the world, 
because Shiites in any place are nationals of the deputy of the absent twelfth Imam, known as valy-
e-faqih.527 
Significantly, intellectuals of the Arab Shiite school and some intellectuals of the Iranian Shiite 
school have opposed the ‘wilāyat al-faqīh’ theory as it contradicts the teachings of Twelver 
Shiism.528 This is because engaging in politics is forbidden according to Shiite scholars, as it 
infringes on powers of the missing Imam. It also undermines the theory of absence, which is based 
on the notion that the nation exists in a time of absence, in which the establishment of Islamic 
government is not possible. Thus, no religious scholar can succeed the missing Imam, because 
such a succession is not mentioned in relation to the twelfth imams.529 In addition, the absolute 
powers of the Supreme Leader as indicated in Khomeini’s theory is not based on evidence from 
Shiite books or a principle recognized by scholars of other Islamic sects.  However, it returns to 
Persian principles that revolve around the so-called reverence or absolute obedience and full 
acceptance of religious political power represented by the political and religious legacy of the pre-
Islamic Persian Empire. The political system of the Empire was based on the idea of the divine 
right embodying rulers with political and religious powers. As the gods have granted this right to 
the king only and not to other human beings.530 Moreover, wilāyat al-faqīh is not historically 
proven, except in the Safavid dynasty, which created Imami Shiism in state institutions. The 
Safavids selected one Shiite scholar as the deputy of the absent imam in order to derive legitimacy 
for their rule. The approach was based on the belief that legitimate government could not be 
practiced except by the Twelfth Imam, according to Twelver Shiism. Thus, wilāyat al-faqīh lasted 
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for two centuries until the collapse of the Safavid Empire until Khomeini revived it.531 However, 
Khomeini has developed this concept, as he took over the political leadership of Iran. In addition, 
he gave to himself and his successors the sanctity to ensure continuity of rule inside Iran, while his 
influence expanded outside Iran. 
4.3.2 Environmental Challenges Facing the UAE 
It is the impact not the causes of environmental degradation that make it a security issue. For 
instance, environmental factors per se are not blame for organized violence, but they may 
aggravate tensions by interplaying with other factors such as mass migration resulting from 
worsening environmental conditions. In turn, this may undermine domestic and international 
security.532 In this context, the UAE faces a number of environmental challenges that pose a threat 
to its national security.  
The major threat is the scarcity of water resources in the UAE, as with other states in the Arabian 
Peninsula. This is due to factors such as location and geography as the area has a desert climate 
zone characterized by extreme drought and desertification, which gives rise to very limited and 
irregular rainfall and the virtual non-existence of fresh surface water. There are no rivers in the 
Arab Peninsula, and the underwater reserves drawn by states in this region are diminishing rapidly 
due to overconsumption during the last three decades,533 because of population growth and urban 
and industrial expansion.534 Therefore, the UAE is challenged by the scarcity of water resources 
and fast depletion of underground water reserves which is compounded by a continuous 
deterioration in the quality of this water. The quality of underground water is now unfit for use as 
fresh water because of the increase in the salinity in most areas.535 In addition, underground water 
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is contaminated with seawater in many coastal areas.536 As a result, the UAE has concentrated on 
desalination on its coastlines on the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman as a strategic option to 
meet its residential, commercial and industrial needs. The UAE is second in the world in the 
production of desalinated water, behind Saudi Arabia. Its production capacity increased three-fold 
since 2000 to the current 1,700mcubic meters year, which accounts for 90% of total usage.537 It 
has also focused on recycling of wastewater for use in gardening, landscaping, green areas and 
forests.538 
While water desalination has helped the UAE meet its fresh water needs, the process has a negative 
toll on the environment as desalination plants discharge highly saline water that produce negative 
physical, chemical and biological impacts in the bio-marine environment.539 Water desalination 
plants and electric power plants also contribute to global warming because of the heavy use of 
fossil fuels, which leads to significant emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere.540 According 
to Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority’s estimates, nearly 13.5 million tons of gases are 
released from desalination and electric power plants in Abu Dhabi each year and carbon dioxide 
makes up 99.5% of such emissions.541 
In order to reduce this environment threat, the UAE government sought to minimize its reliance 
on fossil fuels through the use of non-renewable energy to produce fresh water and electricity. In 
2006, a study conducted by the UAE government to evaluate the energy situation until 2020 
revealed that the current energy production capacity would be sufficient to meet only half the 
demand in 2020 which indicated the need to build a long-term energy infrastructure. The report 
found that: the natural gas reserves were insufficient to meet the projected demand; the use of oil 
and diesel was costly and harmful to the environment; the use of coal, while lower in costs was 
even more harmful to the environment; and alternative energy sources would only meet 6-7% of 
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the peak demand on energy in 2020.542 Therefore, the UAE government opted to diversify energy 
sources instead of relying on one source for the production of electricity and using a mix of non-
renewal fossil fuels, such as oil, natural gas, and coal, and low-carbon emissions sources.  
In addition, the UAE took strategic steps towards developing sustainable and diversified energy 
sources,543 in order to balance between its increasing electrical energy needs and its responsibility 
to find environment tally friendly and low-carbon emission technologies.544 The UAE is one of 
the signatory nations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to stabilize the emission of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and 
reduce the possibility of climate change. Abu Dhabi is one of the world’s most sustainable cities 
in the world as it relies completely on solar and other renewable energy to create an environment 
free from carbon emissions and waste. Abu Dhabi also hosts the headquarters of the International 
Renewable Energy Agency, which is a non-government organization that aims to promote the 
worldwide reliance of renewable energy. The UAE started a project to build solar energy stations 
such as the Smash 1 station and the Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashid Solar Energy Complex in Abu 
Dhabi, which are the largest in the Middle East. In contrast to solar energy, given the climate and 
geography of the UAE, the prospects for the generation of energy from wind power or water are 
insignificant. However, the UAE government took the decision to develop nuclear power for 
generating electricity given that it is a clean source of energy because of its low carbon 
emissions.545 The reliance on nuclear and renewable energy for the generation of electricity will 
contribute to minimizing reliance on non-renewable sources of energy and help the sustainability 
of the environment, while containing the global warming problem and guaranteeing energy 
security of energy in the UAE.546 
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The move towards nuclear energy started with the promulgation of a decree by the president of the 
UAE, on 23 December 2009, to establish the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation. The 
Corporation is tasked with the construction and management of four, 1,400 MW capacity nuclear 
power stations in Abu Dhabi in cooperation with Korean Electric Power Corporation, the world’s 
third largest nuclear power company. The first nuclear station is planned to go online in 2017 and 
the fourth in 2020.547 Nuclear energy is expected to contribute as much as 25% of the electricity 
needs of the UAE by 2020.548 
However, the use of nuclear energy has raised significant concerns among experts and the public 
over its safety following the Fukushima Diiachi Nuclear Power Station disaster in Japan in March 
2011. The Fukushima nuclear power station contained six nuclear reactors with a production 
capacity of 4.7 MW. The massive earthquake, combined with the giant tsunami waves, cut 
electricity supplies in the area and shut down the safety and cooling systems for the first, second 
and third nuclear reactors. The fifth and sixth reactors were in complete shutdown status pending 
regular maintenance and recharging with nuclear fuel when the catastrophe hit, while the fourth 
reactor had just been emptied of fuel before and was about to be recharged. Operators relied on 
secondary systems in case of any failure in the electric power grid and these systems ran on diesel. 
However, the seawater flooded the pumps and washed away the diesel tanks. The failure of the 
cooling systems in the three reactors resulted in overheating and the exposure of fuel vessels, which 
increased the pressure inside these vessels and led to a hydrogen explosion (a nuclear reaction 
resulting in the third hydrogen isotope known as Tritium and which is a by-product of nuclear 
fusion). Dangerously high concentrations of radioactive materials leaked into the environment 
around the site.549 
In light of the environmental disaster in Japan, the UAE government, through the Federal 
Authority for Nuclear Regulation,550 instructed the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation to 
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address all issues related to the safety of the nuclear power stations being built in the UAE. The 
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation had applied for a license to build the nuclear power station 
in the Brakah area in Abu Dhabi. Accordingly, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation prepared 
a report on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Catastrophe for the purpose of ensuring that 
the multi-unit nuclear power station would be built, designed and operated so as to mitigate risks 
in a situation similar to the Fukushima accident despite this being highly unlikely to occur in the 
UAE. The report also validated that the structures, systems and components, as well as the 
proposed safety enhancements, guaranteed a significant safety margin in the event of an 
unexpected shutdown and to withstand stressful events of a remote probability. After a meticulous 
evaluation of the report, The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation concluded that the safety 
grounds were sufficient for the issuance of the construction license.551 
Another serious environmental challenge faced by the UAE is air pollution. In 2012 the External 
Affairs, Planning, Petroleum, Mineral Resources, Agriculture and Fisheries Committee, formed 
by the Federal National Council, confirmed in a report the results of empirical research that links 
air pollution in the UAE to certain respiratory diseases. The study indicates that between 15% and 
40% of UAE children suffer from asthma because of direct environmental factors such dust, carbon 
monoxide emissions from cars and plants, in addition to genetic factors.552 
The study also reveals that stone crushers in the mountainous areas in Ajman, Ras Al Khaima and 
Fujairah, where raw materials used in the manufacture of marble, granite and cement are mined, 
cause respiratory diseases in the nearby population as a result of the build-up of dust particles 
resulting from these mining activities.553 However, some of the companies continue to pollute the 
environment, despite the stringent supervision of their activities by the Ministry of Environment 
in the application of the Council of Ministers’ Decree No. 20 of 2008 on the regulations applicable 
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on stone crushers and quarries and the transport of mining materials within the UAE.554 These 
regulations address various aspects of the quarrying and mining activities, including licensing of 
works, limiting works, controlling dust, environmental monitoring and liability for environmental 
damages. The Decree ensures that the mining companies have an obligation to conform to its 
provisions and the provisions of executive decisions rendered for its enforcement. Furthermore, 
the Decree obligates licensing authorities to issue operating licenses only if the applications are 
supported by an environmental permit issued by the relevant environmental authority in the area 
and is subject to the approval of the Federal Environmental Agency. The Decree also prohibits the 
use of explosives and detonations without a prior permit from the relevant authority, which is 
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Interior. The decree also stipulates that in all cases, each 
detonation shall be carried under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in coordination with 
the specialized authorities. These laws also ban any works that may entail any damage of whatever 
kind to the environment, including earth scrapping in plateaus and valleys in preparation for 
mining and quarrying works. The resolution also ensures that companies transporting the products 
of these quarries are under an obligation to take all necessary measures to prevent any spillage or 
dumping of quarry and mining materials during transport. It also places quarrying facilities under 
an obligation to use modern dust-control technologies. In the event of any environmental damages 
or damages to any third parties because of any contravention of the provisions of these regulations, 
offenders shall be liable for all the costs deemed necessary for remedying the damages.555 
The Assistant Director of the Masfout Municipality in Ajman blamed the repeated violations by 
the mining companies on the low fines stipulated for violations, which range from AED5,000 to 
AED30,000. These are insignificant compared to the profits made by the companies. Thus, the 
fines do not act as a deterrent against environmental violations. Officials also point out that all the 
quarrying and mining companies commit environmental violations when not being supervised by 
the authorities. These violations result in the imposition of fines or the closure of the quarry for a 
certain period. The owners then agree to pay the fines and pledge compliance with any measures 
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required by the Ministry of Environment, thereby, resuming mining activities within a few days 
from the closure, and the repeat the violations during any gap in the supervision.556 
Moreover, the marine environment in the UAE faces many challenges, with oil pollution being the 
most important. As previously highlighted, the UAE has nearly 700 kms of coastlines on the 
Arabian Gulf and 100 kms on the Gulf of Oman, in addition to nearly 600 kms of coastlines around 
natural islands that are under its territorial control. The Arabian Gulf is a shallow semi-closed 
sea,557 the length of which is around805 kms stretching from the mouth of Shat Al Arab to the 
Strait of Hormuz.558 The average depth of the water is 35 meters and the maximum depth is 100 
meters near the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, the width of which is only 60 kms.559 More than 
250,000 oil tankers enter and exit the Arabian Gulf every year, carrying nearly 60 percent of the 
world’s total seaborne oil exports.560 Although oil is an essential commodity, the tankers pollute 
the marine environment in the UAE and other littoral states of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman due to the amount of oil that leaks from these tankers. These leaks occur because of 
accidents, rusting hulls, the dumping of sea water used in washing the oil tanks back into the sea 
or the dumping of waters used in balancing the tankers, which are filled to at least 60% of their 
capacity with seawater after offloading their oil in order to maintain their balance at sea. All these 
accidents and practices pose a threat to the marine life, including fish, sea turtles, sea birds and 
coral reefs in the affected areas.  
Floating oil slicks produce vapours that saturate the air and reach coastal areas. The concentrations 
of hydrocarbon vapours can reach unacceptable limits, which, in turn, affects the marine and land 
environment. Petroleum oils also contain numerous organic compounds of varying degrees of 
toxicity. Among the most troublesome of these compounds is Benzopyrene, which is carcinogenic 
producing a highly toxic effect on marine life. Oil is less dense than water; therefore, it floats on 
the surface forming a thin layer that separates water from the atmosphere. This layer spreads over 
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large areas of the water surface, preventing the exchange of gases between air and water, in turn 
reducing the amount of oxygen dissolved in water, which disturbs the gaseous balance. The 
insoluble oil layer also prevents light from reaching aquatic life and hinders the process of 
photosynthesis, which is a main source of oxygen, a purifier of water. This leads to massive marine 
life death and the disruption of the food chain and the ecosystem. Furthermore, oil leaked into the 
marine environment travels for long distances carried by the current and with the movement of the 
tide forms small black balls that obstruct shipping activities, fishing, spoil the beauty of the pristine 
sandy beaches and harms crustaceans and the coral reef, and in turn, tourism. More stable 
hydrocarbon compounds from leaked oil move along the food chain and become stored in the 
livers and fats of marine animals. The harm from these compounds takes years to manifest in 
humans.561 
Since independence, the UAE has witnessed many accidents involving oil spills from tankers. In 
2013, two square kilometres of the Merbah and Gadfaa area in Fujairah were hit by a major oil 
spill from a tanker sailing along the coastline. Mohamed Al Yatim, Secretary General of the 
Fujairah Fishermen Association, said the oil spill was serious because of the density of the tar layer 
that reached more than one kilometre into the sea. The tar from the oil spill accumulated on the 
beaches of the Merbah and Gadfaa area, which resulted in the stinging smell of tar. Yatim added 
that the pollution was also harmful because the greater part of the fish population lives near the 
water surface where the oil slick was nearly 20 cm thick. The pollution problem in Fujairah had 
largely receded in the previous five years after the enforcement of the MARPOL International 
Agreement on prohibiting oil tankers from washing their tankers in territorial waters. Prior to the 
convention, the coast of Fujairah experienced an average of 10 pollution accidents every year, but 
this fell to only one or two every year, with the severity of the pollution also considerably lower.562 
The construction by the UAE of artificial islands in its territorial waters generated strong 
controversy from among environmentalists over the possible harmful impact on the marine life in 
the Arabian Gulf. In 2011, Dubai built the artificial islands in order to diversify its economy, which 
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does not rely on oil exports, but on sectors such as real estate, financial services, aviation and 
tourism. These artificial islands greatly improved the investment outlook for Dubai in particular 
and the UAE in general. The artificial islands host giant residential, commercial, retail and 
entertainment projects. Moreover, the construction of artificial islands is a legitimate practice 
recognized by international organizations. For example, Articles 11, 58, 60 and 82 of the United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 provides for practical guidelines 
for coastal states seeking to build artificial islands.563 The convention gives coastal states the right 
to construct artificial islands on which structures and installations are built, operated and used. 
According to the Convention, the artificial islands are subject to the state’s absolute sovereignty. 
Coastal states may also establish safety zones around the artificial islands in order to guarantee the 
safety of the artificial islands in light of the internationally recognized standards, including 
international shipping routes. The safety zones may not be larger than 500 meters. The artificial 
islands cannot have their own territorial waters and their existence does not affect the demarcation 
of borders of regional waters.564 
The UAE incorporated the articles regulating artificial islands stipulated by the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 in its federal legislation. Thus, the UAE 
promulgated Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 on marine areas, which provides for the creation of 
artificial islands as regulated by international conventions.565 In light of these legislative 
developments, the Government of Dubai commenced building artificial islands in a three-stage 
operation, and the governments of the other Emirates soon followed suit. The first stage involved 
the creation of two artificial islands shaped like two giant palm trees, which is the UAE’s national 
symbol. The first of the two islands is Jumeirah Palm and is one of the largest artificial islands in 
the world with an area of 560 hectares. The Jumeirah Palm comes with complete infrastructure 
servicing residential, entertainment and tourism facilities.566 The second island is Jabil Ali is still 
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being constructed and will be twice the size of Jumeirah Palm, with an expected population of 
250,000 in 2020.567 More than 262 million cubic meters of rock and sand were used in the building 
of the islands.568 The total area of the two islands is nearly 110 million square meters and they will 
add some 120 kms of sandy beach to the Dubai coastline.569 
In the second phase, Dubai built 300 small artificial islands in the shape of a map of the world 
surrounded by a 26 km-long white rocky fence to protect it from erosion. This project is called 
World Islands. The projects range from private islands for homes to resorts and private residential 
islands. It will cover an area of 9 kms in length by 6 kms in width.570 Three million cubic meters 
of sand and 33 million tons of rocks were used to build the World Islands, which will add nearly 
232 kms of sandy beaches to the coastline of Dubai. Marine and air transport will be the only 
means to move between the islands.571 Most recently, Dubai began the third stage of the project to 
build another four islands, named the Deira Islands, which will have a total area of 15.3 square 
kms and will add nearly 40 kms of beaches to the coastline.572 The infrastructure for these artificial 
islands can accommodate the development of hotels, resorts, retail centres, apartments and housing 
for real estate investors and therefore contribute to bolstering Dubai’s status as an international 
tourism, retail and business centre.  
However, some environmentalists believe that the building of artificial islands on along the shore 
of Dubai has disturbed the environmental balance in the water of the Arabian Gulf and claim that 
coral reefs have suffered massive destruction as a result of the reclamation and backfilling works 
to create the islands. Environmentalists are also concerned that the habitat for sea turtles has been 
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destroyed or altered because of the changes in the natural water currents in the area.573 In an attempt 
to address these concerns, Nakheel, the Dubai government-owned company in charge of the 
artificial island projects, responded that research carried out prior to the start of the projects 
confirmed that sea turtles only settle on remote islands and that the majority of the coral reefs near 
the coast of Dubai were already dead.574 Nearly 65% of these reefs were killed by causes such as 
disease, fluctuations in the seawater temperature, oil pollution, unplanned coastal development 
works and the lack of fishing regulations.575 For these reasons, Nakheel transferred the remaining 
coral reefs in the areas to the wave barrier around the World Islands project using the most 
advanced technology. This was undertaken under the supervision of a team of environmental 
scientists led by renowned marine biologist and assistant professor and head of the marine biology 
lab at New York University in Abu Dhabi, John Bert. After five years spent transferring the coral 
reefs to their new habitat, Bert said:  
The transfer operation is among the biggest coral reef transfer projects ever carried out 
in the world. More than 20,000 coral colonies were saved. Pioneering technology was 
used in the submarine transfer of the coral reefs, which demonstrated the skill of the 
engineers and environmental scientists working together to protect marine environment. 
This step has an additional advantage to other marine creatures as the new coral reef 
habitat has become a diverse ecosystem that hosts a verity of coral reefs fishes including 
rare species never before seen in that area.576 
4.3.3 Infiltrators into the UAE 
Since independence, the UAE has suffered from illegal immigration by different nationalities. 
Citizens from neighbouring Asian countries, in particular Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh 
and India, make up the vast majority of illegal immigrants.577 A number of factors contribute 
directly to this issue. One is the long UAE marine borders, extending over 700 kms on the 
coastline. This length allows individuals to more easily elude the coastguards. Moreover, the 
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smuggling of immigrants into the UAE is now a profitable trade for international gangs.578 
Smugglers use a variety of methods, with as many as 156 identified in 1993.579 The main method 
is the use of small boats or commercial vessels laden with goods that give infiltrators illegal access 
into UAE by dropping immigrants near the coast.580 Furthermore, land borders shared with the 
Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia are also used. As the UAE border guards and coastguards 
have imposed more stringent control measures over the UAE’s eastern beaches, infiltration has 
intensified in the coastal areas overlooking the Sultanate of Oman.  
The harsh economic condition in the neighbouring Asian countries is one of the main reasons 
encouraging their citizens to illegally enter the UAE in search of better job opportunities and a 
better standard of life. Their chance of obtaining a work visa in the UAE are increased by the high 
standards that hinder official access, except for those who have academic or technical skills that 
are needed in the UAE. The majority of the illegal immigrants work in the construction sector for 
very low wages.  
However, the economic situation has never been the sole motivation for illegal entry into the UAE. 
Other reasons including illegal activity, such as drug smuggling to the wider Gulf region.581 For 
instance, in 2009, the Saudi authorities declared that in cooperation with the UAE authorities they 
had aborted a drug-smuggling operation from UAE to Saudi Arabia by an international smuggling 
gang. The cargo comprised 686,000 narcotic pills.582 In addition, in 2012, the UAE authorities 
arrested a gang in Sharjah that were selling drugs inside the UAE. The gang comprised 11 people 
and was led by two women, who infiltrated the UAE. They distributed drugs through group 
members, which included five people from one GCC country and one Arab woman. All 11 
members were caught red-handed, when the police raided the apartment. They found 5,177 
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Tramadol capsules in addition to 250 capsules of narcotics.583 Other illegal immigrants have been 
involved in smuggling goods, such as gold to avoid paying customs duties, or counterfeit goods 
such as cigarettes. In addition, some illegal entrants smuggle cash linked to money laundering 
activities. Finally, some enter illegally after being denied legal entry, such as those who have been 
deported on criminal grounds that affect the stability and security of the UAE community. Such 
people may not be allowed back except with special permission from the UAE Minister of Interior.  
The UAE security authorities started to document the number of infiltrators arrested in 1977, since 
then until 1990, the number of infiltrators fluctuated. The numbers rose from 1991 until a peak of 
11,487 in 1995. Then the numbers fell to a low of 1,664 in 1998. This sharp decrease from 1996 
can be attributed to the issuance of Decree No. 13 of 1996, which amended the regulations on 
foreigners’ visas and residence.584 However, the numbers rose sharply from 1998 to a new peak of 
14,617 in 2001. In subsequent years, the number of infiltrators arrested fell because of the state 
strengthening its borders and the development of the hardware to monitor the land and sea borders. 
In 2011, only 446 people were arrested (see Figure 4.5). 
Illegal infiltration into UAE poses security, economic, social and political threats to the state. From 
a security perspective, due to the stringent measures of banning their access to jobs and housing,585 
illegal immigrants may commit crimes, such as murder, smuggling and marketing of narcotics, 
robbery, forgery, prostitution or begging, especially as the UAE security authorities have no 
fingerprints for such infiltrators. Statistics issued by the UAE Ministry of Interior indicate that 
most crimes in the country are committed by unemployed people who live illegally in the state.586 
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Figure 4.5: Number of Infiltrators Arrested, 1971 to 2011587 
From an economic perspective, large sums of money from the proceeds of illegal activities such 
as drug selling, prostitution, and robbery are being smuggled out of the state by illegal immigrants. 
Such illegal money transfers undermine the national economy. Moreover, the presence of a number 
of illegal residents in the state exerts more pressure on the services provided by the state for legal 
residents. This, in turn, increases expenditure on the basic services by the state that could have 
been spent in other fields.588 From a social perspective, illegal infiltration poses direct threats to 
the UAE national security. In general, UAE imposes stringent measures on public health for the 
prevention of diseases, especially those that are contagious. All foreigners are subject to full 
medical tests, but illegal immigrants cannot be examined, and hence all individuals in the 
community are at risk from any infectious diseases they may carry such as AIDS, swine flu, and 
bird flu.589 From a political perspective, some foreigners seek access to UAE with the aim of 
carrying out espionage activities and hence harm the country’s national security. According to Al-
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Sheryany, the Iranian regime has been responsible for the illegal infiltration of a number of its 
subjects into the UAE for this type of activity.590 
In contrast, a large segment of illegal immigrants claim that they are UAE nationals and that they 
lived in UAE before its independence, but due to circumstances failed to obtain nationality. For 
example, a large number claim that they had settled in UAE before independence but that they had 
migrated to neighbouring countries to work. Following the UAE’s independence and as the living 
standard improved following the discovery of oil, they decided to return, but could not provide 
sufficient evidence to support their claims. In 2008, the UAE government established a Supreme 
Committee including representatives of the Ministries of Interior, the Ministry of Presidential 
Affairs and the State Security Department of UAE in order to find a solution for those who have 
no specific nationality in the state. The UAE government opened special centres in Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman for two months in order to receive applications of those who want to 
rectify their residency status by applying for the UAE citizenship. The applications require the 
applicants to submit their passports of countries of origin until their residency is legalised in the 
UAE and a decision is made based on a review of their case by the Committee.591 This committee 
finally settled the issue by guaranteeing the rights of those entitled to nationality according to the 
rules of the laws on naturalization and passports, subject to showing the earlier nationality for those 
who had ID cards. It also emphasised the importance of settling the issue of their residency with 
their families in the state.592 
Following the final demarcation of borders with the Sultanate of Oman in 1999, the UAE built a 
border wall to stop the infiltration of foreigners into the state. On behalf of the state, the UAE 
Armed Forces signed an agreement with Advanced Integrated Systems and AGT companies to 
supply the latest state of the art technologies and systems to secure its borders from infiltrators.593 
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Both companies devised an integrated system of detectors and sensors that meet the UAE’s needs 
and its geographical nature.594 Despite this, a number of infiltrators still make their way into UAE. 
In order to address and counter these security challenges, the UAE established the General 
Authority of Ports Border and Free Zones Security in 2011, which is affiliated to the Supreme 
Council for National Security. The Authority enjoys a legal personality, and financial and 
administrative independence and has executive and regulatory powers. The Authority is authorized 
to propose draft laws, and to develop a national strategy for the security of the UAE’s ports, borders 
and free zones, in order to ensure the achievement of the national security strategy.595 
4.3.4 Cyber War 
The progress of the UAE in embracing the digital technology era has weakened the state’s grip on 
its national security and control of national sovereignty.596 Even the most powerful countries in 
the world such as the US lack the ability to protect cyber-controlled systems located within their 
borders. Thus, the national infrastructure, such as power plants, railroads, airlines and banking 
services are exposed to cyber-attack.597 A cyber-attack on a state’s infrastructure could 
conceivably have devastating consequences for the very existence of the country, as it would 
undermine the government’s ability to maintain internal security and defend its national borders. 
For instance, perpetrators of cyber-attacks can remotely take control of gas pipelines, fuel 
production facilities, chemical plants, electrical power plants, air navigation systems, traffic lights 
and other vital systems in the target country, and wreak havoc by manipulating the programming 
of these systems. Cyber-attacks can also result in devastating economic losses if banks and stock 
exchanges are targeted, even if the interruption of services is brief. Finally, cyber-attacks may 
undermine the combat readiness and effectiveness of the armed forces.  
Therefore, and despite the difficulty of combating cyber-crimes, from the mid-1990s the UAE 
government has taken initiatives to address these crimes. The General Dubai Police Headquarters 
created the first cyber-crime department in the Federation; a practice followed by other police 
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headquarters around the UAE. The UAE also passed Federal Law No. 2 of 2006 on combating 
cyber-crime. However, due to the rapid technological advances and the emergence of new forms 
of crimes, the law was amended by Federal Law No. 5 of 2012, which covers a broad range of 
crimes committed by any means of information technology.598 For example, the new law 
criminalizes the use of information technology with intent of hacking, carrying denial of service 
attacks, forging electronic documents and fraud, and the law also criminalizes the unauthorized 
disclosure of information electronically stored including the data and numbers related to credit 
cards or bank accounts or details or any other method of electronic payment. Furthermore, the law 
criminalizes any person using information technology to forge, counterfeit or copy credit or civil 
identity cards, as well as abuse, defamation or extortion using information technology. The 
amended law also defines crimes carried out against national security and stability using 
information technology.  
 
Figure 4.6: Types of Cyber Attack 
Cyber-attacks that pose threats to national security are classified into three distinctive types. First, 
attacks carried out by cyber criminals who break into computer systems for personal interest. 
Second, attacks carried out by Hacktivists599 who break into the computer systems of governments, 
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international organizations or companies to spread their message and attract international attention 
to causes they advocate. Third, cyber-attacks lunched by one government against another for the 
purpose of achieving their national interests600 (see Figure 4.6). 
Cyber-crimes are committed by persons who illegally hack into computers and the personal 
telephones of individuals, companies and government institutions around the world for the purpose 
of theft, extortion or the sale of the information obtained from these devices. These represent the 
biggest security nightmare for countries as cyber-crimes result in USD110bn in losses annually. 
Nearly 550 million people globally were victims of some form of cyber-crimes in 2013.601 In 
relation to the UAE, a study by Trend Micro security specialists indicated that during 2009 internet 
piracy disabled 250,000 computer systems in the UAE, the majority of which came from locations 
outside the country.602 Justin Doo, Director of Information Security at Symantec MENA said that 
during 2012, UAE residents were victims of nearly 1.5 million electronic crimes,603 highlighting 
a sizeable increase in the number of incidents.  
The first electronic crime in the UAE was registered in 1995 when a number of girls filed a case 
with the police against a person who hacked their email accounts and stole personal photos before 
blackmailing them, asking for cash in return for not publishing the photos online. With the aid of 
computer experts, the police arrested the suspect who was living in the UAE.604 After this case, 
the first police department specializing in cyber-crime was formed in an acknowledgement of the 
emergence of new forms of crimes, which threatened security in the UAE.605 This also required a 
drive to secure qualified police cadres specializing in cyber-crimes. As a result, the electronic 
crimes department were able to arrest a person from a European country who hacked into the email 
of a Chinese company in Dubai, then wrote to the company’s clients notifying them that the 
company’s bank accounts were changed and that they should send their transfers to a new banking 
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account. However, the thief was able to steal USD 3 million as the company did not realise it had 
been hacked until it received emails from clients complaining that their goods had not arrived 
despite making payment.606 The authorities also detained a gang that gained unauthorized access 
to bank accounts by using cameras planted in ATMs which filmed PINS entered by clients. Gang 
members used these PINS to withdraw cash from ATMs using a device to program the ATMs by 
transferring data through the card slot. The gang was arrested along with the equipment used in 
the crime and AED20,000 of stolen funds.607 The UAE security authorities also arrested a gang 
that were counterfeiting credit cards using a high-tech machine imported into the country in an 
apartment. Gang members used the credit cards to buy products worth millions of dollars before 
selling the goods and dividing the proceeds among them. When caught, they confessed to 
siphoning nearly AED16 million from banks accounts using the stolen credit card information.608 
Despite the success of the UAE in arresting many cyber-criminals, the authorities continue to face 
an uphill battle to protect the security of information in the country. The rapid advance in the use 
of smartphone and digital smart tablets in daily life makes it lucrative for cyber-criminals to hack 
into these devices and steal credit card information and personal files. The use of malicious links, 
spread through email, increases the number of victims. The viral progress of malicious software 
used by internet criminals enables them to hack applications used by government systems on smart 
and digital smart tablets in the future.609 
Second, recent years have seen the rise of Hacktivists who are mainly anonymous and do not adopt 
any particular ideology but fall under the umbrella of the online protest movement against 
governments and international companies and advocate popular freedoms. Hacktivists use their 
piracy skills to hack websites of government and international organisations to shut them down or 
to steal confidential information in order to leak the data or to expose activities such as violations 
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of human rights. However, their activities can cause serious damage to national security for the 
states targeted.  
A number of groups and activists have gained online fame such as Anonymous, Julian Assange 
and Edward Snowden. The Anonymous hacking group is one of the most famous Hacktivist groups 
on the internet as it has launched multiple campaigns of cyber-attacks on corporate and government 
websites in order to direct international media attention to certain issues. For example, in 2012, 
Anonymous launched what was dubbed ‘Operation Paycheck’, which targeted Amazon, Visa, 
MasterCard, PayPal and a Swiss bank,610 in response to these companies’ stance with respect to 
shutting the Wikileaks’ website down, freezing its assets and stopping donations. As a result of 
this cyber-attack, PayPal lost more than £3.5million.611 In 2013, Anonymous threatened the Israeli 
government that it will launch an attack on 7 April dubbed ‘#OpIsrael’ in retaliation for its 
oppression of the Palestinians and the Israeli government’s lack of respect for human rights and 
international law. When the deadline passed, hackers groups attacked a number of Israeli 
government websites. These included the website of the cabinet, which was disabled for a lengthy 
period, the Tel Aviv stock exchange, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Knesset, the 
Israeli police, the Ministries of Infrastructure, Education, Transport, and Justice, the army logistics 
centre, and many private companies and e-commerce websites. The hackers also compromised 
more than 19,000 Israeli Facebook accounts by publishing the passwords for these accounts, along 
with data of 30,000 Israeli credit cards stolen after tens of e-commerce sites were hacked. In 
addition, names, ID numbers, email addresses and geographic data of thousands of Israeli 
politicians, Israeli army officers and Mossad agents were released.612 In 2014, the Anonymous 
hacking group launched the ‘OpHackingCup’ attack against Brazilian government websites in 
support of local protests against the money spent by the government to host the World Cup at a 
time when the country was suffering from weakening public services and infrastructure due to 
limited resources. Brazilian government websites, along with those of a number of private 
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companies, were shut for a number of hours. The organizations affected included the Department 
of Justice, Sao Paulo Military Police, the Brazilian Intelligence System, the Brazilian Football 
Confederation, Bank of Brazil, Hyundai Brazil and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry from where 
confidential emails were stolen.613 
Rarely do Hacktivists reveal their real identities for fear of prosecution under the anti-piracy and 
anti-cyber-crimes laws. However, this is not the case with Julian Assange, the founder of 
Wikileaks, a website responsible for leaking thousands of classified military and diplomatic 
documents by the US and other countries. Nevertheless, in 2007, Assange declared that his 
responsibility as a member in the advisory body of Wikileaks614 was to guarantee complete 
anonymity to the sender of classified documents or material or material subject to regulations that 
were considered to be of political, diplomatic or moral importance. These materials are then 
evaluated by a team of experts, volunteers from major international media organizations, 
journalists and Wikileaks staff.615 The leaking of classified documents published by the website 
led to a barrage of accusations by many countries, including the US, that these documents pose a 
threat to their national security. In 2010, Wikileaks published nearly 92,000 classified US military 
documents on the war in Afghanistan.616 The documents included names of Afghani citizens who 
worked with the US and allied forces in Afghanistan, threatening their security.617 A spokesperson 
for the Afghan militia movement, the Taliban, said the group would use the materials to track 
down Afghans who colluded with what Taliban considers as foreign invading forces.618 The leak 
prompted a strong condemnation by a White House spokesperson who said the leaks pose a threat 
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to national security and put the lives of American and their allies in danger.619 Wikileaks also 
leaked 40,000 classified US Defence Iraq War logs,620 and up to 250,000 documents classified by 
the US Department of State.621 These leaks provided terrorists with sensitive information that put 
US national security at risk.  
Wikileaks also published Cable No. 09STATE15113 sent by the US Secretary Department to US 
embassies and consulates directing diplomats to update a list that was prepared as preliminary 
survey on 2008 of infrastructure and key resources sites in relevant countries, the loss of which 
might pose a threat to US national security, economy or public health. The sites included oil and 
gas pipelines, underwater telecommunications cables, and installations near US borders, such as 
dams and chemical plants that could cause damage to US national security if targeted. The US 
State Department also instructed staff to focus on services and export facilities; for example, those 
related to critical minerals or chemicals needed by US industry, or strategic companies, such as 
telecom hubs that would pose major threat to global communications if attacked. Finally, US 
diplomats were instructed to focus on vital logistical sites such as the Strait of Hormuz and Panama 
Canal, all ports and waterways. According to the cable, to ensure US national security, diplomats 
had to determine the locations of these sites in order to prevent, deter or at least minimize the 
impact of a potential terrorist attempt to destroy or capture them and to plan a rapid response in 
the event of an attack, natural disaster or other emergency.622 The publication of this cable on 
Wikileaks drew widespread condemnation from the US and the UK. British Foreign Secretary 
William Hague said the publication by Wikileaks of a list of sensitive locations around the world 
in relation to US interests without consideration to the security of millions of people was 
deplorable, as the sites could become targets for terrorists holding anti-American sentiments.623 
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The final type of cyber-attack that poses threats to national security is cyber-warfare, which refers 
to acts by one nation attacking computers or networks of another nation with the aim of destruction, 
disruption or espionage,624 and in defence of the national interests of the attacking government. 
Cyber-warfare first emerged on the international scene in 1998 when Pakistan and India were the 
first two countries to wage such a war,625 following India’s test of nuclear weapons and the re-
emergence of the bitter and historic conflict over the disputed Kashmir region.626 India and 
Pakistan, like other countries who have taken part in cyber warfare, never openly admitted their 
actions due to the illegitimate nature of the cyber-attacks and the violation of the sovereignty of 
the victim countries.  
Cyber-warfare is radically different from conventional warfare in that it is covert, may be launched 
simultaneously from across multiple countries, and engagement is undeclared, with no party 
assuming responsibility. Instead, the perpetrators hide their identity and maintain a pretence of 
innocence.627 For example, in 2012 Saudi Aramco was a victim of a cyber-attack when a highly 
destructive virus dubbed Shamoon infected the company’s computers. It wiped clean (burned) the 
hard drives of more than 30,000 computers. Everything was deleted—e-mails, working files, 
documents, commercial data, address, and whatever else was stored in the hard drives—and 
presumably much of it was also pilfered by the attackers. It was all replaced with a single image, 
a burning US flag.628 Saudi Aramco took more than ten days to restart all its electronic services hit 
by the virus.629 Meanwhile, the same virus was infecting the computers of Qatar RasGas Group, 
which is the largest liquefied natural gas producer in the world.630 US security officials said the 
Iran was “almost certainly” behind the attack on Aramco and Qatar RasGas.631 However, the Saudi 
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authorities did not accuse Iran; instead, a spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry described the 
attack as an act of terrorism by organized groups from a number of countries across four 
continents.632 
In 2013, Edward Snowden who was working in the US National Security Agency leaked highly 
confidential documents from the Agency to the British newspaper, The Guardian, and American 
newspaper, The Washington Post. The Guardian revealed that the list of targets included 
traditional opponents of US and sensitive states in Middle East, but also allies such as European 
Union missions, the French, Italian and Greek embassies, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, India, and 
Turkey. It added that one of the documents, dating from 2010, targeted 38 embassies and missions 
and included details of an unusual combination of methods, which ranged from planting listening 
and bugging devices in the electronic communications equipment, to capturing the transmission 
of the cables through specialized antennas.633 The newspaper pointed out that the leaked 
documents suggested that the goal of wiretapping the EU Embassy in Washington was to collect 
information about political differences on global issues as well as differences between the member 
states. Thereafter, the German magazine Der Spiegel revealed that the National Security Agency 
tapped the phones of 122 world leaders, including the leaders of Colombia, Peru, Somalia, Belarus, 
Guatemala and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Der Spiegel also reported that the National 
Security Agency had been monitoring the mobile phone of Merkel for up to 10 years.634 The 
magazine also published the contents of a National Security Agency document from 2010 which 
indicated that an American intelligence unit, ‘Special Collection Service’ (SCS), comprising 
agents from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and high-level officials of the National Security 
Agency was active in around 80 locations, including 19 European cities, such as Berlin, Madrid, 
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Rome, Paris, Geneva and Prague. According to the magazine, the SCS teams were usually working 
under the cover of diplomatic representation and thus enjoyed diplomatic protection.635 
The Snowden documents also revealed espionage programs used by the CIA and its allies to 
monitor activity of any user of the Internet around the world.636 The Guardian newspaper revealed 
classified documents about the espionage activities at the UK’s Government Communications 
Headquarters, which, with the help of the National Security Agency, captured images of millions 
of Internet users across the world during their conversations over computer cameras. This was part 
of a monitoring program called ‘Optic Nerve’. The documents from 2008 to 2010, showed that 
during six months in 2008 the operation targeted about 1.8 million users of the ‘Yahoo’ accounts, 
and their images were stored in the agency database, regardless of whether or not the individuals 
were the target of British intelligence. After the revelations, Yahoo denied any complicity in the 
operation as the company does not violate its users’ privacy. The Guardian also revealed that in 
the previous five years German, Spanish and Swedish Intelligence Services had developed 
programs to monitor internet and mobile traffic similar to those carried out by American 
intelligence agencies. The methods included tapping the fibre-optic cables and working secretly 
with telecommunications companies. The newspaper further reported that the UK’s Government 
Communications Headquarters played a leading role in providing advice to its European 
counterparts on how to overcome national laws that restrict the authority of intelligence agencies 
regarding surveillance activities.637 Moreover, The Guardian revealed that the National Security 
Agency could monitor the activity of any user of the Internet around the world, through a secret 
program called ‘X-Keyscore’. This program allows direct access without permission to the content 
of e-mail messages and the contents of messages, which are exchanged on social networking sites 
such as Facebook or any other activities on the Internet, if the Internet Protocol address (IP address) 
of such persons are available to the Agency. In this context, the Agency set up at least 700 servers 
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with the program including in Russia, China, Venezuela and the UAE.638 Since the amount of 
information held electronically has reached limits that threaten the national security of countries, 
to mitigate this threat the UAE now uses Cloud Computing systems, not only to save the huge 
volumes of data efficiently, but also because Cloud Computing can enhance the security of the 
data. For example, the Cloud Computing can make cyber-attacks more difficult by removing the 
idea of having a fixed point of access. In Cloud Computing data is transferred continuously so that 
the attacker will not know where the goal is that s/he targets. Nevertheless, Cloud Computing is 
not a safe environment to save information. It is possible that an employee in a company that is 
responsible for the maintenance of the Cloud Computing system could leak information kept in 
the system to any persons or countries in return for money or leaking information to websites as a 
Hacktivist.     
4.3.5 Proxy Battlefield 
Analysts anticipated that the UAE would face prominent security threats following the withdrawal 
of the British forces in 1971, the gravest of which would be sabotage acts carried out by internal 
or external parties. The threat occurred because of the lack of limits imposed by the UAE 
authorities on foreigners seeking to obtain entrance and residence visas. The analysts argue that 
this would give subversives easy access to UAE.639 Although this analysis is old, the predictions 
of the British analysts have come true. UAE has been targeted since independence by a number of 
terrorist attacks and crimes that have dealt a blow to its national security. These have resulted 
primarily because of the lack of firm security regulations in relation to investigations prior to the 
issuance of residence and visit visas for foreigners. For example, national from the US and certain 
European countries are exempt from visa requirements. In addition, other foreigners from east and 
west Europe can obtain tourist visas upon their arrival to UAE, for 30 days, without renewal. 
Furthermore, Thai, South African and Chinese tourist visas require a guarantee from the hotels 
                                                          
638 Greenwald, Glenn. (31 July 2013). “XKeyscore: NSA tool collects 'nearly everything a user does on the internet'”. 
The Guardian. Available at: <URL:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-
data> Access Date: 27 April 2014; see also, The NSA files. (31 July 2013). “XKeyscore presentation from 2008 – 
read in full”. The Guardian. Available at: <URL:http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-
xkeyscore-program-full-presentation> Access Date: 26 April 2014. 
639 Burdett, A.L. P. (2002). Records of the Emirates: 1966-1971, Volume 6: 1971. London: Archive Editions, pp. 409-
411. 
164 
 
and the tourist companies hosting them.640 This lack of control has seen the UAE become a proxy 
battlefield for international criminal and foreign intelligence organizations.641 
There have been a number of terrorist-related incidents. In the 1970s, armed Palestinian groups 
abused the UAE government’s support for the Palestinian case and their right to their territory, by 
making the UAE a theatre for their terrorist operations. In 1973, a Japan Airlines jet was hijacked 
by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Japanese Red Army642 on its 
way from Amsterdam to Tokyo.643 The jet was directed to Dubai International Airport.644 After 
negotiations between the UAE security authorities and the hijacker, the jet was fuelled645 and flew 
to Libya, where all the hostages were released.646 In 1974, a British Airlines jet was hi-jacked from 
Dubai International Airport by the PFLP,647 while en-route from London to Brunei via Beirut, 
Dubai, Calcutta and Singapore. As passengers were disembarking, four Palestinian terrorists 
scaled the wall of Dubai International Airport, and opened gunfire on the British jet, which was 
fuelling. They injured an airhostess and an airport worker who were nearby.648 They boarded the 
jet, and flew the remaining passengers and crew to Libya.649 Then in 1977, Saif Said bin Ghubash, 
the UAE's first Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was assassinated by a gunman of Palestinian 
origins. Minister Ghubash had been escorting his Syrian counterpart, Abdul Halim Khaddam, in 
Abu Dhabi International Airport. As both ministers entered the Main Hall on their way to the 
departure lounge, the man attempted to assassinate the Syrian Minister and shot the UAE Minister 
by mistake. Ghubash was immediately taken to hospital but died of his injuries.650 
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On 28 March 2009, Sulaiman Madov, a Chechen military leader and government opponent, was 
assassinated as he was leaving his home in Dubai.651 He was shot inside the parking area in the 
building where he lived.652 Lt. Gen. Dahi Khalfan, the Dubai Police Commander, reported that the 
Chechen Vice-Prime Minister Adam Delimkhanov was the mastermind behind the 
assassination,653 while five others were the perpetrators.654 Two were arrested, one Iranian and 
another Tajik, while the other three, two Russians and a Kazakhstani, including the actual 
murderer, fled to Russia immediately after committing the crime.655 International arrest warrants 
were issued for the perpetrators by the UAE authorities through Interpol.656 
In 2009, the UAE security authorities foiled a terrorist plot that targeted the Dragon Mart, one of 
the biggest markets for the sale of Chinese products in Dubai. The UAE security forces arrested 
two Chinese men, members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is on the UN list of 
terrorist organizations. Members of this movement belong to the Uighurs Muslim minority in 
China, and most of them live in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, East Turkestan, which is calling 
for autonomy from China. The terrorists entered in UAE on 16 July 2009 to target Chinese interests 
in the country following unrest in Xinjiang.657 The Chinese market in UAE is one of the biggest 
in the world outside China.658 
On 19 January 2010, Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a senior Hamas military commander, was killed at 
Al-Bustan Rotana Hotel in Dubai. The crime was discovered the following day by room service at 
the hotel. At first, the security forces had no suspicions about his death, knowing nothing about 
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his identity. Al-Mabhouh earlier had entered the state with a passport that did not mention his 
position. He was found lying in bed with his medications by his side, and no traces of violence 
were noted. His hotel room was also locked from inside, so all the evidence pointed to natural 
death.659 Once the UAE security forces found his real identity, a serious investigation was carried 
out in the case.660 The body of Al-Mabhouh was subject to a post mortem, and it was found that 
he had been injected with succinylcholine, which is a strong sedative used in hospitals. Then he 
was suffocated using a pillow.661 The UAE security forces sought the help of the CCTV in Dubai 
International Airport and some hotels and shopping malls in Dubai, and gathered thousands of 
pictures before and after the crime was committed to solve the case. These images played a major 
part in solving the case.662 
A group of 28 suspects of different nationalities were found to have taken part in his 
assassination.663 In a press conference, Lieutenant General and Chief of the Dubai Police Force, 
Dahi Khalfan Tamim, reported that the assassins had come to Dubai on different flights from a 
number of European countries. Pictures were taken of them as they arrived in Dubai International 
Airport.664 Investigations revealed that 12 suspects held British passports, six held Irish passports, 
four held French passports, and three held Austrian passports, in addition to two Palestinians, and 
a German suspect.665 The analysis of the CCTV footage revealed the assassination plot. The 
assassination group resided in different hotels in Dubai. They went to the hotel, to wait for Al-
Mabhouh who was supposed to arrive at 14:12 but turned up at 15:25. Two of the group also went 
up in the same elevator with Al-Mabhouh to locate his room, after which the leader of the group 
booked the room opposite. The group closely monitored all parts of the hotel until Al-Mabhouh 
                                                          
659 Al Arabiya News. (7 March 2010). Dubai says Mabhouh betrayed by Hamas member. Available at: <URL: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/03/04/102144.html> Access Date: 3 November 2011. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Agarib, Amira. (1 March 2010). “Suspects in Mabhouh killing hiding in Israel”. Khaleej Times Online. Available 
at: <URL: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/theuae/2010/M 
arch/theuae_March20.xml&section=theuae> Access Date: 16 December 2011. 
662 Al Najami, Siham. (16 February 2010). “Video footage: Dubai to issue warrants for 11 in Hamas man's killing”.  
Gulf News Newspaper. Available at: <URL: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/crime/video-footage-dubai-to-issue-
warrants-for-11-in-hamas-man-s-killing-1.583814> Access Date: 16 December 2011. 
663 The Staff. (9 October 2011). “Mabhouh's killers could be executed in UAE”. Emirates 24/7 Newspaper. Available 
at: <URL: http://www.emirates247.com/crime/region/mabhouh-s-killers-could-be-executed-in-uae-2011-10-09-
1.422454> Access Date: 16 December 2011. 
664 Al Najami, Siham. (16 February 2010), op. cit. 
665Worth, Robert F. (24 February 2010). Inquiry Grows in Dubai Assassination. The New York Times. Available at: 
<URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/world/middleeast/25dubai.html> Access Date: 16 December 2011. 
167 
 
left at which stage the assassination group was divided into four groups inside the hotel. When Al-
Mabhouh returned to his room at 20:24, part of the assassination group, who were waiting in his 
room, attacked him. The whole group left the hotel at 20:52.666 The Israeli Institute for Intelligence 
and Special Operations, known as the Mossad, was accused of the murder, and international arrest 
warrants were issued against the suspects by the UAE security forces through Interpol.667 
Furthermore, the UAE has witnessed acts by international criminal gangs. On 15 April 2007, the 
House of Graff jewellers in Wafi Mall at Dubai, Dubai was robbed by the international ‘Pink 
Panther’ gang.668 The thieves entered the mall in cars during shopping hours,669 and threatened 
salesmen in the jewellery shop with weapons before stealing diamonds worth an estimated 
AED14.7million.670 According to Dubai Police, the robbery only lasted for one minute and 45 
seconds.671 Dubai Police also reported that the gangsters were from East Europe and entered the 
country with forged passports.672 However, Dubai Police recovered all the diamonds, and arrested 
the logistics person of the gang in UAE.673 Moreover, Dubai Police sent twelve DNA samples 
from the suspects to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), following which 
four were matched to samples from a robbery of a jewellery shop in Vaduz, the capital of 
Liechtenstein.674 It was later found that the perpetrators were an international gang, which was 
given the name Pink Panther by the British Police following the first robbery in the Mayfair area 
                                                          
666 YouTube. (24 June, 2014). “The murder of Mahmoud Al Mabhouh”. GulfNewsTV at YouTube. Available at: <URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJujIwtdk8w> Access Date: 16 December 2015. 
667 Borger, Julian  and  Tran, Mark. (18 February 2010). “Dubai police call on Interpol to help arrest Mossad head”. 
The Guardian. Available at: <URL:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/18/dubai-police-certain-mossad-
killing> Access Date: 16 December 2011. 
668 Issa, Wafa. (15 February 2011). “How Dubai heist was linked to Pink Panther gang”. The National Newspaper. 
Available at: <URL:http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/how-dubai-heist-was-linked-to-pink-panther-gang> 
Access Date: 3 November 2011. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Abdullah, Shadiah (8 June 2008). “Serb Sentenced to 10 Years in Jail for Wafi City Robbery”. Arab News. 
Available at: <URL: http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=24&section=0&article=110701&d=9& m=6&y=2008> 
Access Date: 3 November 2011. 
671 Al Theeb, Alia and Za'za', Bassam. (17 April 2007). “Dh50m worth of jewellery gone”. Gulf News Newspaper. 
Available at: <URL: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/crime/dh50m-worth-of-jewellery-gone-1.69026> Access 
Date: 3 November 2011. 
672 Al Theeb, Alia. (30 April 2007). Robbers used toy gun to pull off heist. Gulf News Newspaper. Available at: <URL: 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/crime/robbers-used-toy-gun-to-pull-off-heist-1.49760> Access Date: 3 November 
2011. 
673 Al Theeb, Alia. (30 April 2007). Crime Wafi robbery arrests. Gulf News Newspaper. Available at: <URL: 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/crime/wafi-robbery-arrests-1.49755> Access Date: 3 November 2011. 
674 Issa, Wafa. (15 February 2011). op. cit. 
168 
 
in London, 2003.675 The gang carried out about 120 raids on luxury shops in more than 20 
countries.676 Interpol believe that there might be up to 200 criminals in the gang; most of them 
Serbs with military experience.677 
On 16 November 2008, a Chinese businessman was kidnapped in Dubai by a Chinese mafia gang. 
The gang demanded a ransom of USD27million for his release, or otherwise he would be killed.678 
The UAE police investigations traced the hostage to an apartment in Ajman; the gangsters also 
had another place in one of the old Arabian homes in Fujairah. Dubai Police attacked both places 
at the same time after obtaining prosecution permission in UAE, and in coordination with Ajman 
and Fujairah Police forces. The kidnapped businessman was released and the eight gangsters, 
including a woman, were arrested inside the Ajman apartment. At the same time, the gang leader 
was arrested in Fujairah.679 
4.3.6 Economic Threats 
Macroeconomic stability is a key factor for creating the conditions for state institutions to operate 
successfully in terms of the Idea of the State. In the case of the UAE, the macroeconomic stability 
of the state is threatened in a number of ways. First, when there are long-term falls in oil prices. 
Second, if there is an internal security crisis. Third, in the case of insecurity in neighbouring states. 
These factors can result in the slowing of state spending on development projects and the related 
state sectors, as well as a slowdown in the financial and commercial markets because of weaker 
investor confidence. In turn, this will exacerbate the financial problems because of declining 
liquidity in the banking system. A contraction or slowdown in real GDP growth will reflect 
negatively on income levels as employment levels fall, reducing savings rates and falling private 
sector investment. Weakening macroeconomic conditions exacerbate the security, economic and 
social conditions in the country raising the threat of insecurity as workers take action through 
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strikes. Furthermore, in the UAE where the government has significantly raised living standards 
through high expenditure on education, housing and health care, austerity packages undermine the 
Idea of the State. The Constitution stipulates that the state shall provide the right to housing, health 
care and education free of charge for its citizens. Thus, fiscal cutbacks can undermine the state 
institutions that protect the interests of the citizens, which will result in threatening the stability of 
the state. 
A further economic threat is the high levels of money transfers by foreign residents in the UAE. 
The transfer of these remittances reduces liquidity in the banking system and foreign currency 
reserves, as well as curtailing economic growth through lower domestic spending. Fiscal policy in 
the UAE encourages foreign workers and foreign investors to transfer most of their savings from 
salaries, wages, investment returns and capital abroad, since such transfers are not subject to 
income tax, and there are no fees imposed on transfers outside the country.680 This occurs despite 
the fact that the UAE government has provided an investment environment for foreign residents 
on its territory, to invest their money and their savings in the state's economy. 
Meanwhile, the free zones in the UAE, despite of being one of the most successful free zones in 
the Middle East, can pose a threat to the security and stability of the state. This is because the local 
governments permit the companies operating in the free zones to employ non-Emirates, which 
could further exacerbate the demographic structure imbalance. According to the Alroeya 
Newspaper, the main reason that foreign investors establish companies in the free zones is to obtain 
residency visas, which are valid for three years, as opposed to two years for companies established 
outside the free zones. This is a more important consideration than the success of the company, 
since the procedures for establishing a company in the free zones is relatively easy, and the costs 
of establishment start from AED 25,000 plus an annual fee.681 
Finally, the real-estate sector, which is promoted as a key sector in each Emirate’s sustainable 
economic development plans, in relation to its role in supporting other productive and service 
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sectors. However, this focus on real estate as a driver of the economic growth does not actually 
achieve the sustainable development of the economies, as real estate is an infrastructural support 
for other economic sectors. Furthermore, it is exposed to high risks of supply exceeding demand.682 
Thus, the development of the real estate sector as a key rather than a supportive sector is liable to 
encourage high returns to investors only for short periods. Therefore, it will not have a positive 
role in sustainable economic development in the long run, but may actually be a hindrance to the 
growth of other sectors, which may be more important pillars in the process of sustainable 
development.683 
In summary, the discussion of the major threats to the physical base in the UAE demonstrates the 
interdependence of the elements of the physical base and their impact on the country’s national 
security. The threat posed to the territory of the UAE by Iran’s occupation of the three islands of 
Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunb is a destabilising tool used by Tehran. This is particularly 
the case because of Iran’s aggressive policy towards the region and its failure to respond to 
international efforts to resolve the issue. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear development programme, 
with plants such as Bushehr close to the Islands, poses an environmental threat to the UAE and 
neighbouring countries. If a nuclear accident or an earthquake hit these structures, it would have a 
devastating effect on the UAE’s environment, public health and the availability of clean water 
sources for desalination. Furthermore, the threats to the physical base in the UAE in the form of 
coordinated cyber-attacks on its e-infrastructure are not an immediate danger. However, the speed 
and size of a successful attack could affect the UAE’s stability and hence its existence. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The internal and external threats to the security of the UAE are presented in line with Buzan's 
hypothesis ‘the nature of the state’ in order to develop an understanding of the national security of 
the UAE within an established frame of reference. The threats to the various components of the 
hypothesis, and the idea of interdependencies between the various threats, relate strongly with 
Buzan’s proposition. The threats discussed are dynamic, interacting with each other as suggested 
by Buzan. For example, the effect of the current demographic imbalance and its negative 
                                                          
682 Bin Ghaith, Nasser. (2011). “Should the government save the real estate sector? (1/2)”. Darussalam.ae Website. 
Available at: <URL: http://www.darussalam.ae/print.asp?contentId=1300> Access Date: 28 August 2015. (In 
Arabic). 
683 Ibid. 
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implications for the UAE’s national identity (an essential component of the idea of state) is also a 
threat for the country’s long-term political stability. This is because the undermining of the 
traditional national identity is imminent due to tits heavy exposure to the cultures and identities of 
the majority migrant population in the UAE. Relatedly, the failure of the state to ensure that the 
education system underpins the traditional national identity is a further threat to the idea of the 
state in the UAE. The future may require a reshaping of the idea of state in order to encompass the 
foreign identities, which impact the other constituent parts of the state, namely the physical base 
and the institutions of the state.  
These threats are being exploited by forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda or IS, that 
are attempting to destabilize the institutional structure of the UAE. These groups have and are 
attempting to exploit the gaps created by the demographic imbalance. They have occasionally 
succeeded in building their networks and infiltrating the institutions (an essential component in 
expressing the existence of the state), aiming to destabilize the system and overthrow the existing 
power structures.  
Furthermore, Iran has threatened the physical base of the UAE in 1971 through its occupation of 
the three UAE islands in the Arabian Gulf. In addition, its nuclear program threatens the 
environment of the UAE. Furthermore, Tehran’s use of proxy battlefields in the region, such as in 
Syria, Iraq and Yemen, highlights the interdependency of the threats to the components of the idea 
of state as suggested by Buzan. This is also reflected in the imbalance in the demographic structure, 
which is an economic drain on the country when untaxed income is remitted in large volumes by 
the majority foreign population. This threatens the physical base of the UAE. 
In the final chapter, the preceding chapters are re-capped and the conclusion of the study is 
detailed, as well as recommendations provided for further research.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the national security of the UAE since independence 
in 1971. In this context, the study discusses and the policies adopted by the decision makers in the 
UAE to ensure the security of its citizens, the stability of the state and its impact on the ground. 
The study points to the presence of threats that affect the UAE’s national security, despite the 
promulgation of legislation and creation of institutions specifically designed to contend with such 
threats. In order to achieve the objective, two questions are answered. 1) What is the most 
appropriate theory by which to analyse the national security of the UAE? And 2) What are the 
major threats, which affect the elements of the UAE national security according to the selected 
theory of analysis?   
In order to answer these questions, the research is structured as follows. The study commences 
with a discussion on the relevancy of delinking the UAE’s national security from the Arab states’ 
national security, despite the similarities of effects. Thus, the first chapter stresses the importance 
of separating the formulation of the concept of Arab national security from that of the national 
security of UAE. However, this differentiation is controversial for a wide segment of Arab 
academic researchers, who consider the subject of national security of Arab Middle Eastern states 
as inseparable and interdependent and, therefore, each country’s national security should not be 
defined in isolation. 
This thesis also criticises the concept of interdependent Arab national security on the grounds that 
nations cannot be built solely on a populace linked by speaking one language, but it is based on 
several elements, including racial origins. Although the vast majority of the nationals of the 
Arabian Peninsula are of Arabic ethnicity, other Arab countries include different ethnicities, such 
as Armenians in Lebanon, Kurds and Turkmen in Iraq and Syria, and Amazigh and Berbers in 
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Thus, even if the populace of the various countries speak 
Arabic they are not all Arabs. Furthermore, the League of Arab States, which includes all the Arab 
countries in the Middle East, has never concluded an agreement between its members to unify their 
foreign policy in order to serve the interests of all Member States in the League. Members have 
concluded agreements for joint defence, in addition to economic and cultural cooperation, which 
are included under the framework of collective security but not Arab national security. In fact, the 
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agreements are tools used by the individual states to maintain their own national security. This is 
because any obligations under these agreements can be evaded if they conflict with the national 
interests of the state. Thus, the researcher addresses the subject of the national security of the UAE 
without succumbing to the prevailing thought in the Arab region in relation to the framework of 
the concept of the so-called Arab National Security. 
The second question is answered by exploring the literature on national security approaches and 
theories in chapter two. This is done in order to establish an analytical framework for the study. In 
undertaking the literature review, the lack dearth of academic research on the topic in relation to 
the UAE was highlighted. Nevertheless, the chapter reviews the interpretations of the four schools 
of international-relations theory—Realism, Constructivism, Liberalism and Copenhagen—about 
the behaviour of states towards the preservation of their national security. The discussion 
highlights that most of the hypotheses are not commensurate with the nature of the social, 
economic and political composition of UAE. This is because the four schools tend to analyse 
national security based on the norms of first-world countries. Furthermore, the analysis of the four 
schools is founded on a Western historical perspective with its social, political, strategic and 
geographical environment, which is significantly different from that existing in the Third World 
and developing countries, including the UAE. However, the researcher concludes that Buzan’s 
hypothesis from the Copenhagen School on the ‘Nature of the State’ takes into account the 
differing conditions in the Third World and developing countries. Thus, the study adopts this 
approach for the analysis of the national security of the UAE. 
The third question, which identifies the main components of the UAE’s national security based on 
Buzan’s hypothesis, is answered in chapter three. The chapter commences with an analysis of the 
UAE’s formation and the consequent creation of the political, social and economic structure of the 
country. These elements help to form the three pillars of Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis, 
namely: the idea of state; the physical base; and the institutions established to ensure the continuity 
and stability of the state. 
The three pillars of Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis are used in chapter four to analyse 
the types of internal and external threats to the UAE’s national security. Buzan’s proposition is 
closely related to the reality of the situation in the UAE, as the analysis links the various threats, 
which are dynamic and interrelated, to the components of the hypothesis. Nevertheless, the threats 
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highlighted in chapter four are not a definitive list as impact of one threat may create further 
unforeseen threats in the future. For example, the effect of the current demographic imbalance 
impacts the UAE’s national identity, an essential component in the idea of the state, and although 
a threat to the long-term political stability of the country is not a threat at present. A second effect 
of the imbalance is the economic drain because the majority foreign population remits untaxed 
income in huge volumes from the UAE. This threatens the physical base of the country. 
The threats to the idea of the state include the growing demographic imbalance, with UAE 
nationals accounting for less than 11% of the entire population. This imbalance has occurred 
because of the reliance on foreign workers to work on the huge economic development projects 
implemented by the government. The reliance on expatriate workers has turned the UAE turned 
into a de facto multicultural society. Thus, the transformation of a homogenous society to a 
multicultural society will result in a reconfiguration of the nation and what it stands for by 
redefining the idea of the state. Thus, the rest of the associated elements can be destabilized, which 
could lead to the collapse of the established society. In addition, Ministry of Education has failed 
to protect Emirati students from the influence of ideas atypical for their values, which may be 
gained through the curriculum of private schools within the state. The Private Education Law 
issued by the Council of Ministers obliges the Ministry of Education to approve the curricula of 
private schools in the UAE. However, the ministry is not carrying out its duties, under the pretext 
that there is not sufficient staff at the Ministry who have the necessary language skills to review 
the curriculums of the foreign schools. If the foreign curricula contain beliefs that depart from the 
national identity of the UAE, then it could result in the creation of generations who embrace 
ideologies that call for the demolition of the idea of the state. 
One of the threats to the institutions is the risk created by human rights organizations cooperating 
with extremist organizations who wish to overthrow the UAE regime. This is created by the proven 
lack of credibility of the reports issued by certain human rights associations. These reports have 
undermined external support for the government of the UAE and boosting the credibility of 
extremist organisations.  
Meanwhile, the hostile policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the UAE and its neighbours 
poses a threat to the physical base of the state. In particular, the Iranian regime rejects the UAE’s 
call for a peaceful solution to the issue of the island of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, 
175 
 
which were occupied by the Shah of Iran's regime in 1971. The UAE proposes a solution through 
bilateral negotiations between the two countries, referring the case to the International Court of 
Justice or resorting to international arbitration. In addition, the Iranian regime continues to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the regional countries through its clients and agents in order to protect its 
presence on the international scene. A further threat arises from the failure of neighbouring 
countries to control their land, sea and air borders with the UAE or the inadequate systems of 
certain countries regarding the issuance of travel documents. Most illegal infiltrators into the UAE 
come from the maritime border between the UAE and Iran, or the land and sea borders between 
the UAE and the Sultanate of Oman. In relation to passports, weak controls over the issuing of 
passports in a number of countries has been exploited by some intelligence agencies and 
international criminal organizations in order to use fake travel documents to enter the UAE in order 
to carry out criminal operations on its territory. In addition, in a number of countries, people 
deported from the UAE because of criminal activity can change their passports in their home 
country and therefore return to the UAE.  
Other factors that threaten the physical base of the state include the high levels of remittances by 
the expatriate workforce and investors without having paid taxes on their earnings. This curtails 
financial liquidity and foreign currency in the financial sector. In addition, the depletion of the 
already overstretched infrastructure, such as electricity production and water use, on expanding 
development projects, will add further pressure on these resources. A further factor is the inability 
to guarantee the security of the cyberspace of the state against the virtual attacks, including 
ensuring information. This is because of result of the constant evolution in information 
technologies and new methods developed to penetrate electronic systems. 
Furthermore, a number of environmental challenges pose a threat to the UAE physical basis. First, 
water shortage is a pressing and growing national security threat as pressure rises on the existing 
capacity to desalinate the seawater to meet the demands of the ever-expanding population. 
Furthermore, the desalination process poses a threat to salinity levels impacting negatively on 
marine life, which is a key element of the food chain in the UAE. The lack of natural alternatives 
of water sources is a time bomb for the national security of UAE. Second, the environmental threat 
from a nuclear accident is present, given Iran’s nuclear energy program. Third, air pollution levels 
have increased exponentially in the UAE as the number of cars and vehicles has increased with 
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the size and wealth of the population and the failure to provide a suitable public sector transport 
system. Although, different local authorities monitor the level of pollution in the Emirates 
measures to combat or reduce the effects of the emissions fall short. The number of respiratory 
diseases has increased in the recent years, which has elevated the pressure on medical resources. 
The UAE government is developing evolving policies to address these threats. Recent 
developments include the introduction of new legislation such as Federal Law No. 6 of 2009 
concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which aims to develop and regulate the nuclear 
sector within the UAE for peaceful purposes to meet future challenges of energy supply. In 
addition, Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 attempts to combat crimes in relation to the use of information 
technology. The Law includes articles that provide legal protection for the privacy of information, 
data and figures published and circulated on the information network. In addition, Federal Law 
No. 7 of 2014 addresses terrorist crimes, the threat of which have been exacerbated by the 
breakdown in security following the outbreak of Arab Spring in late 2010. For example, Islamic 
State controls significant territories in the Middle East, which have seen the destruction of the 
institutions of the countries, and the announcement of an Islamic Caliphate. This law adopts a 
comprehensive vision of terrorist crimes, their types, classifications, purposes, objectives, the 
relevant organizations and the penal limits in order to achieve security and stability in the state 
community. Finally, Federal Law No. 2 of 2015 attempts to combat discrimination and hatred. The 
Law prohibits abuse of the divine entity, religions, prophets, apostles, holy books, houses of 
worship, and discrimination based on religion, creed, doctrine, sect, race, colour, or ethnic origin. 
The law also criminalizes statements or actions by posting on information or communications 
networks, websites, or any readable, audio or video means that could provoke tensions between 
individuals or groups, in order to maintain the cohesion of community texture in the state. 
Furthermore, new institutions have been established to address relevant threats. These include the 
Higher National Security Council in 2006 to regulate and coordinate the work of the security 
services, and federal and local institutions concerned with maintaining the security and stability of 
the State, through four subsidiary bodies. In addition, the Federal Demographic Structure Council 
was created in 2009 to coordinate with the federal and local institutions and research centres in 
relation to the demographic structure of the UAE. The body is charged with establishing an 
integrated information base, which is to be the main source for decision-makers in addressing the 
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demographic imbalance while maintaining the focus on economic and social development. 
Furthermore, the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation was set up in 2009 to regulate the 
nuclear sector in order to ensure security and nuclear safety. Finally, in 2016, the Federal 
government introduced two new posts. The first is the Minister of Tolerance, who is tasked with 
consolidating tolerance as a fundamental value in the multi-cultural UAE community. It also 
introduced the post of State Minister of Happiness who has the task of harmonizing all plans, 
programs and policies of the State in order to achieve happiness for the community, thereby 
ensuring security and stability in the UAE. 
In conclusion, the challenges are still strong as there are gaps in implementing executive 
procedures because of a lack of effective coordination between different segments of the executive 
apparatus. This is particularly apparent between the local and federal authorities. For example, in 
the case of the education sector, the split between the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai has created 
two parallel legislative and organizational bodies within the Ministry of Education (MOE). The 
MOE supervises and legalizes the education system, with an emphasis on the national curricula. 
The diversification of the curriculum is not an issue in itself as long as there is agreement on the 
core value system, which represents the identity of the UAE. In this context, common identity and 
national history subjects have not yet been introduced despite the identity challenges facing the 
new generations. The problem is that a common approach to the core value system preserving the 
national identity and hence ensuring the nature of the state has not gained a consensus. 
5.1 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
Analysing the existing and potential threats to the UAE’s national security based on the established 
school of thoughts is challenging. The UAE has a unique existential structure and the pace of 
change and challenges that it has and is going through, makes it difficult for any referential theory 
to provide a complete answer. While Realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism theories may 
provide a degree of reference by which to analyse the threats, they fail to address the situation in 
the UAE. However, Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis (from the Copenhagen School), 
despite its controversial approach, can provide comprehensive reference of analysis for the UAE 
state nature. 
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The threats posing to the UAE national security when analysed from Buzan’s perspective are 
multidimensional. Buzan’s model of the stable state is comprised on three interrelated components: 
1) the idea of the state which comes as a result of a joint contract between a group of people who 
share the same culture, and perhaps the same race, gender or heritage to create a state that protects 
them and express their interests in the international arena; 2) the physical base of the state which 
includes its territory, its inhabitants, natural resources and human-made wealth; and 3) the 
institutions serving the interests of the state. Any threats to one of these three components are 
considered threats to the national security (see Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: National Security Threats Dynamics 
This research has established a referential framework for analysing the UAE’s national security 
according to Buzan’s hypothesis. This approach is the first of its kind undertaken of the UAE. The 
analytical framework could be used for similar studies on the national security of the other 
members of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) because of the similarity 
of their socio-political and economic environment. 
The research highlights the inapplicability of the major national security theories established in the 
West in relation to the Middle East. This is because of the complexity and differing natures of the 
geopolitical and socioeconomic environments of the region compared to the West. The more a 
theory is neutral and takes a global perspective relative to the generic compositions of states the 
easier it is to relate to the Middle East. This is the strength of Buzan’s theory. Further studies 
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tailored towards understanding the specifics of national security studies of the Middle East and the 
Gulf countries are needed.  
5.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The researcher encountered difficulty in finding literature relating directly to the national security 
of the UAE. This problem created an academic barrier that forced the researcher to use material of 
a more generic nature. As such, in order to establish a coherent understanding of the idea of the 
state, reviews of the education system, the institutional structure, and knowledge of the physical 
base of the UAE were undertaken. However, the lack of official statistics for the number of public 
and private schools in each of the seven Emirates meant that the researcher had to conduct field 
visits to all education zones in each Emirate in order to collect the relevant data. The Ministry of 
Education does not receive the data from private schools because of their autonomy from the 
Ministry, despite claims to the contrary by the Ministry of Education's Assistant Undersecretary 
for Private Education Affairs. The official stated that the Ministry received the statistics from all 
school districts and educational zones in the state periodically and added that it is available in the 
Department of Statistics in the Ministry.  
5.3 IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research does not provide the definitive list of threats to the UAE’s national security. 
However, it does shed light on areas for further research in terms of the potential threats and further 
assessments of the existing measures taken by the UAE’s state authorities to preserve its national 
stability. In particular, the researcher recommends further studies into future threats of an 
electronic nature. This is important because new technology has reshaped social interaction across 
the globe and provided unprecedented access to information. This access poses multidimensional 
threats to the national security, through economic threats in the form of fraud, theft of business 
secrets theft, and allowing terror groups to inculcate youngsters with radical ideologies, which 
threatens social stability. 
Furthermore, the researcher recommends conducting an in-depth study on the role of educational 
curricula on the national security of the state. The education system is not limited to promote 
loyalty to the state, but plays a prominent role in the development of countries’ economies. For 
example, Japan was able to advance economically after the destruction of its capabilities at the end 
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of World War II, but only after improving its education system. It is now a member of the Group 
of Seven major industrialized nations, thanks to its educational outcomes, which have successfully 
balanced economic development and maintaining its national identity. Japanese society, despite 
its huge economic and social change, still clings to its own language and traditions stretching back 
thousands of years. Therefore, it would be interesting to study this model within the frame of 
UAE’s national security. Finally, a similar approach in analysing the UAE’s national security in 
the light of Buzan’s theory is recommended for other Gulf countries.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Statement in Islah magazine 
“A statement to Muslims about death sentences against fighters Khaled Al-Islambouli and his 
brothers.” 
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Translated into English: “A statement to Muslims about death sentences on fighters Khaled Al-
Islambouli and his brothers.” 
Behold, God has given the believers their lives and their possessions, promising them paradise in 
return, [and so] they fight in God’s cause, and slay, and are slain: a promise which in truth He has 
willed upon Himself in [the words of] the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur’an. And who could 
be more faithful to his covenant than God? Rejoice, then, in the bargain which you have made with 
Him: for this, this is the triumph supreme!" God Almighty has spoken the truth. 
If there is anything at all for Egypt to be proud of, it would be sufficient honour and pride for her 
that she had among her sons, those who are facing strong injustice and stand up to restrain tyrants 
valiantly, turning away from this world pleasures, seeking to die for the sake of God, nothing ever 
scares them from obeying and applying the orders of God and fearing no one but Him. 
Whenever another Pharaoh appears to tyrannize over Egypt, to become unfair and despotic and 
behave arrogantly or tyrannically, God sends from its people those who correct the wrong and end 
the corruption in its lands. And whenever diseases become entrenched, affliction spreads and 
enemies combine to attack it, advocates for God emerge in the arena, in which they are ready with 
the righteous word, seeking God’s word, combating the falsehood, fighting it for the sake of God. 
Thus, while “some of them have died and some are still waiting to follow the same path, and they 
never changed their oath that they made to God.”  
When the country was opened to the Jews and corruption spread throughout Egypt as miscreants 
controlled every part of its land, it was incumbent upon the people of righteousness to remove the 
evil by their own hands after all other ways have been closed to them. Muslim preachers and 
religious men have been sent to the darkness of prisons without committing any fault except for 
not submitting to Jews and refusing to surrender to the enemies of God and the enemies of Egypt. 
It happened that the great Mujahid Khaled Islambouli and his righteous brother mujahideen 
sacrificed themselves for the sake of God Almighty in response to His orders to uphold His Word. 
It happened that God’s will was fulfilled when Anwar Sadat was executed at the hands of these 
young believers after he challenged the Supreme Being, disputed and shared God Almighty in his 
pride and superciliousness with all effrontery and tyranny, sending thousands of innocent people 
to prison, preventing and restricting the freedom of Muslims and their mosques, and after he 
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rubbed Egypt’s face in the dirt by accepting to submit and lie down in the face of the enemies of 
God.  
Whatever is said about the legality of the assassination, it remains clear that those who took 
retribution against the tyrant are well aware of the large responsibility and its great sensitivity, so 
they strived and died, and therefore gained the divine reward. They were keen—even according to 
the testimony of their opponents—not to target others, only the evil head, even though they were 
able to target more people. However, they had a genuine commitment to the order of God, who 
ordered believers to not to kill a soul without a just cause such as a legal punishment for murder 
or for causing corruption on earth. However, Sadat was a person who killed innocent souls using 
mock trials, and spread corruption on earth and betrayed the Muslim nation; accordingly, he 
deserved death since Egypt is worthy of life. 
Islambouli and his brothers only applied the rules of fairness and smashed the falsehood. 
Therefore, they fought for the holiest thing of Egypt, for its religion, because the rulers of Egypt 
should have not descended on this dangerous slope, which caused their deceased ruler to succumb 
to that fate,who only scourged Egypt since the era of the former tyrant Nasser. 
The death penalties issued against these honourable brave men are a stigma on the history of the 
ruling regime in Egypt, with its injustice and flagrant arbitrariness, which led to the withdrawal of 
all litigants from the courtroom. Throughout the trial, the rights of those righteous men were 
aggressively denied. The statements of the Minister of Defence and the press of the regime about 
sentencing them to death issued before the end of the trial made the trial a farce, like the previous 
trials of martyrs Abdulkadir Ouda, Sayyid Qutb, Shukri Mustafa and their brethren. 
The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe sent many messages to the Egyptian President 
denouncing the trial of these young believers before a military court and these unfair sentences 
against them. It invites all who care about Egypt as a Muslim nation to join their call for the 
abolition of these unfair rules and sentences and claim for not litigating against these mujahideen 
unless before a court that they accept. 
We ask Almighty God for Egypt to be united by the pillars of justice under the Qur’anic guidelines 
and laws; by which people never fear the absolutism of a ruler over them while the ruler never 
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fears the fury of his people by the ruling nor the ruling fury of the parish, while all people are equal 
before the Law, no matter what their position in society. 
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe 
London on 14 Jumada al-Awwal, 1402 A.H.684 [9 March 1982]. 
The Islah magazine, Issue 50, 1982. 
  
                                                          
684 Hijri Calendar [A.H. or Anno Hegirae] is the Islamic calendar adopted by Muslims, which is based on the lunar 
calendar, by which the Muslims determine the times of festivals and the month of fasting each year. It began with the 
year in which the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) migrated from Mecca to Medina, which was a turning 
point in the message for the Islamic religion and of which it was possible to end with the killing of the Prophet in 
Mecca at the hands of opponents to his message. 
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Appendix 2:685 Interview 1 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Huda Ali Bin Salem Al Zaabi 
Head of Applied Sciences in Curriculum Department 
UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Dubai  
Date: 30 March 2011 
INTERVIEWER: Who are the people that write the national education curricula? 
INTERVIEWEE:  
x Curricula specialists of the Curricula Department in the Ministry of Education. 
x University Professors. 
x Subject teachers and instructors. 
x Members of different social organizations in the state.  
x 90% of those who write and create the curricula are Emiratis and only 10% are foreigners.  
INTERVIEWER: What are the main objectives of the National Education Curriculum [ie achieve 
a national identity related to the UAE] that are to be deeply rooted in the students?  
INTERVIEWEE: 
1. Students should express their identity and belonging to the UAE, and shall care for the 
positive aspects in the national culture, and shall learn how to preserve the UAE community 
as an Arabic Islamic community (national identity). 
                                                          
685 Interviews with Educationalists are brief due to the survey’s limited questions. 
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2. Students shall recognize the importance of the government and should be able to 
distinguish between the different roles played by the different political institutions in the 
state. Students should also develop their knowledge about the characteristics of the UAE 
federal regime (the state and the government).  
3. Students should gain greater knowledge about the regulations, rules, and systems at home, 
at school, and in the community, and should be able to understand how laws are enacted 
and how they operate in UAE. They should also get to know more about the role of laws 
in protecting and regulating the community (the law).  
4. Students should acknowledge their rights and obligations and should be able to observe 
human rights in general, as well as the rights and obligations of children. They should be 
taught how to accept the views of others and to respect the views of the majority and act 
upon the same (rights and obligations). 
5. Students should take part in work at home and school and should protect the environment 
from the different sources of pollution, in addition to being committed to active 
participation in the students’ groups (active participation). 
6. Students should be able to recognize the basic concepts of a developing economy, and 
should identify the main economic values required to achieve social development, in 
addition to identifying the basic concepts of the economic system in the UAE (National 
Economy). 
INTERVIEWER: Is the curricula of National Identity being taught at all stages in the government 
schools?  
INTERVIEWEE:  
x No. It is taught in the first, second, third, seventh, eighth, and ninth grades.  
x The National Education Document was developed in 2009, in the light of which national 
identity books are written from the kindergarten stage through to high school.  
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Appendix 3: Interview 2 
Interviewee: Mr Brian Fox  
 Division Manager for Licensing & Accreditation 
 Abu Dhabi Education Council 
Location: Abu Dhabi 
Date: 3 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in Emirate of Abu Dhabi?  
INTERVIEWEE: There are 184 private schools in Emirate of Abu Dhabi.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in private schools in Abu Dhabi in the 
school year 2010/11?  
INTERVIEWEE: The total number of private school students in Abu Dhabi is 175,000 students, 
and national students comprise 31% of the total number of students in private schools.  
INTERVIEWER: Are the statistics about the number of students in the private and government 
schools being sent to the Ministry of Education?  
INTERVIEWEE: Statistics are not sent to the Ministry of Education, as Abu Dhabi Education 
Council is independent from the Ministry of Education.  
INTERVIEWER: Are licenses being granted to private schools in Abu Dhabi according to the 
Private Schools Regulations issued according to the Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008? 
INTERVIEWEE: Educational licenses are being granted to the private schools in Abu Dhabi 
according to the rules and regulations of Abu Dhabi Education Council, which conforms with the 
Private Schools Regulations issued upon the Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008.  
INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in Abu Dhabi commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private 
Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be 
approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner 
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consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include 
Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools are committed to teaching the three compulsory subjects 
from Grade one until Grade 12.  
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Appendix 4: Interview 3 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Farida Mohammed Mahmud 
 Private Education Section 
 Sharjah Educational Zone 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Sharjah 
Date: 7 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Sharjah?    
INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Sharjah has 77 private schools.  
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Appendix 5: Interview 4 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Musa Gharib 
 Chief of Private Education Section 
 Ajman Educational Zone 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Ajman 
Date: 10 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Ajman?    
INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Ajman has 22 private schools.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 
2010/11?  
INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 01,602.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the 
Emirate?  
INTERVIEWEE: The total number is0,141 students.   
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent 
periodically to the Ministry of Education?  
INTERVIEWEE: Each school year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of 
Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations.    
INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Ajman commit to Article 12 stipulated in 
the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools 
shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner 
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consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include 
Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools comply totally with this matter.  
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Appendix 6: Interview 5 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Thuraya Al Kharji 
 Chief of Private Education Section 
 Umm Al Quwain Educational Zone 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Umm Al Quwain 
Date: 10 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Umm Al Quwain?    
INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Umm Al Quwain has five private schools.   
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 
2010/11?  
INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 6,717.    
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the 
Emirate?   
INTERVIEWEE: The total number is216 students.   
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent 
periodically to the Ministry of Education?  
INTERVIEWEE: Each school year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of 
Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations.  
INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Umm Al Quwain commit to Article 12 
stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in 
these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and 
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taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The 
curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance 
with Ministry guidelines”? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools totally comply with this matter.  
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Appendix 7: Interview 6 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Salem Saif Al Jaber 
 Chief of Private Education Section 
 Ras Al Khaimah Educational Zone 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Ras Al Khaimah 
Date: 11 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah?    
INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah has 24 private schools.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 
2010/11?  
INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 17,279.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in private schools in the Emirate?  
INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 3,347 students.  
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in private schools being sent 
periodically to the Ministry of Education?  
INTERVIEWEE: Each school year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of 
Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations. 
INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah commit to Article 12 
stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in 
these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and 
taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The 
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curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance 
with Ministry guidelines”?  
INTERVIEWEE: As a matter of fact, during the inspection campaigns carried out on private 
schools in the Emirate, some violations on the part of private schools in the Emirate were revealed. 
The Ministry earlier approved the admission of Arab students in three Indian schools in the Emirate 
of Ras Al Khaimah upon certain terms and conditions. The most important of which was that Arab 
students are to be taught the Ministry curricula in three subjects, namely: Arabic, Islamic 
Education, and Sociology, according to the number of sessions given in the government schools, 
i.e. 9 to 13 sessions. The three schools approved such conditions and implemented the same. 
However, they violated the conditions due to the difficulty presented in coordinating two different 
curricula. Normally, the Indian curriculum is heavy and long and hence requires more sessions. 
Furthermore, teaching the compulsory subjects according to the Ministry curricula exerted 
significant pressure on the schools. Thus, one of them chose not to accept Arab students, while the 
other two reduced the sessions of the three compulsory subjects (Arabic, Islamic studies, and social 
studies). Both schools assigned the computer teacher to teach sociology. Thus, Ras Al Khaimah 
Educational Zone stopped admission of Arab students in the Indian schools in the Emirate for 
failing to abide by the terms and conditions laid by the Ministry of Education, and due to their 
delay in correcting the violations recorded by the zone.  
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Appendix 8: Interview 7 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Sulaiman Salem Sulaiman 
 Chief of Private Education Section 
 Fujairah Educational Zone 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Fujairah 
Date: 12 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Fujairah?    
INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Fujairah has 12 private schools.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 
2010/11?  
INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 11,521.  
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the 
Emirate?  
INTERVIEWEE: The total number is0,112 students.   
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent 
periodically to the Ministry of Education?  
INTERVIEWEE: Each school calendar year, we are committed to sending statistics about the 
number of Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry 
regulations.  
INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Fujairah commit to Article 12 stipulated in 
the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools 
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shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner 
consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include 
Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?   
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools totally comply with this matter.  
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Appendix 9: Interview 8 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Fatima Alnasser 
 Strategy Development Associate  
 The Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) 
Location: Dubai  
Date: 17 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in Emirate of Dubai?  
INTERVIEWEE: There are 146 private schools in Emirate of Dubai.  
INTERVIEWER: How many students are there in all the private schools in Dubai for the school 
year 2010/11?  
INTERVIEWEE: Statistics are not ready to be publicized. (Note: It was only two months until the 
end of term).  
INTERVIEWER: What is the number of Emirati students in the Private schools in Dubai? 
INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 27,011 students for the school year 2010/11, but those are 
initial numbers.  
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics for the number of students in the private and government schools 
being sent to the Ministry of Education?  
INTERVIEWEE: Data about the private schools in Dubai are being collected through Knowledge 
and Human Development Authority (KHDA), and then statistics are sent to the Ministry of 
Education. As for the government schools, data are collected through the Ministry of Education in 
coordination with the KHDA and then a copy of the statement is sent to the KHDA.  
INTERVIEWER: Are licenses being granted to private schools in the Emirate of Dubai according 
to Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008 regulating Private Schools system? 
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INTERVIEWEE: Educational licenses are being granted to private schools in Dubai according to 
the rules and regulations of the KHDA, which conforms to the Private Schools Regulations issued 
upon Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008.  
INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi commit to Article 12 stipulated 
in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools 
shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner 
consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include 
Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?  
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools totally comply with this matter.  
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Appendix 10: Interview 9 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Sheikha Khulood Al Qasimi 
 The Director of the Curriculum Department 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Dubai  
Date: 24 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: What are the standards and conditions imposed on selecting school textbooks in 
private schools in the UAE?  
INTERVIEWEE: School textbooks and curricula must:  
x Eliminate all texts, names, animation, picture, or data that do not conform to the laws 
imposed by UAE and the traditions, national, religious and social values of the UAE 
community.  
x Eliminate of all flags, symbols and slogans of countries and organizations that do not share 
normal relations with UAE. 
x Eliminate anything that might offend Allah, Prophets and Messengers, the Divine 
Religions, and all that has to do with UAE.  
x Eliminate all subjects that deal with life practices that do not conform to the UAE Arab 
Muslim community (alcoholic drinks, drugs, etc.)  
x Comply with the publication laws applicable in UAE. 
x Conform to the curricula stipulated in the school license (British, American, Indian, 
Pakistani, Philippine, German, etc.), and the other curricula applicable in private schools.  
INTERVIEWER: Does the Curriculum Department in the Ministry review all the books of foreign 
curricula before approving them to be used in private schools? 
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INTERVIEWEE: The Curriculum Department reviews the books being taught in private schools, 
which adopt the Ministry of Education curriculum. However, it does not review foreign books 
being taught in private schools, which adopt a foreign curriculum. The Ministry sets out to its rules 
and regulations on the school textbooks and curricula to be used as a pre-condition for private 
schools applying for license. Thus, upon receiving complaints from students or parents about any 
mistakes or notes included in the curricula of private schools, these are investigated by the Private 
Schools Inspection and Supervision Office in the Ministry of Education. If any violations are 
proven, the schools are sanctioned according to the Private Schools Regulations.  
INTERVIEWER: Are those working in the Curriculum Department qualified to review the foreign 
curricula?  
INTERVIEWEE: We do not have sufficient qualified resources in the Ministry capable of 
reviewing the dozens of books and curricula in foreign languages, to ensure that they conform to 
the standards and regulations laid down by the Ministry and to approve the teaching in the private 
foreign schools. This requires the presence of a huge number of Emiratis with B.Sc.s in Education, 
and who are fluent in the relevant foreign languages (English, French, German, Russian, Japanese, 
Urdu, etc.).  
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Appendix 11: Interview 10 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: H.E. Ali Mehad Al Suwaidi 
 The Acting Director General 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Dubai 
Date: 24 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: Are you confident that there are no ‘hidden curriculum’ in the curricula taught 
in foreign private schools, especially as there is no review whatsoever on your part of the foreign 
books being taught at private schools in the UAE? 
INTERVIEWEE: Firstly, I do agree with you on this point; however, what we have to understand 
is that foreign books are not the only tool for penetrating and affecting Emirati students negatively. 
We actually do not know what happens inside the classroom after the foreign teacher closes the 
door on the students. Hence, we mainly depend on the students and their parents to report any 
violations in the books being taught in private schools. We also mainly rely on them to report any 
violations on the part of foreign teachers inside classrooms.  
INTERVIEWER: What methods are adopted by the Ministry of Education to protect Emirati 
students in private schools from being exposed to missionary or semi-missionary thoughts or from 
receiving indirect messages that criticize and question the customs, traditions, and moral values of 
their community? During my field visits to the educational zones in the UAE, I found that there 
are about 100 Emirati students registered at St. Mary’s Catholic High School in Fujairah. Upon 
asking the Chief of Private Education in Fujairah educational zone about them, he told me that the 
number of Emirati students at this school could easily multiply if it were not for the limited spaces 
in school due to the high turnover in registration; the school teaches the British curriculum.  
INTERVIEWEE: The responsibility of the Ministry within the private school is to commit to 
teaching Emirati and other Arab students the Ministry curricula in three core subjects, including 
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their mother language and Islamic religion, as these play a role in maintaining their language, 
religion, and identity. Moreover, all private schools in UAE are committed to raising the state flag 
and playing the national anthem in morning assemblies. In addition, on finding any violations in 
private schools, for example failing to teach the compulsory curricula of the three subjects 
according to the Ministry’s terms and conditions, or if the private schools teach curricula that do 
not agree with the rule and regulations set by the Ministry of Education, penal measures are taken 
until the violations are corrected.  
Meanwhile, the responsibility outside the private schools lies principally with the parents of the 
citizen students who voluntarily send their children to private schools. We depend on parents to 
guide and advise their children to hold on to their identities, values, and religion. Most foreign 
private schools celebrate occasions that contradict our culture and religion, such as Christmas, 
Easter, and Thanksgiving. For example, I always advise my grandchildren who study in private 
schools to hold on to their customs and traditions and to the teachings of Islam.  
INTERVIEWER: The Minister of Education reported to Gulf News [ a popular newspaper] that 
the Ministry has no authority over private schools located in Abu Dhabi and Dubai due to the 
independence of both Abu Dhabi Educational Council and Knowledge and Human Development 
Authority (KHDA) of Dubai. What is their authority?   
INTERVIEWEE: The Minister meant that the Ministry has no organizational and administrational 
authority to regulate the work of private schools in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Both Abu Dhabi 
Educational Council and the Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) of Dubai 
have independent powers over private schools in their zones. Both have educational strategies in 
their local governments. However, the Ministry of Education respects their vision, and we may 
also make use of similar strategies, if they are successful, in other zones.  
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in private and government schools 
being sent by Abu Dhabi Educational Council and KHDA to the Ministry of Education on a regular 
basis?  
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, annual statistical lists containing the number of students are usually sent 
by all educational zones in the United Arab Emirates to the Ministry of Education.   
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Appendix 12: Interview 11 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Anonymous 
 UAE Ministry of Education 
Location: Dubai 
Date: 24 April 2011 
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools in the Emirate of 
Sharjah for the school year 2010/11?  
ANONYMOUS: The confirmed number of students is 120,430.   
INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the 
emirate?  
ANONYMOUS: The total number is 15,519 students.   
INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent 
periodically to the Ministry of Education?  
ANONYMOUS: Each school year, the Ministry receives the statistics from Sharjah Educational 
Zone.  
INTERVIEWER: Do the private schools in the Emirate of Sharjah commit to Article 12 stipulated 
in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools 
shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner 
consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include 
Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?  
ANONYMOUS: Yes, I know the private schools totally comply with Article 12.   
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Appendix 13: Interview 12 
Transcript translated from Arabic 
Interviewee: Tharwat El-Kherbawy 
 A former Muslim Brotherhood member in Egypt 
 Author of The Secret of the Temple 
Location: Abu Dhabi 
Date: 24 February 2013 
INTERVIEWER: What is the approach of ‘Cessation and Ascertaining’ that has been pursued by 
Shukri Mustafa (the Spiritual Father of the current Muslim Brotherhood Leader, Mohammed 
Badie) and his group? 
INTERVIEWEE: Shukri Mustafa and his group believe that all human beings in the world are 
infidels, because they are not ruled by sharia (Islamic Law), while they believe that Islam has been 
absent from the world since the end of ‘The Rightly-Guided Islamic Caliphate’ in the year of 661. 
They believe that Muslim rulers who do not rule by sharia are definitely infidels, as well as their 
populaces, because they are content and allow that to take place. Moreover, they consider Muslim 
scholars as infidels because they have not declared their rulers and their people disbelievers. Shukri 
Mustafa and his group anathematize all persons whom they introduced to their thoughts who then 
refused or disapproved of the thought, or those who accepted their thoughts but refused to join 
their group and pay allegiance to their leader. In addition, they consider a person who joined their 
group and left it as an infidel.  
INTERVIEWER: Did Mohammed Badie, the current leader [at that time], visit Yemen?  
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, he settled in Yemen from 1979 to 1985; and during this period, he travelled 
to Afghanistan several times during the fight against the Soviet Union there.  
INTERVIEWER: Has Ayman al-Zawahiri been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1975 to 1979. 
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INTERVIEWER: Did Osama bin Laden join the Muslim Brotherhood as a member? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood [he was introduced] by Manea Qattan, 
the first Egyptian Chief for the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Saudi Arabia and then he 
became a disciple of Dr. Abdullah Azzam, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in 
Jordan, who was residing in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. 
INTERVIEWER: Is al-Qaeda subordinated to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Muslim 
Brotherhood organization is affiliated to al-Qaeda? 
INTERVIEWEE: Al-Qaeda is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, the same as 
Hamas, but the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood is a secret unlike the 
relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
 
